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Home Newsroom News and press releases Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 13 October 2016
Newsroom

Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 13 October 2016

KYIV 14 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, with most concentrated in areas north-east and east of Mariupol and in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area. In Luhansk region the SMM also recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period, most of which occurred north-east of Zolote. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; the SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* It followed up on reports of damage to civilian infrastructure. The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines. It observed the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance near populated areas. The Mission monitored long queues of vehicles and pedestrians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line.

The SMM recorded a lower number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including over 311 explosions compared with 550 explosions in the previous reporting period. More than 118 explosions were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area and more than 170 explosions were recorded in areas north-east and east of Mariupol.

During the evening of 12 October over a period of four hours, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded eight undetermined explosions and six explosions assessed as impacts, as well as 45 bursts of tracer rounds fired from east to west, all at unknown distances north-north-east of its location. The camera then recorded 64 explosions assessed as impacts and 12 undetermined explosions at distances ranging from 5-8km north-north-west of its location.

During the same evening while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions and over thirty bursts of heavy-machine-gun and twenty shots of small-arms fire at locations 2-6km east, south-east and south of its location.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the next day, the SMM heard over 102 undetermined explosions, ten explosions assessed as impacts and four explosions assessed as caused by outgoing rounds from heavy weapons, 49 shots of infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) rounds and over 80 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at distances 2-5km east and east-south-east of its location.

Positioned at the north-eastern edge of government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 24 explosions assessed as caused by artillery fire at distances 3-5km north-east, north-west and east-north-east of its position. Positioned near “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km NE of Mariupol) during approximately 25 minutes, the SMM heard over 40 undetermined explosions at distances 4-5km south-south-west of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM also recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including seven explosions, compared with 18 during the previous reporting period. Positioned near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk, inside the disengagement area), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an unknown distance north, and could not determine whether it occurred inside the disengagement area. Positioned outside the disengagement area in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an unknown distance to the south-west, and could not determine whether it occurred inside the disengagement area. Positioned outside the disengagement area in government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions assessed as caused by artillery fire approximately 5km north-east of its location, assessed as occurring outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to the SMM’s monitoring, was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. As a result SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to monitor parts of them.

On the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, Ukrainian Armed Forces and Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC again told the SMM the sides were ready to disengage once orders to do so were received. The SMM observed an IFV (BMP-2) near the southernmost government checkpoint near the bridge (inside the disengagement area). At 12:50, the SMM observed the firing of a white signal flare by “LPR” members, which they told the SMM was to signal to the Ukrainian Armed Forces that “LPR” members were ready to start the disengagement. The Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that he had not been aware that the flare was fired and did not have orders to begin disengagement. The Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC claimed that there had been shelling of the southernmost government position (inside the disengagement area) near the pedestrian bridge the night before and the SMM observed two fresh craters on the east side of the road approximately 5m from the government position. Near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area), the SMM observed two 12.7mm ammunition boxes being unloaded into the “LPR” checkpoint and a heavy machine-gun being moved into position by armed “LPR” members. Later in the day the SMM observed one military-type truck with a white number 22 painted on the passenger door carrying approximately 15 men in military-type clothing in the rear trailer and traveling north-east on a dirt road past the Prince Ihor monument. The SMM was not able to reach the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area) from either side of the contact line (on three separate occasions) or “LPR”-controlled areas south-west of the pedestrian bridge (inside the disengagement area) due to the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement).*

Positioned in two separate locations in and around the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM recorded five undetermined explosions, assessed as outside the disengagement area (see above). Due to the lack of guarantees that the area had been demined, the SMM could not proceed through the potential Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route from either side.*

The SMM was not able to proceed from the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske towards the disengagement area as “DPR” members did not ensure safety and security for the SMM and the Russian Federation Armed Forces side of the JCCC was not present and hence could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM.* The SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-80) traveling east through Petrivske (outside the disengagement area) carrying nine men dressed in military-type clothing. In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM was not able to proceed east towards the disengagement area as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM because, according to him, mines on the road leading to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) had yet to be removed and he had no information on when that would happen.* 

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to civilian infrastructure. In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk), led by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC, the SMM observed an impact in a yard and damage to a nearby residential building and assessed the damage to have been caused by the impact of a 120mm mortar. The SMM spoke with a female resident, who said that the damage occurred during shelling the evening of 12 October. The SMM observed shrapnel damage to the yard, walls, windows and interior of the residential home well as a small shed. The SMM also observed a house across the street with shattered windows. At a factory between Kalynove-Borshchuvate and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two impacts, one at a building near the main gate of the factory and a second impact near another building 300-400m away.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: two tanks being towed on trailers near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); one self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk); and one mortar (M37, 82mm) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed one tank (T-64, 125mm) being transported on a military-type flat-bed trailer and accompanied by an “emergency services” van traveling east on road H-21 near “DPR”-controlled Serdyte (45km east of Donetsk). In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: three tanks (T-64, 125mm) stationary by the H-21 road and three tanks (T-64, 125mm) at the entrance of a military training area, all near Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk); two tanks on trailers and nine stationary tanks (T-64, 125mm) on the side of the road near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk), three tanks (T-64, 125mm) on trailers near Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk), four tanks (T-64, 125mm) on trailers near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), and four tanks (T-64, 125mm) near Rubizhne (85km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and eighteen mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm). The SMM also noted as missing: 68 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 12 mortars (2B11, 120mm).

The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines and observed that 64 tanks (T-64, 125mm) were missing, three of which were observed as missing for the first time (plus 31 as of 28 February, eight as of 19 April, one as of 29 June, ten as of 21 July, and one as of 16 September) as well as that 23 mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were missing, nine for the first time, plus eight as of 28 February and one as of 16 September.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: ten IFVs (BMP-1) and five armoured personnel carriers (APC; three BTR-3 and two MT-LB) near government-controlled Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk); and one IFV (BMP-1) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) near populated areas. At a T-junction on the road between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km north of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed for the first time the tail of a 120mm shell stuck in the asphalt. The SMM assessed that the UXO had recently impacted. In Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed an unexploded anti-tank rocket (RPG-18) protruding out of the ground in an agricultural field, approximately 20m away from an inhabited house. Also in Novooleksandrivka, the SMM observed two newly placed mine hazards consisting of red metal boards with white lettering stating “Stop Mines” on both sides of Parushovka Street.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At 16:20, while at the government checkpoint in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 210 cars and five mini-buses queuing to enter government-controlled areas. While passing the checkpoint, approximately 20 civilians stopped the SMM and complained that they had been queuing since 06:00 and that the line was not moving. In twenty minutes the SMM observed that the line did not move forward. The SMM spoke with the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint commander who said that the checkpoint had had a higher level of traffic than usual throughout the day.

At 11:00 at the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw 400 pedestrians queuing to travel in the direction of government-controlled areas. At the same time the SMM saw 150 pedestrians waiting to pass the checkpoint in the opposite direction. In the morning at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw some 300 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and a similar number queuing to travel in the opposite direction. Several hours later, the SMM observed 200-250 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 400-500 queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

  • In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), on two separate occasions, the SMM was unable to proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area as the Russian Federation officer at the JCCC was not present and hence could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM was not able to proceed east towards the disengagement area as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM because, according to him, mines on the road leading to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) had yet to be removed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • At a “DPR” checkpoint on the western outskirts of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, “DPR”-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from passing, citing the “security situation”. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • On three separate occasions, the SMM could not proceed further from either side of the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. On each occasion the SMM informed the JCCC.
  • On three separate occasions on the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska (inside the disengagement area) the presence of mines and mine hazard signs restricted SMM’s freedom of movement. The SMM was not able to proceed further to a summer cottage area (neighbouring to the railway bridge) as it continued to observe a mine hazard sign east of the parking lot near the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the bridge. On each occasion the SMM informed the JCCC.
  • On two separate occasions on the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area the possible presence of mines and UXO impeded the SMM from reaching the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area). While on foot patrol on Moskva-Donbas Street the SMM was not able to proceed further to the railway bridge due to the presence of mines and contamination with UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia bridge (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM could not proceed towards government-controlled areas as “LPR” members present informed the SMM that demining had not taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • In Shchastia, the SMM was unable to proceed from the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the bridge towards the “LPR”-controlled side as the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander present told the SMM that the area was contaminated with mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • In government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM was unable to proceed due to the presence of concrete blocks and road obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”) in the road as well as the possible presence of mines/UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

  • At a “DPR” checkpoint near Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk), an armed “DPR” member stopped and forced the SMM to wait in the queue for crossing the checkpoint. He said that he had received an order from his “commander” to put SMM and UN vehicles in the queue. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.