Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 31 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with 30 October, although it recorded over 40 explosions assessed as artillery rounds in Horlivka. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations (57 explosions assessed as artillery rounds) compared with 30 October. It continued to follow up on reports of civilian casualties in Makiivka. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM monitored a number of heavy weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines. It monitored five border areas currently not under government control. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including 218 explosions, compared with 332 on 30 October.  

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 30-31 October the SMM heard 28 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-north-west and north. The following day positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at locations ranging from 1-7km west to north-east.

The SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded ten explosions (all assessed as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons) 2-5km east-south-east, south-east and south-south-east on the night of 30-31 October, and 32 undetermined explosions 4-5km east-south-east and south-east in the early morning of 31 October. During the day, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 46 explosions at 1-5km west, 34 of which were recorded within 30 minutes during the morning. Positioned in Avdiivka for nearly four hours during the almost same time the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations.

On the night of 30-31 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 58 explosions (34 of which were assessed as outgoing artillery rounds of unknown calibre, and seven were assessed as impacts of artillery) 7-8km west-south-west and west-north-west.

During the same night, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), facing north-north-east, recorded nine explosions (two undetermined explosions and seven assessed as impacts of rounds from an unknown weapon) at an undetermined distance. The camera also recorded an exchange of fire which began with 47 bursts of cannon fire and two bursts of small arms, all fired from west to east, and one burst fired from north-east to south-west, followed by a total of 246 bursts of cannon fire (123 bursts fired from west to east, 14 from north-west to south-east, 67 from east to west, 42 from south-east to north-west, and one from north-east to south-west).

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard five explosions (three of which were assessed as outgoing rounds from an unknown weapon and two as impacts from an unknown weapon) and bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an undetermined distance south-south-west and south-west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with 30 October.

During the night of 30-31 October while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 58km west of Luhansk) the SMM recorded explosions assessed as caused by artillery rounds for the second consecutive night – 22 explosions at 3-10km west and 35 explosions at 10-15km north-west. Other than the aforementioned, the SMM did not record ceasefire violations during the reporting period in Luhansk region.

The SMM continued to follow up reports of civilian casualties caused by shelling, which had occurred in the Kirovskyi district of “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 27 October (see SMM Daily Report 29 October 2016). On the sixth floor of the building number 10 in “kvartal Stoyitel” the SMM observed broken windows at the northern side of an apartment. A male resident told the SMM that when his mother had been standing close to the window, an explosion had occurred and she had sustained cuts to her head. According to him, she was treated on the spot by medical staff from an ambulance and did not require further treatment.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. The SMM observed no movement of forces or hardware or demining or fencing off of mines in any of the areas. In the three areas the SMM noted a calm situation and did not observe any ceasefire violation. 

On the government-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that no disengagement or demining would take place. In government-controlled areas north of the railway bridge an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP) inside the disengagement area. On the side not controlled by the government of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, a mine hazard sign on the road prevented the SMM from monitoring in the area of the railway bridge.  

The SMM was able to reach an “LPR” checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area from government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) through the Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route, which remains closed to civilians, although it did not have access to rest of the disengagement area.*  The presence of an unmanned roadblock (concrete blocks and barbwire layers) 300m north of the government checkpoint prevented the SMM from proceeding to “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk from government-controlled Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). At a checkpoint on the “LPR”-controlled side of the Zolote disengagement area the SMM was prevented from accessing surrounding fields and areas off of main roads, as an “LPR” member told the SMM that its safety could not be guaranteed.

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), the SMM was unable to travel on the road west of the village due to the possible presence of mines and the lack of security guarantees from “DPR” members. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound in Anadol (39km north of Mariupol); four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound in Donske (47km north of Mariupol); and four multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in Stupochky (60km north of Donetsk) heading south-west.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed two tanks (T-64) each loaded on a transporter heading east near government-controlled Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk); and two tanks (T-64) each loaded on a flat-bed truck heading south near government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: two stationary armoured personnel carriers (APCs; MT-LB) near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk) on 30 October; two APCs (BTR-4) heading west near Maksymilianivka (30km west of Donetsk) on 30 October; one stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area); two stationary IFVs (BMP) near Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk); four stationary IFVs (BMP-2) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); and one IFV (BMP-2) and one APC (BRDM-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw: one APC (BTR-80) heading north-west and another APC (BTR-80) heading south-west near Donetsk central railway station; and one IFV (BMP-1) towed by a truck travelling near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) loaded on a truck pointing north-east near Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk); and three APCs (MT-LB), one of them mounted with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk). An SMM mini UAV spotted one IFV (BMP) near Stanytsia Luhanska (see above).

In government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed a checkpoint 200m from a school, where it noted four Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel checking passing vehicles. Between government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) and Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol) the SMM observed a newly established position. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that they had moved their position from Lebedynske to the current place – located 3km further south-east. The SMM noted that two roads leading east to Berdianske were blocked by concrete and wooden barriers. In “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw six armed “LPR” members reinforcing a checkpoint at the southern edge of the village. The SMM noted two additional barriers with “stop” signs and additional concrete blocks at the checkpoint.

The SMM monitored five border areas currently not controlled by the government. On 30 October, the SMM observed a calm situation at the border crossing points in Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), Uspenka and Ulianivske (73 and 61km south-east of Donetsk, respectively).

At the Dovzhanskyi border crossing point (84km south-east of Luhansk) for 45 minutes, the SMM saw five cars, one truck and one bus (all with Ukrainian licence plates) enter Ukraine. At the pedestrian border crossing point in Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) during its 20-minute observation the SMM observed one woman (aged 80) carrying food cross into Ukraine. 

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. In government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), the SMM monitored ten workers of a water supply company cutting trees and undergrowth in order to prepare further repair works on power lines.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was not able to proceed further to a summer cottage area (neighbouring the railway bridge south of Stanytsia Luhanska) as it observed a mine hazard sign east of the parking lot near the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area). An armed “LPR” member at the checkpoint told the SMM that the road towards the railway bridge had not yet been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The presence of an unmanned roadblock (concrete blocks and barbwire layers) prevented the SMM from travelling from government-controlled Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) to “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, an “LPR” member told the SMM that fields and areas other than roads located in the disengagement area had not been cleared of mines. The SMM was therefore not enabled to access the area fully. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two separate occasions, the SMM was prevented from travelling on the road between government-controlled Katerynivka and government-controlled Popasna (64 and 69km north-west of Luhansk, respectively) from both sides due to the presence of a roadblock. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel on the road west out of Petrivske due to the possible presence of mines and the lack of security guarantees from “DPR” members, as a “DPR” member present told the SMM that demining had not yet been conducted in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed across the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from both sides. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and armed “LPR” members present at their respective checkpoints told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC. On the road leading north at the “LPR” checkpoint south of Shchastia bridge the SMM noted concrete blocks, which it had previously observed on 30 October (see SMM Daily on 31 October 2016).
• At a checkpoint in government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol) Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to proceed further eastbound to the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the south-western outskirts of Donetsk city armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM and said it had to wait in the queue alongside civilians. The SMM decided to turn around and detour. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.