Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 8 July 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a higher number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the previous day, with violence focusing around Donetsk city, Yasynuvata and Svitlodarsk. In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded two ceasefire violations in one location. It followed up on reports of shelling in Novooleksandrivka, Kalynove and Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, observing weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines and the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone, including in residential areas. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure in Pryshyb, Shchastia, and Krasnyi Lyman. It monitored also the situation of internally displaced persons in Odessa.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the previous day,[1] most of which in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north of Donetsk), where the SMM heard 103 undetermined explosions 1-5km north, west and north-west. Between 16:00 and 16:30, the SMM heard 71 undetermined explosions, heard and saw more than 100 air bursts, and heard uncountable overlapping bursts and single shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-7km west-south-west, west and north-north-west of its position.

In Donetsk city centre the SMM heard, on the night of 7 to 8 July, 59 undetermined explosions 8-15km north and north-west of its position. Whilst at the Donetsk central railway station, the SMM heard and saw one impact (from an unknown weapon) 2-3km north-north-west, and heard 26 undetermined explosions, 92 bursts and 14 single shots of small-arms fire mainly 2-8km north, north-east, north-west, and north-north-west of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard between 22:04 and 22:35 on 7 July, 23 undetermined explosions, 11 explosions assessed as 82mm mortar round impacts, and 28 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and anti-aircraft (ZU-23, 23mm) fire 6-10km west, west-north-west, and north-north-west of its position.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard, during the night of 7 July, 12 undetermined explosions, 15 explosions assessed as artillery (152mm) impacts and ten explosions assessed as caused by outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher rounds 4-6km north-east of its position. The following day, between 17:00 and 17:25, the SMM heard 42 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (82mm) 600 to 800 meters south-south-east of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded during the night of 7 June four undetermined explosions, one impact of an unknown weapon type, and 11 bursts of direct tracer fire from west to east, two from south to north-north-east, two from north to south-south-west and one from east to south-west.

Aerial surveillance available to the SMM revealed more than 350 impacts along the highway south-east of government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as caused between 27 June and 6 July by undetermined weapons fired from a southerly direction.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted a calm situation. In government-controlled Novozvanivka (71km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two distant undetermined explosions.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In Novooleksandrivka (66km west of Luhansk), four residents (two men and two women, in their fifties and sixties) showed the SMM five craters, which they said had been caused by shelling during the night of 6-7 July, and an unexploded rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) on the ground. The SMM assessed the craters to be fresh, but could not determine the type or direction of fire. In the southern part of “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two fresh craters assessed as caused by recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire from a south-westerly direction. The SMM also observed that an “LPR” position in that area had been reinforced with a recoilless gun (SPG), oriented towards the west, and an armoured personnel carrier (APC; MT-LB) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun. Following reports by the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north of Luhansk) of shooting at one of their advanced positions near the bridge during the night, the SMM observed fresh craters assessed as caused by grenade launcher (AGS-17) rounds and holes caused by small-arms fire. A soldier showed the SMM an unexploded rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) on the side of the road.

In government-controlled Lopaskyne (24km north-west of Luhansk), five men (between 30 and 60 years old) told the SMM that during the night a Ukrainian Armed Forces military minivan had exploded on the road between Lopaskyne and government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). They showed the SMM photos of the scene, based on which the SMM assessed that the explosion was likely caused by a landmine. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the Trokhizbenka checkpoint confirmed that the incident took place, saying that it most likely was caused by a landmine.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed, in “DPR”-controlled areas, three howitzers (D-30, 122mm) towed by three of a convoy of five military-type trucks south of Khartsyzk (26km north-east of Donetsk), heading west; and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by military-type trucks near Kolosnykove (20km north-east of Donetsk), heading west.

The SMM also observed heavy weapons in areas known to the SMM, which it could not verify as withdrawn as they do not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 36 towed guns (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), including 18 observed for the first time, 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), and four mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm). The SMM noted as missing 18 towed guns (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), 26 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), three towed anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm) first observed missing on 6 April, four surface-to-air missiles (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) first observed missing on 2 March, and two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) first observed missing on 19 April. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed ten mortars (PM-38, 120mm), including one observed for the first time, and 13 towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm), four of which observed for the first time. The SMM noted as missing two mortars (PM-38, 120mm) (one first observed missing on 29 June and the other on 8 July), and one towed howitzer (D-30, 122mm) first observed missing on 8 July.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft weapons and other hardware in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw a light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a 12.7mm heavy machine-gun and a camouflaged armoured combat vehicle at a checkpoint near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk); an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) on 7 July; and a cargo helicopter, assessed as MI-8, flying west of a factory in Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk), all on 7 July. On 8 July, in government-controlled areas the SMM observed an APC (BRDM-2) between houses in a residential area in Zolote-3; an APC (BRDM-2) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BTR-4) both stationary in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); two APCs (BRDM-2) 2km east of Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk), moving east; an IFV (BMP-2) heading south-west in Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and a stationary APC (BTR-80) in the same city; and a light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun in Lopaskyne. In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) towed by a military-type truck heading south in Luhansk city; as well as two APCs (MT-LB) mounted with an anti-aircraft gun in Kalynove.

Aerial surveillance available to the SMM revealed the presence of two armoured vehicles (undetermined type) near Svitlodarsk, and four armoured vehicles near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), both on 6 July.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. In “LPR”-controlled Pryshyb (33km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and preparatory works for further repairs and installation of a gas pipeline. Workers of the gas company informed the SMM that some 500 people - who have had no gas supply in their homes for two years due to shelling damage - would benefit from the current repair works. The demining team concluded the demining work. The SMM monitored from both sides of the contact line repair work on the water turbines in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and repair of the water and gas pipelines in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At a “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed 253 cars and three buses heading towards government-controlled areas, as well as 68 cars and one bus queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM also noted 21 trucks from the “Rinat Akhmetov Foundation” queuing to enter non-government-controlled areas. Ten civilians, queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas said that it took up to six hours to pass the checkpoint; while people waiting in the “priority line” for the elderly, disabled and people travelling with small children, said that the average waiting time was about one hour. At a government checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), civilians complained about lack of potable water and shade. At the first government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 80 to 100 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 20 people queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM noted that the average waiting time to enter government-controlled areas was 40 minutes.

Residents in government-controlled Katerynivka (62km west of Luhansk) complained of additional restrictions to their movement. They told the SMM that pedestrians had to take a longer route across the village forcing them to pass through the local checkpoint to reach Zolote-3, south of Katerynivka, because a recently built trench had blocked the regular direct route. The SMM observed a new trench and a new military position beyond the trench blocking the dirt track mentioned by the residents that linked Katerynivka with government-controlled Zolote-3.

In Odessa the SMM monitored the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs). On 7 July the SMM followed up on reports of mainly IDPs, but also Odessa self-defence members and Anti-Terrorism Operations (ATO) veterans, occupying an unfinished U-shaped apartment building belonging to the Odessa regional council. The SMM saw one security guard at the main gate of the building. Being led through the building by a young man who identified himself as an IDP, the SMM noted that some door locks of apartments had been recently replaced. A middle-aged female IDP, who introduced herself as the co-ordinator of the initiative, said that IDPs (previously reported as some 100 people) were planning to stay at the site until they were given permanent accommodation in Odessa city. The SMM noted not more than 25 people (men, women and children) on two separate visits at the building. A self-defence leader told the SMM by telephone that he and three other activists, as well as ten ATO veterans were also living in the building, adding that they took turns guarding it.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, an armed “LPR” member denied the SMM access to the bridge as it did not share its patrol plan. He also insisted that it had to be presented in the Russian language. Further he requested and took notes of the SMM IDs. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).
• Armed men at a “DPR” checkpoint at the western entrance of Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) allowed the SMM to travel through the village, but insisted that it cannot stop there. Later at the same checkpoint, armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to stop in the village, but without deviating from the main road.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. * Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.