Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 13 July 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared to the previous reporting period, with violence focused around Donetsk city, Yasynuvata, and Shyrokyne. In Luhansk region for the fourth consecutive day, the SMM continued to record a high number of overnight ceasefire violations in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis in Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city, in Kamianka and in Stanytsia Luhanska. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure in Slovianoserbsk, Pryshyb and Krasnyi Lyman. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The SMM noted long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. Its freedom of movement was restricted on three occasions, including at a border crossing point, all in areas outside government control.* The SMM followed up on reports of smuggling of grenades and  explosives in Kharkiv region’s border area. In Odessa it observed three Polish citizens blocked inside a hotel by self-defence activists.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.

Positioned in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard, between 00:52 and 01:00, 18 explosions assessed as outgoing 120mm mortar rounds 4-7km north-north-east of its position. Whilst in Proletarske district (22km east of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine outgoing explosions 4-6km north of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions, and heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons, 1-8km west-south-west, west and north-west of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 4-5km east and one assessed as impact 8-12km north of its position.

During the night of 12-13 July, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), recorded, at unknown distances ranging from north to east, four undetermined explosions, and an exchange of direct tracer fire, starting with 12 bursts from south to north and north-north-east, one burst from south-east to north-west, and 19 bursts from south to north-east and north-north-east.

In Luhansk region for the fourth consecutive day, the SMM recorded a high number of overnight ceasefire violations in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk).  

Whilst in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard, on the night of 12-13 July, 84 explosions assessed as infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon (73mm), recoilless-gun (SPG), rocket propelled grenade launcher (RPG) and 82mm mortar fire, more than 500 bursts of automatic grenade launcher (AGS) fire and some 2,000 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-south-west of its position, and saw red tracers fired from west to east, east to west, north to south and south to north, in the general area south of its position. In government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard, on the evening of 12 July, ten explosions (five assessed as impacts, two as outgoing, three as mortar or artillery rounds) 5-10km south-east and south of its position. The next day, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10-12km south-south-east of its position.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line. In Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city (15km south-west of the city centre) the SMM conducted analysis on eight fresh craters assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds (seven fired from a south-westerly direction and one fired from a westerly direction). The SMM saw a crater on the south-facing concrete wall of a utility building at Novosadova Street and another in a field close to a road. Four craters were spread out in a field in the same district - one on a gravel road and the other 10m off the road; another on a west-facing wall of a house where an entire room and part of the roof were destroyed; and another near an adjacent house. On the gravel road the SMM observed multiple fresh caterpillar tracks and assessed one pair as tank and another pair as either armoured personnel carrier (APC; MT-LB) or self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) tracks. The SMM observed two craters near the Trudovskaia coal mine, some 10m apart on the tarmac. The artillery shells had caused severe damage to the exterior wall and roof of a building, while the interior was burnt. On Aleutska Street the SMM noted that the metal gate of a factory was freshly pierced by shrapnel while the roof of one of the factory buildings was burnt. Several residents separately told the SMM that the shelling in the area had occurred during the night. The SMM saw a woman in her fifties with injuries to her arm; she said she had suffered those while working in one of the buildings that were hit.

Whilst in the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city, accompanied by the Russian Federation Armed Forces representative to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), the SMM was approached by a white van, whose driver reached out of the window, punched the rear window of the SMM’s vehicle, and grabbed the OSCE flag pole, snapping it in two pieces.

In government-controlled Kamianka (38km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed one crater next to a road and another in a field 50 meters from the road, both some 50 meters from the nearest houses. The SMM assessed both craters as fresh and caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a north-easterly direction.

In Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM followed up on reports of shelling on the night of 12-13 July. At Lomonosova Street, the SMM observed a 50cm hole in the south-facing wall of a house assessed as caused by 73mm IFV (BMP-1) cannon rounds fired from a south-easterly direction. At the railway area the SMM observed seven impacts assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds and 16 impacts assessed as caused by automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) rounds, all fired from a southerly direction. At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed damage and impacts on the road leading to the broken section of the bridge assessed as caused by 30mm automatic grenade launcher (AGS) fire, and holes in the barriers at the Ukrainian Armed Forces position immediately north of the broken part of the bridge assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds all fired from a southerly direction, and fresh damage to the canopy and sides of the emergency service tent assessed as caused by shrapnel.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed in government-controlled areas, a towed gun-howitzer (D-20, 152mm) in Khersones (15km north of Mariupol), and 12 anti-tank guns (2A29/ MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), six near Novozhelanne (34km north-west of Donetsk) and six near Zhelanne (36km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM also observed weapons in areas known to the SMM, which it could not verify as withdrawn as they do not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 12 multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and four mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm). The SMM noted as missing six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and noted that one site was abandoned, with 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) missing.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and other hardware in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed one APCs (a BTR-D on 12 July and an MT-LB on 13 July) stationary in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); a helicopter (MI-8) flying south over Biletske (63km north-west of Donetsk), one IFV (BMP-2) stationary in Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), and four APCs (one BTR-60 and three BRDM-2) west of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed five APCs (MT-LB) in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), where the SMM noted also an increase in the number of military-type vehicles and armed people present, previously abandoned buildings currently occupied by armed men in military-type attire, upgraded fencing and barbed wires, four (from previously one) fuel trucks, and 45-gallon fuel drums with “Bashneft” printed on the sides, which the SMM assessed as new. Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 12 July of two armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. In the area between “LPR”-controlled Pryshyb (34km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works on gas pipelines. From government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable maintenance works to water and gas pipelines in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk). In Shchastia, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works at the power plant.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At a government checkpoint in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM noted 142 passenger vehicles and some 100 pedestrians waiting to travel to government-controlled areas, and 69 passenger vehicles and nearly 150 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. At a government checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw 120 passenger vehicles and 200 pedestrians waiting to travel to government-controlled areas, as well as 18 passenger vehicles waiting to travel in the opposite direction. At a “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 270 passenger vehicles queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 30 passenger vehicles queuing in the opposite direction.

At a government checkpoint in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed exceptionally long queues, with 160 cars and about 800 pedestrians queuing to leave government-controlled areas, and 45 cars and about 1000 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM noted that the movement of vehicles towards and from government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) was much slower compared to previous days. The SMM noted that in two hours no more than 20 vehicles approached the checkpoint from Maiorsk. At the government checkpoint in Maiorsk, several pedestrians surrounded the SMM complaining that they had been queuing for several hours, including some who said they had been sent back to “DPR”-controlled area the night before at the time of closing the checkpoint. Later the SMM noted a faster pace.

At the government checkpoint immediately north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed around 400 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas and some 200 people waiting to pass in the opposite direction. A medical assistant and two employees of emergency services (women, in their thirties), working in the tent at the checkpoint, said that they had assisted 23 individuals during the day with health problems caused by the heat, including two who had been sent to the hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM monitored a border area not controlled by the Government and encountered a restriction there.* The SMM visited the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) and observed nine cars and one minivan with Ukrainian licence plates and one car with Russian Federation licence plates queuing to leave Ukraine, and ten cars (eight with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) and 20-25 pedestrians entering Ukraine within 40 minutes. An armed “LPR” member approached the SMM and demanded that it leave the area.

On 12 July in Kharkiv, the SMM followed up on reports of smuggling of grenades and explosives in Kharkiv region’s border area with the Russian Federation. The commanding officer of the Zhovtneve border guard division in Kharkiv said that on 2 July a 39-year-old Ukrainian citizen, allegedly a “DPR” member, was arrested after crossing the green border into Ukraine, through a joint operation with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in attempt to smuggle two hand grenades, 1kg of explosive (semtex) and five blocks of explosives (TNT) into Ukraine. An SBU representative told the SMM that the man was in custody.

In Odessa the SMM observed 30 Odessa Automaidan self-defence activists (between 20 and 50 years old, including one woman) in camouflage clothing blocking the entrance of Hotel Geneva in the Arkadia district to prevent, as they said, three Polish citizens (including a member of the Polish Senate) from meeting with representatives of the organization “Mothers of 2 May” and laying flowers at Kulykove Pole. The SMM saw two cars with Automaidan symbols and Ukrainian flags parked in front of the hotel, as well as six uniformed police and a bus with 30 riot police present. Later the SMM observed the activists preventing a representative of an Opposition Bloc member of Parliament from entering the hotel. They tore a pin of the Ukrainian flag from his clothing.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At the border crossing point in Voznesenivka, an armed “LPR” member denied access to the SMM as it did not provide its patrol plan. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, both an armed “LPR” member and his superior denied the SMM access to the bridge as it did not provide its patrol plan (in the Russian language).

Delay:

• At an “LPR” checkpoint in Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk), armed “LPR” members delayed the SMM for 20 minutes waiting for permission from their superior. It was granted after the SMM informed the JCCC to facilitate its access.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.