Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 16 October 2016

The SMM recorded 199 and 236 explosions on 15 and 16 October, respectively in Donetsk region. The SMM noted the security situation in areas of north-east and east of Mariupol remained volatile, which represented more than 50 per cent of all ceasefire violations recorded in the region on 16 October. In Luhansk region the SMM noted a higher level of violence both on 15 and 16 October (100 and 72 explosions, respectively, including explosions caused by artillery or mortar), compared with 14 October. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* Shots impacting close to a patrol near Zolote forced the SMM to leave an observations post. The Mission followed up on reports of casualties and shelling. The Mission monitored the withdrawal of weapons and saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line.

Compared with 854 explosions recorded on 14 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 199 and 236 explosions on 15 and 16 October, respectively.[1]

On the night of 14-15 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions 8-10km north. The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 5-7km west. During the daytime of 16 October, the SMM heard 49 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at locations 3km ranging from north to north-west of the same position.

On the night of 14-15 October,  while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions, 22 shots of automatic-grenade-launcher fire, 20 shots of small-arms and 136 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-6km south-east. While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) between 18:06 and 21:24 on the same night, the SMM heard 28 explosions (20 assessed as 73mm rocket-propelled grenade rounds, seven as outgoing 73mm recoilless gun (SPG-9) rounds or infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) 73mm cannon rounds, and one impact of 82mm mortar round) 4-5km west-north-west of its location. On the following night, the SMM heard 18 explosions, including eight assessed as outgoing 73mm self-propelled grenade rounds and ten as outgoing 73mm recoilless gun (SPG-9) rounds or IFV; BMP-1, 73mm cannon rounds, all 4-5km west-north-west.

Between 14:10 and 15:22 on 15 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 8-10km west of its position, assessed as outside of the disengagement area. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) present in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that all of them were the results of controlled detonations.

On the night of 14-15 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded seven undetermined explosions 6-8km south-south-east of its location. On 15 October, positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions, three of them 3-4km east, two of them 5km west and two 5km south-west. The SMM also recorded one explosion assessed as outgoing artillery round (unknown calibre) 3-4km east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 1‑5km west and seven undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 2-8km north-west. During the night of 15-16 October the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded 70 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east. The following day, positioned in Avdiivka the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 2-5km north-east. Positioned in Yasynuvata the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 2-5km west and west-north-west.

In areas north-east and east of Mariupol the SMM recorded nearly 60 explosions on 15 October and nearly 140 explosions on 16 October. Positioned 1.5km north of government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard, between 08:59 and 11:08, on 15 October 21 undetermined explosions 5-8km north-east and at an undetermined distance south-east, one explosion assessed as outgoing artillery fire at an undetermined distance east and one explosion assessed as impact of an artillery round 5km east-south-east. Positioned in government-controlled Orlivske (23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 6km north-east. During the night of 15-16 October, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne, facing north-east and north-north-east, recorded 12 undetermined explosions and one explosion assessed as outgoing round from an unknown weapon at an undetermined distance. The camera also recorded an exchange of tracer fire, first five tracers fired from south-west to north-east and then continuing with 290 tracers (141 tracers from east to west and 149 from west to east). On 16 October positioned in “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM registered 36 explosions (11 assessed as outgoing rounds, three as impacts of unknown weapons and 22 undetermined explosions) 2-6km south-south-west and south. Positioned in Sopyne the SMM heard 70 undetermined explosions 3-5km north-east, east-north-east and east.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted a higher level of violence both on 15 and 16 October (100 and 72 explosions, respectively, including explosions caused by artillery or mortar), compared with on 14 October (100 shots and explosions). In the night hours of 14-15 October, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 93 undetermined explosions, approximately 5-10km west of its location.

On 15 October, while on the bridge in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions approximately 15km west of its position, assessed as outside of the disengagement area.

During the day on 15 October, positioned in government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 5km north-east, bursts and shots of small-arms fire 4km east and south-east, all assessed as outside of the disengagement area. On 16 October, from 09:36 to 09:46, while in a government-controlled part of Zolote, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 5-6km north-east, assessed as outside of the disengagement area. From 11:35 to 11:52, while at an observation post on the government-controlled side of the Zolote/Pervomaisk closed crossing route, outside of the disengagement area, the SMM heard over 60 explosions assessed as caused by (82mm and 120mm) mortar rounds, and sporadic bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) and heavy-machine-gun fire, 4-6km east. At 11:52, while at the observation post, the patrol heard whistling past them what were assessed to be two heavy-machine-gun bullets, approximately 1-2m from the patrol’s position. The SMM heard the bullets impact on the observation post structure but did not see the impacts. The patrol members were wearing clearly marked OSCE clothing and protective gear. After hearing the impacts, the SMM took cover behind the observation post structure and departed the area (see SMM Spot Report 16 October).

On 16 October, whilst in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 20 explosions (assessed as 82 and 120mm mortar and under-barrel grenade-launcher rounds) 10km north-east, and more than 20 undetermined explosions (assessed as under-barrel grenade-launcher and automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) rounds) 6-7km east-north-east. 

On 15 and 16 October, the SMM followed up on reports of casualties and shelling. The SMM, accompanied by Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), observed fresh damage to the western-facing wall and roof of a private house in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM also saw a car in the yard had shrapnel impacts. The Russian JCCC officer showed the SMM the remains of a 73mm rocket-propelled grenade, allegedly found on the spot. The SMM assessed the damage to be consistent with this caliber and weapon type. A resident (middle-age woman) of the house told the SMM that shelling had started at about 23:30 on 14 October, and the house had been hit at 00:40 on 15 October. No casualties were reported.

In “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 96km south of Donetsk), the SMM, accompanied by two armed “DPR” members, observed three impact sites. At the first site, the SMM saw a fresh crater near the road – 100m away from a residential area – and damage to a nearby metal electricity pole. The SMM assessed it as caused by an 82mm mortar round. At the second site – an open field the SMM observed a fresh crater which it assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round possibly fired from a west-north-westerly direction. The third impact site was located in the garden of a house. The SMM saw a destroyed wooden shed and the broken window panes of the main house. The SMM assessed the impact to have been caused by a 152mm artillery round possibly fired from a west-north-westerly direction.

In “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (97km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a fresh crater in the garden of an abandoned house. The SMM assessed that it was caused by a 152mm artillery round possibly fired from a west-north-westerly direction. The Russian JCCC officer told the SMM that the shelling occurred at approximately 17:00 on 14 October.

Whilst on the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that all the north-facing windows of a shop had been broken and the tail of 82mm mortar round stuck on the soil in the front of the shop. Several civilians in Uzhivka and Pikuzy separately told the SMM that there had been no water supply in the area for several days. Additionally, residents  in Pikuzy have not had access to gas. On 16 October, the SMM observed a crew working on repairing the damaged gas pipeline.

In government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM, accompanied by Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC, observed damage to the roof and the ceiling of two apartments in a two-storey house on Tsyolkovskovo street, which it assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round possibly fired from an east-north-easterly direction. On the street 10m outside the house, the SMM observed another crater and assessed it as caused by an 82mm mortar round possibly fired from an east-north-easterly direction. According to the persons occupying one of the flats the shell had landed on 15 October at 22:59; two persons had been inside the apartment but there had been no casualties. In the garden located next to each other a few metres from the house on Lev Tolstoy street; the SMM observed two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), which were assessed as 82mm mortar rounds possibly fired from an east-north-easterly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The JCCC, tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. As a result SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to monitor parts.

On 15 October, positioned in government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 5km north-east, bursts and shots of small-arms fire 4km east and south-east, all assessed as outside of the disengagement area.

On 15 October, the SMM proceeded through the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route from the “LPR”-controlled side up to the railway bridge since it was informed by armed “LPR” members that the road had been cleared of mines/UXO since 29 September. Due to the possible presence of mines and UXO located 50-70m south of the railway bridge, the SMM did not proceed further. On 16 October, the SMM decided not to proceed from the “LPR”-controlled side.* The SMM visited a former “LPR” position in the south-eastern corner of the disengagement area and observed it abandoned. Due to the lack of guarantees that the area had been demined, the SMM could not proceed through the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route from the government-controlled side.

On 15 October in Stanytsia Luhanska a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC informed the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had not received any order to disengage the area. The SMM observed a newly constructed observation post with concrete walls at the Ukrainian Armed Forces position north of the bridge and just few metres north of the disengagement area. On 15 and 16 October the SMM could not access the narrow path east of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska near the parking lot at the “LPR” checkpoint because it did not get security guarantees that the area was demined. Moreover, it observed the mines sign and green plastic tapes on the branches of the trees in the area.* On 15 October, while on the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, assessed as outside of the disengagement area (see above).

On 15 October, the SMM could not enter the disengagement area on the western side of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske as neither Russian Federation Armed Forces JCCC officers nor “DPR” members ensured safety and security for the SMM.* The Russian JCCC officers also stated that he did not have patrol vehicles and sufficient personnel to assist in ensuring  the SMM’s security. The Russian JCCC representative said that the extent of demining activities required in Petrivske had not been established yet; however, the “DPR” had decided that they would not be demining the road north of the disengagement area, which connects Petrivske with Viktorivka. Two previously observed mine warning signs (white lettering in both Russian and English languages on a red background) were visible on the western side of Petrivske. On 16 October, the SMM once again could not proceed towards the disengagement area as armed “DPR” members did not ensure safety and security for the SMM and the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC were not present, thus not assisting in ensuring security for the SMM.* On 16 October, the SMM observed “DPR” members in military-style attire in at least three civilian dwellings in the village. On 15 October, while in Petrivske, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, assessed as outside of the disengagement area (see above). The Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC present in Bohdanivka told the SMM that all of them were the results of controlled detonations.

On 15 and 16 October, a Ukrainian JCCC officer could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) to Petrivske via the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk), because mines had yet to be removed.* The SMM observed two stationary IFVs (BMP-1) in the tree line 150m further on the road towards Viktorivka, just outside of the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed on 15 October: five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) transported on five flatbed trucks south of government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk), later on possibly observed the same ones near a checkpoint around 3-4km east of government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), and  one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) loaded on a tank transporter heading south-west in government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk). On 16 October, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) each loaded on a trailer heading north-west near government-controlled Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also saw ten anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in government-controlled Mykolaivka (37km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed  on 16 October a transporter truck with trailer carrying one tank (T-64) heading towards government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 16 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm). The SMM noted that 19 towed howitzers (2A36) were missing; seven for the first time. The SMM observed that one site was continued to be abandoned as first observed on 19 August, with 14 towed howitzers (eight 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and six 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[2] and a UAV in the security zone. On 15 October, the SMM observed a stationary light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun and one armoured personnel carrier (APC; MT-LB) equipped with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near a government-controlled part of Zolote, three stationary IFVs (BTR-3) and one APC  vehicle Kozak stationary in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk). On 16 October, the SMM saw two stationary IFVs (BMP-1) in the tree line in Bohdanivka on the road towards Viktorivka (see above). On 16 October, a stationary light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun was observed at the same location (see above). Moreover, the SMM saw one IFV (BTR-8) heading west and one stationary IFV (BMP-2) near government-controlled Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk), one stationary IFV (BTR-3) near Makarove, and two IFVs (BTR-2) in Stanytsia Luhanska which were heading north. In “LPR”-controlled area the SMM saw two stationary APCs (BTR-80) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) on 15 October.

On 16 October, in Sakhanka, the SMM observed “DPR” members in military-style clothes conducting a flight of a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) at 100m height. As soon as the UAV operators noticed the SMM, they left the area in a green military-type van.

The SMM observed the presence of anti-tank mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 15 October, on the road between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) and Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), 50-70m south of the railway bridge, the SMM observed the tail fin of an 82mm mortar round stuck in the asphalt and marked with a red triangle mine hazard sign. On 16 October, at the entrance of the government checkpoint on road H15 and on the road leading north, behind a concrete block and partially covered with tarp, south-west of government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw several anti-tank mines.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints and the situation of civilians along the contact line. On 15 October in the morning hours, at a government checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed at least 200 pedestrians and 66 civilian cars waiting in queue to enter government-controlled areas as well as at least 12 pedestrians and 33 civilian cars waiting to travel in the opposite direction. The pedestrians at the checkpoint complained that due to unknown technical reasons, the State Security of Ukraine website for obtaining electronic permits had not been operational for the last eight days. At the checkpoint in Marinka, the representatives of the Co-ordination Centre, dealing with the cases where it is not clear whether a person should be granted access to cross or not, confirmed this information and said that everyone who needed to prolong or obtain an electronic permit had to wait until the website was functional again. In cases such as funerals and emergency medical operations, they referred to the possibility of granting exceptions.

On 15 October, at 08:25, at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed approximately 60 pedestrians (men and women of different ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and approximately 220 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM saw a wooden stove in a State Emergency Service tent which has been operating for the previous three days, as temperatures dropped below zero. The State Emergency Service personnel told the SMM that the tent was operating from 07:30 until 18:00, sometimes until 20:00. At 07:30, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed approximately 400-450 pedestrians (men and women of different ages) queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas and 10-15 pedestrians waiting to proceed in the opposite direction. By 14:30, the former queue had decreased to approximately 150 pedestrians (men and women of different age groups), whereas the latter increased to 300.

On 16 October, in the morning hours, the SMM observed higher numbers of people at the government checkpoint north of the bridge and at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge. At the former checkpoint, at 09:00, the SMM observed nobody waiting to enter government-controlled areas and approximately 400 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. At 07:25, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed approximately 1,000 pedestrians queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas and 15 pedestrians waiting to pass in the opposite direction.

During the entire weekend, the SMM noted that some sand was thrown on the ramp in order to reduce the risk of sliding.

In order to follow up on the freedom of movement of residents of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) who complained on many occasions about the inability to move freely to and from their village, on 15 October the SMM monitored the flow of people through the street connecting Novooleksandrivka with Popasna (see SMM Daily Report 2 June). The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the newly established checkpoint near that street stated that the checkpoint would be opened on a daily basis between 09:00 and 16:00 for those residents of Novooleksandrivka whose names are on an official list received from the Anti-Terrorism Operation headquarters. They said that from the opening time until 11:50 around 16 people had crossed the checkpoint. According to them, two more civilians were trying to cross but were not permitted to pass, because their names were not on the list. The SMM noticed that the mine signs were still at the end of the street near the newly established checkpoint (see SMM Daily Report 14 October). However, the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said that there had been no mines and the signs would be removed soon. One resident of Novooleksandrivka who was returning to his home after shopping in Popasna said that he had not had any problem crossing this checkpoint.

On 16 October, the SMM observed that Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the checkpoint located 1.5km south-east of government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk) did not allow all civilians to proceed north-east, towards government-controlled Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk), claiming that the road had been closed to all traffic and suggesting an alternative route.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions, on 15 and 16 October, the SMM could not proceed further from the government-controlled side of the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. On both occasions, the SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 15 October, the SMM was not able to proceed further to government-controlled area of Zolote from the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area) due to the possible presence of mines and UXO on the government-controlled Zolote side of the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 16 October, at the “LPR” checkpoint on the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk, an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that it could proceed on the road towards Zolote, as the road on the “LPR”-controlled side was clear of mines and UXO, but that he was unaware of any change in status regarding the government-controlled side of the road. The SMM decided not to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two occasions, on 15 and 16 October, the SMM did not proceed across the bridge from “LPR”-controlled areas south of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia because an armed “LPR” member told the SMM not to proceed because of the presence of mines. The SMM observed that the road in “LPR”-controlled areas south of the bridge was blocked by barbed wire. On both occasions, the SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two occasions, on 15 and 16 October, the SMM did not proceed across the bridge from government-controlled Shchastia to “LPR”-controlled areas due to the presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two occasions, on 15 and 16 October, the SMM could not access the narrow path east of the parking lot at the “LPR” checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and therefore did not proceed to the summer cottage area because the armed “LPR” members did not remove the mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 15 October, while west of the Prince Ihor monument 1.2km south of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska (inside the disengagement area), on a road leading to an “LPR” position the SMM observed the presence of an anti-personnel mine (MON-50) attached to the trunk of a tree and remnants of a multi-launch rockets system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) rocket on the tarmac, 0.5m off the road. Also, 70m west, the SMM observed a green mine sign and trunks of trees used as obstacles on the road. On 16 October, the SMM decided not to proceed on that road due to the UXO observed the previous day. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 15 October the SMM could not proceed at the south-east edge of Stanytsia Luhanska due to a tree blocking the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 15 October the Russian Federation officers at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk). Therefore, the SMM could not to proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 16 October, on two occasions, the SMM could not proceed towards the disengagement area from Petrivske as armed “DPR” members did not ensure safety and security for the SMM and Russian Federation JCCC officers were not present and did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 15 and 16 October a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) due to the presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 16 October, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the checkpoint located 1.5km south-east of government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk) did not allow the SMM to proceed north-east, towards government-controlled Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk), claiming that the road had been closed to all traffic and suggesting an alternative route. The SMM observed that all civilian cars had to take the alternative route.

Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.