Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 6 November 2015

This Report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including its Addendum. The SMM’s monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The SMM observed explosions and gunfire from its position at Donetsk railway station. “LPR” members prevented the SMM from accessing border areas not controlled by the Government in Luhansk region, in violation of both the SMM mandate and the Addendum.

Whilst at the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city), between 07:45 and 15:20hrs, the SMM recorded a total of 52 explosions at locations ranging from 4 to 7km north-east and north-west of its position as well as 15 heavy machine-gun bursts 4 to 7km north-north-west and east-south-east from its position[1]. While at an observation post near Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), between 12:15 and 12:20hrs, the SMM heard several single shots from small arms and several machine-gun bursts 2km north-east of its position. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces training ground near Vodiane (government-controlled, 15km north-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed a small-arms training. While in the village of Opytne (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard four explosions, which the SMM assessed to be related to demining activities. During that time, the SMM also heard bursts of small arms fire. The SMM heard a number of explosions in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), Hrodivka (40km north-west of Donetsk) and Ivanivka (37km north-west of Donetsk), as well as small-arms bursts in the area of government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol).

Following up on reports of shelling at three locations in Krasnohorivka, the SMM observed one fresh impact crater in the town. The SMM conducted a crater analysis and assessed that it had been caused by an 82mm mortar and was likely fired from the east. While at the site, the SMM observed a large fire and a lot of smoke some 600-1000m east of its position. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer suggested that this fire was caused by automatic grenade launcher impacts, which had occurred some 30mins prior to the SMM’s arrival. At 14:34hrs, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact about 1-1.5km south of its position, and left the area due to security considerations. At the two other locations in the town, the SMM observed impact craters and no shrapnel. As a consequence the SMM was unable to assess the site properly.

In government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed five Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers attending to an injured fellow soldier. The Ukrainian Armed Forces head of the JCCC office in Marinka later informed the SMM that two soldiers had been injured in the area earlier that day as a result of triggering a tripwire explosive device in the northern outskirts of Marinka.

At a government checkpoint near Berezove (32km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed that new mine warning signs had been installed near the tree line on both sides of the checkpoint. At a government checkpoint near government-controlled Buhas (46km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 25 trucks with “Rinat Akhmetov Foundation” markings waiting to proceed north.

At a government checkpoint in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a line of 469 civilian vehicles on the government-controlled side and 503 civilian vehicles on the other side.

The SMM visited the eastern outskirts of government-controlled Novotroitske (38km south-west of Donetsk) for the first time. During the visit, the SMM observed several destroyed houses and spoke with a male resident (aged 80 years), who complained that no rebuilding assistance had been provided to the residents of the affected area.

The SMM met with some 15 residents (all of older age and pensioners, with the exception of one) in government-controlled Vodiane. They told the SMM that prior to the conflict the village population was approximately 1,500 people, while now only 70-80 inhabitants remained. The residents complained about the lack of assistance with regard to construction material as many houses in the village are in need of extensive repair. According to them, medical services were provided in neighboring Pervomaiske (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk) and they depended on Ukrainian Armed Forces transportation for medical emergencies.

In “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Hannivka (38km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions at 3 to 5km to the north-west. While in nearby Horodnie (“LPR”-controlled, 40km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four explosions 10-15km to the north-east of its position.

Near “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (53km south-east of Luhansk), armed men held the SMM for over an hour and only then allowed it to proceed to the Izvaryne border crossing point on the Ukraine-Russian Federation border. However, when the SMM reached the border crossing point, the “LPR” checkpoint “commander” told the SMM to leave the crossing point area immediately. The SMM left the area some ten minutes later.

While facilitating and monitoring on-going repair works conducted by the National Electricity Company near “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 16 October 2015), the SMM heard what it assessed to be an exchange of small-arms fire emanating 3km to the north-east of its position. The SMM assessed that the exchange of fire occurred in the vicinity of “Dacha Lenina,” located 2-3km south-east of the Luhansk thermal power plant (located near government-controlled Shchastia, 20km north of Luhansk).

While observing on-going SMM-facilitated preparations for repair work by the Luhansk Energy Association Company in an “LPR”-controlled area between the Prince Igor monument and the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion, which based on its assessments occurred approximately 2km north of its position. The power company workers were further clearing the areas around the electricity pylons in order to enable the continuation of repairs (see SMM Daily Report 2 November 2015).

The SMM visited a Ukrainian Armed Forces-controlled area and a “LPR”-controlled area in Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). Local residents told the SMM that they were able to pass the checkpoints between the areas unobstructed, provided that they carried proof of local residency. The “LPR” checkpoint “commander” and the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint commander confirmed this.  

At the outskirts of “LPR”-controlled Krasnodon village (34km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw improvised hazard signs (three upturned bottles placed on plants in a field close to the road).

In government-controlled Svatove (127km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM monitored the continuing work at the site of the explosion of the ammunition depot on 29 October (see SMM Daily Report 30 October 2015). The SMM went close to the scene of the incident and observed the clearing activities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces demining team. The SMM saw military trucks and personnel of the abovementioned units in the surroundings.

In relation to the Addendum, the SMM revisited three Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines and attempted to visit a fourth storage. At the first site, serial numbers matched those provided in the inventory, with the exception of one main battle tank (MBT), where a discrepancy in one digit of the serial number was discovered, which the SMM already had noted during its first visit. At the second site the serial numbers on three MBTs (T64) and four anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm), did not match the initial inventory, as previously noted by the SMM. Additionally, one mortar (2B9, 82mm) was absent, as the SMM first had noted on 5 November. At the third site, the serial number of one MBT did not match the inventory, but matched the SMM record from its first visit. The SMM was unable to locate a fourth permanent storage site at the provided co-ordinates.

The SMM revisited two “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. At the first area, the SMM noted five mortars (PM38, 120mm) absent, as it was already noted on 12 October. The SMM observed additional weapons in the area and recorded their serial numbers. The SMM was able to visit the other area for the first time since 21 July, as it had been denied access in the meantime. On site, the SMM found that eight previously recorded towed howitzers (D30, 122mm) were absent.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in the area of government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed an anti-tank guided missile system (9K111 Fagot or 9M113 Konkurs, both 120mm) mounted on a stationery infantry fighting vehicle (BMP2) (see SMM Daily Report 20 October 2015).

In areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed: four towed howitzers (2A36, 152mm) and five MBTs (T72) being transported in opposite directions in the area of government-controlled Soledar (77km north of Donetsk); nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1, 122 mm) and six towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) at a training ground in the area of "LPR"-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk). In all instances, the SMM was unable to check serial numbers on the weapons to verify their withdrawal in accordance with the Minsk Package of measures or its Addendum.

In Kyiv, the SMM observed throughout the day approximately 25 people (all men), apparently tending to the 37 tents in front of the Cabinet of Ministers building, set up by the “tariff maidan” initiative at the end of October (see SMM Daily Report 4 November 2015). The SMM observed a number of approximately 15 police officers.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kherson, Chernivtsi and Lviv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial:

• Near “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (53km south-east of Luhansk), “LPR” “border guards” and “customs officers” stopped the SMM, while it was on its way to the Izvaryne crossing point on the Ukraine-Russian Federation border. The SMM was held for over an hour and was allowed to proceed after facilitation through JCCC. However, when the SMM reached the border crossing point, the checkpoint “commander” told the SMM to leave the crossing point area immediately as it was only allowed to visit Izvaryne village. The SMM left the area some ten minutes later.
• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), a soldier denied the SMM access to a side road connecting Maiorsk to government-controlled Kurdiumivka (51km north-east of Donetsk) citing an order from his superior.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.