Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 13 October 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including, however, a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the Mission recorded a significant increase in ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period, mostly west-north-west of Kadiivka. The SMM continued monitoring all three disengagement areas; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor demining activities inside the Zolote disengagement area as part of preparatory work to clear the road and possibly open a new entry-exit checkpoint. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in Svobodne and Ozerianivka.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Dovhe and Kalmiuske. It facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance of essential infrastructure between Klynove and Novozvanivka, in Shchastia, near Artema, and between Zolote and Popasna. The SMM observed long queues at checkpoints near the contact line. In Kharkiv, the Mission monitored the security situation around a concert.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period.

On the night of 12-13 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 3-8km north-west.

On 13 October, positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about seven hours, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 7-10km north-north-west, and eight undetermined explosions and about 80 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun, automatic-grenade-launcher and small-arms fire, all 1-6km at directions ranging from west-south-west to north-west.

The same day, positioned on the south-western edge of government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for seven hours, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 2-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south.

On the evening of 12 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 4-10km north-west, as well as 13 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar (82mm) rounds, about ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and about 15 shots of automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) and small-arms fire, all 3-5km north-north-west and north-west. On the morning of 13 October, positioned in the same location, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3km north.

On the night of 12-13 October, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded four tracer rounds in flight, all at unknown distances and directions.

On the morning of 13 October, positioned in government-controlled Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk) for about one hour and a half, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions 3-5km north, four undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-west and three shots of small-arms fire 1-1.5km south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a significant increase in ceasefire violations, including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about ten explosions).

In the late afternoon of 13 October, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM, within a 35-minute period, heard about 240 explosions assessed as outgoing and impacts of artillery and mortar rounds, and ten shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, all 10km west-north-west.

In the late afternoon of 13 October, while on the northern edge of government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), within about 15 minutes the SMM heard 30 explosions (ten assessed as rounds of IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, three as rounds of rocket-propelled grenade fire and the remainder undetermined) and 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun, IFV (BMP-2) cannon, automatic-grenade-launcher and recoilless-gun fire, all 4-6km south-south-east and 8-10km south-west. In the late afternoon, positioned on the eastern edge of Popasna, within about 20 minutes the SMM heard 24 explosions (mostly assessed as mortar (82mm) rounds), and about 30 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and IFV (BMP-2) cannon fire, all 700m south.

On the morning of 13 October, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-west, and about 130 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km west-north-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 12 October, while on the eastern edge of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 6km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the morning of 13 October, positioned about 250m south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 10km north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 13 October, positioned in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), west of the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor demining activities inside the disengagement area near Zolote as part of preparatory work to clear the road and possibly open a new entry-exit checkpoint near Zolote. (See SMM Daily Report 13 October 2017.)

Positioned near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw five workers clear 5m of vegetation on both sides of a 100m stretch of road, which leads to a bridge inside the disengagement area located between the non-government-controlled checkpoint and the government checkpoint. The Mission also saw that the two previously observed 82mm mortar round tailfins had been removed. (See SMM Daily Report 22 August 2017.)

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in non-government-controlled areas, on 12 October an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air- missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk). (See SMM Daily Report 29 September 2017.) Aerial imagery revealed the presence on 10 October of four surface-to-air missile systems in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw one surface-to-air missile system (9K35), 11 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). The SMM also observed that six anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be absent.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and an anti-aircraft gun in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 13 October, the SMM saw a stationary IFV (BMP-1) near Popasna and a stationary IFV (BMP-1) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 12 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1), two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB), one of which was mounted with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), and a trench digger (TMK-2) near Dovhe. (See SMM Daily Report 29 September 2017.)

The SMM again observed the presence of anti-tank mines on the side of a road 25-30m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint 3km east of Popasna – the same location where the Mission saw an anti-tank mine on 6 May, and monitored and facilitated demining by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on 23 May. (See SMM Daily Report 8 May 2017 and SMM Daily Report 24 May 2017.)

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line. A group of over 20 residents (men and women, mostly elderly) in “DPR”-controlled Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partizan, 23km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that they had been without electricity since 3 September 2017 and about 100 residents in the village have been left without heating or water due to the lack of electricity. The Mission requested that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-operation (JCCC) co-ordinate with the sides to conduct repair works. In Betmanove, a man (in his sixties) also told the Mission that he had been recently denied access twice at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near government-controlled Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk) where he needed to buy medicine for his wife with disabilities. The SMM saw her struggling to stand and move with two crutches. In “DPR”-controlled Kruta Balka (16km north of Donetsk), four residents (three men and one woman, aged 30-90) told the SMM that they have been without electricity for two years which has prevented them from being able to collect water from wells and has left them without heating.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works, co‑ordinated by the JCCC, to the power lines between government-controlled Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk) and Novozvanivka, the thermal power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the Petrivske water pumping station near government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), and the water pipeline between Zolote and Popasna.

The SMM observed long queues at checkpoints near the contact line. At the government-controlled entry-exit checkpoint south of Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission saw about 30 cars, two buses and about 30 pedestrians queuing to travel further into government-controlled areas and about 100 cars, one bus and about 200 pedestrians queuing to travel in the opposite direction. At a checkpoint on road H15 near the Kargil plant in “DPR”-controlled Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 110 cars and five buses queuing to travel into government-controlled areas and about 240 cars and four buses queuing to travel in the opposite direction. A man, together with a woman (both in their sixties), told the Mission that they had been queuing for almost eight hours.

At the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, at 09:15 on 13 October, the SMM saw about 150 pedestrians queuing to travel further into government-controlled areas and about 800 pedestrians queuing to travel in the opposite direction. About seven hours later, at the same checkpoint, the SMM saw no pedestrians queuing to travel further into government-controlled areas and about 500 pedestrians queuing to travel in the opposite direction. An official of the State Border Guard Service told the SMM that on 12 October, around 200 people in a queue to travel from government-controlled areas to non-government-controlled areas had not been able to pass through the checkpoint by the time it had closed at 18:30.

While present at the checkpoint, the SMM also noticed the dire condition of the wooden section of the broken bridge. The SMM saw a woman (in her eighties) in a wheelchair being carried by four porters and observed four other elderly people (two men and two women) taking a considerable amount of time (about five minutes) and leaning onto the insecure hand rails as they crossed the 15m-long bridge. The Mission also saw a woman (aged around 25) carrying her child (aged around two) across the bridge, and then returning to collect luggage and crossing again.

On 11 October, the SMM monitored the security situation around a concert in Kharkiv. The SMM observed that the concert was organized at the Constitution Square by people known to the Mission as activists of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community; 60-70 people (mixed gender, 20-35 years old) were cordoned off and surrounded by about 300 police officers, 150 of whom were in riot gear. The SMM also saw two emergency medical teams consisting of eight people (all men, 20-30 years old) nearby. A police officer told the SMM that the police had received a report an hour before the concert began that there was an explosive device on the square; he said, however, that the police did not find anything suspicious. Prior to the event, the organizers told the Mission that they expected a significant police presence due to the violent incident that occurred at a similar gathering on 17 May. (See SMM Daily Report 18 May 2017.) The SMM observed that the concert ended without incidents and that the participants were escorted away by the police.                                                                                                       

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Seven armed persons in military-style clothing at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk) prevented the SMM from crossing the checkpoint. One of them said that due to an ongoing security operation, the SMM was not allowed to proceed towards the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint north-west of “DPR”-controlled Ozerianivka (35km north-east of Donetsk), armed persons prevented the SMM from crossing the checkpoint, citing orders from their superiors.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC at a checkpoint on the northern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours, but only around the checkpoint. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that, while limited demining activities were underway, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety in the surrounding roads and fields. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:

• An “LPR” member at a checkpoint on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement prevented the SMM from speaking with “LPR” deminers about their work, claiming that special permission must be obtained from other “LPR” members.

[1] Please see the annexed report for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.