Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 13 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area. It observed multiple launch rocket systems in violation of agreed withdrawal lines near Khrustalnyi, Miusynsk and Malynivka. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas, as well as again near Zaichenko and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM continued to facilitate the process of restarting operations at the Donetsk Filtration Station, following a power outage. The SMM continued to monitor repairs and maintenance work to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Artema, and to facilitate demining and repairs at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka and houses in Avdiivka. The SMM followed up on reports that protective masks had been distributed in southern Kherson region in response to hazardous chemical air pollution from a chemical plant on the Crimean peninsula.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions).

On the evening of 12 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-east, south, south-west and west.

On the evening and night of 12-13 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded five undetermined explosions, five projectiles in flight (all from north-west to south-east) and 16 muzzle flashes, all 1-3km south and south-south-west.

During the day on 13 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, as well as four minutes of uncountable overlapping heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km south-west and west-south-west.

On the evening and night of 12-13 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion, 56 projectiles in flight (most from northerly to southerly directions) and two muzzle flashes, all 1-3km in easterly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 16 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (85 explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2]  (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 13 September, positioned about 250m south of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 8-10km north-north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 12 September, inside the Zolote disengagement area near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 12 recent impact craters (not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018) as well as a new military position (not visible in imagery from 17 August 2018).

During the day on 13 September, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka while flying an SMM mini-UAV east of the railway bridge inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire 0.5-1km south, assessed as in the area where the UAV was flying at an altitude of 100m.*

Later the same day, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

In the Petrivske disengagement area, on 12 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) – one (BMP variant) near a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and one (BMP-1) near positions of the armed formations.       

On 13 September, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard 14 shots of small-arms fire 2km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

An SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 37 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the road north of the Petrivske disengagement area between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government controlled areas, on 12 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 14 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and seven MLRS (BM-21) near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw eight MLRS (BM-21) near Malynivka (82km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 12 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a tank (type unknown), 23 towed howitzers (four 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm; four D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm; and 15 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi and 15 tanks (undetermined variant), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Miusynsk. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM observed four MLRS (BM-21) near Rivnopil (86km west of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and saw nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1), four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), and three anti-tank guided missile systems (9P149 Shturm-S, 130mm). It noted that 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing (including three for the first time) and also noted that 18 towed howitzers (2A36), 12 MLRS (BM-21), 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), six towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and evidence of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 12 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP variant), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRM-1k) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). Also on 12 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) near Zalizne (42km north-east of Donetsk). On 13 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk). On 13 September, in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km north-west of Luhansk, outside the disengagement area), the SMM observed two camouflaged IFVs (BMP type), one parked near an abandoned school building, and a new 300m extension of a trench running parallel with road T0512 on the western edge of Andriivka (61km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 12 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP variant) near Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk). On 13 September, the SMM saw two APCs (MT-LB) driving east on road E-58 near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

The SMM continued to facilitate the process of restarting operations at the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire, following a power outage at the station on 6 September. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations nearby, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below). 

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the repair of houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) as well as the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station located between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), where it also facilitated demining.

The SMM followed up on reports that 20,000 protective masks had been distributed in southern Kherson region by a national chapter of an international organization in response to the hazardous chemical air pollution from a chemical plant on the Crimean peninsula. In Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), the head of the Kalanchak district administration told the SMM that they had received masks for civilians in the affected communities. The SMM did not see anyone wearing masks.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Zaichenko, westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “orders” not to allow the SMM to enter the town.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• South of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that no demining had taken place in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• An SMM long-range UAV experienced jamming for two minutes near Dmytrivka (non-government-controlled, 85km east of Donetsk).[5]
• Positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka while flying an SMM mini-UAV inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire 0.5-1km south, assessed as warning shots fired at the UAV inside the disengagement area. The SMM recalled the UAV safely and departed the area.

 

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

*    Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]     Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3]     This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]  The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5]  The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.