Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 November 2016
This report is for media and the general public.
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period, with most of the violations recorded in areas east and north-east of Mariupol. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous day. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Dokuchaievsk and shelling north of Sakhanka. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* It monitored two border areas currently not under government control. It monitored repair works to essential infrastructure. The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In Kyiv the Mission monitored two protests in front of the Russian Federation Embassy.
The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region, including 141 explosions compared with 311 in the previous reporting period. More than 100 of these explosions were recorded during the day in areas east and north-east of Mariupol.
Positioned in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) the SMM heard, between 10:35 and 13:00, 96 undetermined explosions (80 at locations 2-6km north, north-east, and east-north-east, and 16 at an undetermined distance north). The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, during the night of 1-2 November, two explosions (one undetermined and one assessed as impact of a round from an unknown weapon) at an undetermined distance north and north-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south and west. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south-east.
Positioned in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an unknown distance north.
On the night of 1-2 November and during the following day, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded eight explosions (five undetermined and three assessed as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons) 3-8km east-south-east and south-east. During the day, positioned in Avdiivka for two hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and two explosions assessed as outgoing mortar (120mm) rounds 0.5-3km south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard, within two hours, 16 undetermined explosions 3-8km west-south-west and west. In areas further north-east of Donetsk, including government-controlled Svitlodarsk and “DPR”-controlled Horlivka and Debaltseve the SMM noted a calm situation.
In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations - 40 explosions compared with nine in the previous reporting period. Positioned at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Zolote-Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) disengagement area, the SMM heard, within 20 minutes, 40 undetermined explosions 10km north-west (outside the disengagement area).
The SMM continued to follow up on reports of civilian casualties and shelling. At the hospital in “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM saw a man who had sustained shrapnel wounds when allegedly a mortar round had exploded next to his house in Pobeda Street in Yasne (30km south-west of Donetsk) on 31 October. Medical staff at the hospital said that the man had several fragments of metal shrapnel (1-3mm) under his skin. In the Serhiivka area, between “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka and Sakhanka (both 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed a fresh crater six metres from a house. A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) present at the site showed the SMM a tail fin of a mortar round (120mm) lying on the ground nearby. The SMM also observed broken windows and pieces of shrapnel inside the house, and shrapnel damage to walls of an adjacent small kitchen, and a completely destroyed pen.
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. The SMM observed the presence of forces and hardware in Stanytsia Luhanska. It noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the areas.
At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, a senior armed “LPR” member informed the SMM that “LPR” members were ready to disengage. The SMM saw and heard the launching of a white flare signal. One hour later, the SMM received a second confirmation of readiness to disengage by armed “LPR” members and a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC. A senior “LPR” member and media were also present at the site where a second white flare signal was launched, as allegedly the first one could not have been seen by the other side due to fog. On the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had no orders to disengage.
The SMM observed fresh tracks from an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP) between the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position on the bridge and their checkpoint further north of the bridge. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed 25-30 “LPR” members equipped with light weapons, a heavy machine-gun (UTES) and several other machine-guns (KP).
In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), west of Petrivske disengagement area, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the road east to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk), along the northern edge of the disengagement area, was still mined.* He had no information when demining could start.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.
In violation of the withdrawal line, the SMM observed 21 anti-tank guns (2A29/MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) - six in government-controlled Zhelanne (36km north-west of Donetsk) and 15 in “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk).
Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM saw four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed four mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) present. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel allowed the SMM to record for the first time the serial numbers of 18 towed howitzers (2A36/Giatsint-B, 152mm).
The SMM revisited “DPR” permanent storage sites whose locations comply with the respective withdrawal lines, and noted five tanks (T-72) as missing for the first time. The SMM also noted weapons present for the first time.
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles [2] in the security zone. The SMM observed an artillery forward observer (command vehicle; IV16) in government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted two IFVs (BMP) north of the railway bridge in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area).
The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 1 November at a recently relocated government checkpoint in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), a local bus driver said that the relocation had complicated the situation as there was less space to park and reverse which increased the risk of driving into a mine field. The SMM observed several mine hazard signs recently placed on both sides of the road. The SMM also noted that a tent with heating and toilets had been established. The following day, at a government checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 260 civilian vehicles and approximately 150 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 130 civilian vehicles and approximately 200 pedestrians waiting in the opposite direction. Two men (between 40 and 50 years old) separately told the SMM that they had been trying to cross towards non-government-controlled areas since the previous day. One of them said that having not crossed the day before as the checkpoint had closed at 15:00 rather than at the regular closure time, 17:00, he had come back to queue as early as 06:00. Staff members of the State Emergency Service at the tent near the checkpoint said that 40 people had stayed overnight in the tent.
At 07:30, at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed some 750 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas while the checkpoint was not operational. Four hours later the queue consisted of about 400 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas and another 100 waiting in the opposite direction. A 50-year-old woman told the SMM that she had had to wait for three hours to pass the checkpoint in freezing temperatures. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM observed no queue.
The SMM monitored two border areas currently not under government control. At the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed, during 40 minutes, 14 civilian cars (nine with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates) leaving Ukraine, and seven cars and three pedestrians entering Ukraine. At the border crossing point in Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 20 civilian vans and five cars waiting to leave Ukraine.
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. In government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), the SMM monitored workers of a water supply company removing the vegetation along the electrical power line that supplies the water pumping station to prepare further repair works on power lines.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living close to the contact line. In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the head of the district Military-Civil Administration told the SMM that the village continued to lack a gas supply as the JCCC could not facilitate security guarantees for repair works to the central system for gas distribution in areas between government and “DPR” positions. He added that due to the lack of a gas supply approximately 3,000 houses in the area had no heating.
In Kyiv the SMM monitored two protests in front of the Russian Federation Embassy. At the first protest, the SMM saw approximately 90 persons (70 per cent women and 30 per cent men, mainly in their twenties and thirties, at least half of them journalists) gathered in front of the Russian Federation Embassy building to protest against the detention of Ukrainian journalists in the Russian Federation and in Crimea. Protestors had set up a small table with folders containing names of Ukrainian journalists detained in the Russian Federation or in Crimea. In the afternoon, the SMM observed five women and three men (of varying age groups) present at the same place, protesting against the alleged torture of Ildar Dadin in prison in the Russian Federation. Ten National Guard officers and two to four city police officers were present at each of the protests. Both protests ended peacefully.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
- The SMM could not proceed further towards a summer cottage area (neighbouring the railway bridge south of Stanytsia Luhanska) as it observed a mine hazard sign east of the parking lot near the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area). An armed “LPR” member at the checkpoint told the SMM that the road towards the railway bridge had not been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM could not proceed on the road leading west from Prince Ihor monument as an armed “LPR” member said the area had not yet been demined. The SMM noted that an anti-tank obstacle (“Czech hedgehog”) previously observed on the road, was no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 27 October). The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not travel on the road from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) east to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present said the road was still mined and he could not ensure security for the SMM to travel.
- The SMM could not proceed across the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from either side. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and armed “LPR” members present at their respective checkpoints told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM was not able to travel on the road between government-controlled Popasna and Katerynivka (69 and 64km west of Luhansk, respectively) due to the presence of a roadblock and an improvised mine hazard sign (brown background, with “Mine” handwritten in Cyrillic) placed in the middle of the road. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the area had not been checked for the presence of mines.
- Tree branches and concrete blocks on the railway bridge at the north-east corner of “DPR”-controlled Amvrosiivka (56km south-east of Donetsk) prevented the SMM from continuing further towards the city centre.
Delay:
- At a “DPR” checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr; 29km north-east of Mariupol), armed “DPR” members refused access to the SMM unless the SMM showed its patrol plan. Following a successful intervention by the JCCC, the SMM was granted access after a 37 minute delay.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.