Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 March 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and the same number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 10 and 11 March, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on reports of civilians injured and killed following an explosion near a minibus in Donetsk city’s Kirovskyi district. Near Ternove, small arms were again fired toward an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it observed ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including at a heavy weapons holding area, a permanent storage site and at two crossing points near the border with the Russian Federation in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Marinka and Khrustalnyi. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to essential infrastructure near Krasnyi Lyman and Artema. The Mission visited four border areas not under government control.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[2], including more explosions (about 60), between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). Between the evenings of 10 and 11 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 9-10 March, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 33 projectiles in flight from west to east, two undetermined explosions, 51 projectiles from west to east, an undetermined explosion, 11 projectiles from west to east, an explosion and 12 projectiles from west to east, followed by, in total, 29 undetermined explosions, 131 projectiles from west to east, 11 projectiles from east to west, two projectiles from south-west to north-east, two projectiles from north-east to south-west, a muzzle flash and an illumination flare in vertical flight. The following evening, the camera recorded four undetermined explosions, 39 projectiles from west to east, two projectiles from south-west to north-east, a projectile from north-east to south-west, a projectile from north to south and three muzzle flashes. On the evening of 11 March, the camera recorded three projectiles from west to east and one from east to west. All observations were 0.5-3km south.

On 10 March, positioned near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard five explosions at undetermined distances north-west and five explosions at an undetermined distance east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded the same number of ceasefire violations, including an explosion, between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). Between the evenings of 10 and 11 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including an explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM followed up on media reports of civilian casualties from an explosion in Kirovskyi district of Donetsk city. On 10 March, at a hospital in Donetsk, the SMM spoke with four women and two men who all had visible injuries (including bruises and cuts) to their faces; five of the six were wearing eyepatches. Several of them told the SMM that on 9 March they had been passengers in a small bus travelling through Kirovskyi district towards road H-15 when they observed a man running toward the bus shouting “stop the bus!” while being followed by armed men in military-style attire in a car. They said the bus slowed down to let the man on but, as the man approached the bus, the car rammed him and pinned him against the bus. The interlocutors said that they then noticed he was carrying a hand grenade which detonated as he was pinned against the bus. According to them, the explosion shattered the bus’s windows; shrapnel and flying glass caused their injuries. Medical staff at Kalina hospital in Donetsk city told the SMM that they were treating a man who had been a passenger on the bus for shrapnel injuries to the abdomen. At Kalina morgue in Donetsk city, staff told the SMM that on 9 March the bodies of a man and a woman who died in the explosion had been admitted. On Bakhmetieva Street near its intersection with Pochenkova Street in Kirovskyi district, the SMM saw a number of used latex gloves, alcohol swabs and bloody paper towels scattered about. Three local residents told the SMM that they had heard an explosion at 11:00 on 9 March near the intersection of Bakhmetieva and Pochenkova streets and, when they reached the scene of the explosion, they found it blocked off by hazard tape and “DPR” members. They also said they saw people covered in blood near a damaged Mercedes-Benz Vito minibus; some 15 minutes after the explosion, they saw ambulances arrive.

Small arms were again fired toward an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (see SMM Daily Report 27 February 2018). While flying a mini-UAV over a known armed formation compound near Ternove (non-government-controlled, 57km east of Donetsk) on 10 March, the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire emanating 1-2km north-west of its position,  the area above which the UAV was flying. The SMM assessed that the shots had likely been aimed at the UAV; it landed the UAV, which was undamaged, and departed the area. Subsequent examination of imagery recorded by the UAV revealed men in camouflage clothing looking towards the UAV.  

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non- government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 9 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 8-10km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard an explosion 5-10km south-south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske on 10 March and near the disengagement area near Zolote on 10 and 11 March, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM observed a tank (T-72) being transported near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and ten multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (non-government-controlled, formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw two tanks (type undetermined) being transported near Stritenka (formerly Oktiabrske, 62km south-west of Donetsk) on 9 March. On 11 March, the SMM saw a tank (T-72) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk), two tanks (a T-72 and a T-64) near Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk), two tanks (T-72) in Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), three tanks (one T-72 and two undetermined) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk), a tank (T-72) near Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk) and three tanks (type undetermined) near Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk). In non-government-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven tanks (type undetermined) in a training area on 10 March (for previous observations in this area, see SMM Daily Report 10 March 2018).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In areas of Donetsk region outside government control beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and noted that 13 mortars (a 2B11 Sani, 120mm, and 12 PM-38, 120mm) remain missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that six MLRS (BM-21) and five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remain missing, while a towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were noted as missing for the first time.

The SMM revisited two permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that 19 tanks (ten T-72 and nine T-64) continued to be missing. The SMM also observed additional weapons present for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and recent excavations in the security zone. On 10 March, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 13 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (seven BMP variants and six undetermined) and three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (a BRDM, a BRDM-2 RKhB and a BRM-1K) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), as well as an IFV (BMP variant) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk). Near Petrivske (non-government-controlled), the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80).

On 11 March, near Popasna, the SMM saw five IFVs (four BMP variants, one undetermined) and three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (a BRDM-2 RKhB and two BRM-1K). The same day, in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM observed an IFV (BMP-1) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) and newly set-up static anti-tank obstacles made of metal angle beams near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM observed newly excavated tank scrapes near Rozdolne (46km south-east of Donetsk) and newly extended trenches near Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).                                                                                                         

The SMM continued to observe the presence of remnants of war and mine hazard signs. On the south-eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar (government-controlled, 62km north of Donetsk), the SMM observed a red sign with white skull-and-crossbones and “Danger Mines” written on it in Ukrainian and Russian, affixed to a tree. South of Sakhanka, the SMM saw a mortar tailfin embedded 1m from road E58.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the water wells in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and to the Petrivske water pumping station in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited four border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) for 15 minutes on 9 March, the SMM saw three cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates; one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine, as well as a tanker truck and a car (both with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine. Two days later, while at the same border crossing point for 20 minutes, the SMM saw six cars (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates; two with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (both with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine, as well seven cars (two with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Polish licence plates; three with “DPR” plates) and a man (in his thirties) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for an hour on 10 March, the SMM saw no traffic crossing the border.

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes on 11 March, the SMM observed a bus with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine before being told to leave the area.* The same day, while at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about three minutes, the SMM saw no traffic crossing the border before being told to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 10 March 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 10 March, three “DPR” members (men, 25-35 years old) – two armed – prevented the SMM from entering a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• On 11 March, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, an “LPR” member (man in his forties) demanded the SMM leave the area, saying “a restriction on the SMM’s presence in the border area was in force.”
• On 11 March, at a border crossing point near Sievernyi, an armed “LPR” member (man in his thirties), demanded the SMM leave the area, saying “a restriction on the SMM’s presence in the border area was in force.”

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 10 and 11 March, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]
• On 10 and 11 March, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• On 10 and 11 March, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.4
• On 10 and 11 March, the SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC on both occasions.4

Delay:

On 10 March, a “DPR” member prevented the SMM from entering a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region for 20 minutes.

Other impediments:

• On 10 March, near Ternove, the flight of an SMM mini-UAV was interrupted by small-arms fire which the SMM assessed as being directed towards the UAV (see above).
• At a hospital in Donetsk city, the SMM was told it needed permission from a “DPR” member in order to gather information on a casualty.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. 

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.