Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 27 September 2016

This report is for the general public and the media.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 187 explosions compared with 24 in the previous reporting period, with most of them concentrated in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport triangle area. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a single ceasefire violation (one burst) compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process near Petrivske, Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote and noted a calm situation. The Mission was restricted in its freedom of movement, including in disengagement areas near Petrivske and Zolote.* The SMM monitored one border area currently not under government control.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region, including 187 explosions compared with the previous reporting period (24 explosions). Most of the ceasefire violations were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport triangle area, including 180 explosions.

On the night of 26 September, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, within 13 minutes, four explosions (three undetermined explosions and one assessed as an outgoing round from an undetermined weapon), one rocket-assisted projectile, three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and three shots of direct tracer, all at an undetermined distance north-east of its location. Of those, the first rocket-assisted projectile and one burst were fired from west to east, followed by one burst, one shot and one burst all from east to west, four explosions, and finally, two shots from west to east.

During the day of 27 September, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard 85 undetermined explosions 3-6km north-north-east and north-east of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 94 undetermined explosions 2-5km west-south-west and west of its position. Almost all explosions were accompanied by numerous bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) between 10:42 and 15:38, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 2-3km south-south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a single ceasefire violation (one burst) compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). Positioned in Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one burst of small-arms fire, 200-300m south-west of its position.

The SMM continued to monitor and verify the disengagement process in the general areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) and Bohdanivka (41km south-east of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September.

In all three areas, the SMM noted a calm situation, but could not access the actual disengagement area between Petrivske and Bohdanivka or between Pervomaisk and Zolote.*

Near an “LPR” checkpoint between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk and government-controlled parts of Zolote, the SMM observed ten armed “LPR” members, one crane, one tractor, and two vehicles. One “LPR” member told the SMM that they had completed the removal of ten concrete pillars from the road. The SMM noted that a space had been created for one vehicle to pass on the road leading to government-controlled parts of Zolote. The interlocutor also stated that the demining activity had not been undertaken as they were waiting for “permission” to conduct demining. The SMM could not proceed further along the closed crossing route between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk and government-controlled Zolote due to the likely presence of mines, indicated by mine hazard signs on the road.* At the government checkpoint at the northern end of the closed crossing route near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM could not proceed further to cross the contact line due to likely presence of mines and booby traps, about which the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander present informed the SMM. The SMM also conducted a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight over the government-controlled side of Zolote and noted a calm situation.

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske an armed “DPR” member told the SMM that the main road leading to the western edge was mined and therefore dangerous to pass. On the western edge – approximately 150m east of the disengagement area the SMM observed a pile of concrete debris blocking the road and a concrete block on the asphalt road connecting the village with the disengagement area. The SMM also noted several armed men wearing military-style clothes before the block and a string 10m west of the block, which it assessed as a string of anti-personnel mines (POM2). Armed men present told the SMM that proceeding any further westwards was dangerous as snipers were operating in the area. In the village the SMM observed mine hazard signs along the secondary roads which also prevented the SMM from accessing the area outside the main road.* The SMM conducted four mini UAV flights, although the SMM had to abort two attempted mini-UAV flights on the western edge of the village due to continuous jamming. The SMM was unable to proceed further to the east from the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position east of government-controlled Bohdanivka in order to reach the disengagement area in Petrivske as the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) could not facilitate security guarantees for the SMM.* In Bohdanivka the Ukrainian Armed Forces General told the SMM that if the SMM observation posts would not be established on both sides of the disengagement area, he would not conduct any disengagement of the Ukrainian Armed Forces unit in the area. The SMM asked the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and “DPR” members, separately, to conduct demining activities on the road connecting Petrivske and Bohdanivka through Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). The Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would start demining activities in the area after maintenance of seven-day comprehensive ceasefire. The “DPR” members told the SMM that they considered the road out of the disengagement area and therefore they would not remove mines, despite their obligation to do so under Paragraph 6 of the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014 and renewed commitments in the mine action decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016, as well as their responsibilities to ensure secure and safe access for the SMM monitors in accordance with the Addendum to the Package of Measures and the Framework Decision of 21 September. Demining of the road is also required to ensure SMM’s patrolling and remote observation in the disengagement area as stipulated in the Framework Decision.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with criteria set forth in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed that one site continued to be abandoned, as first noted on 31 April, with 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) missing.

The SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted three tanks (T-64) as missing: one as first observed on 6 September and the latter two observed missing for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw two stationary infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP-2) at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge – one inside the disengagement area and another outside the disengagement area. An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC; MT-LB) and six IFVs (three BMP-1 and three BMP-2) in various locations in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At a government checkpoint in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM noted 90 minutes before the closure of the checkpoint, that 164 cars were queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 60 cars and 50 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction.

In the morning at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, ten minutes before the opening of the checkpoint the SMM observed 175 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 150 pedestrians queuing to travel in the other direction. In the morning at the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed approximately 1,000 pedestrians queuing to travel in the direction of government-controlled areas and approximately 100 pedestrians queuing to travel in the opposite direction. The SMM noted that the state of the wooden structure connecting the pieces of the destroyed bridge continued to be critical. The SMM noted gaps in the handrail and steps missing on the steep ramp, making it a slippery and dangerous trip, especially for elderly and people with disabilities.

The SMM observed four-five fresh impacts/holes on the north-east facing side of a kiosk near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM also observed at least three relatively fresh impacts/holes on the south-facing side of the metal obstacles south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the bridge.

The SMM monitored one border area currently not under government control. At the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed 38 cars and one bus queuing to cross into the Russian Federation. Twenty-six cars had Ukrainian licence plates, 11 cars and one bus had Russian Federation licence plates, and one car had “LPR” plates.  The SMM also saw 36 cars (31 with Ukrainian licence plates, four with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with German licence plates) at a parking lot near the border crossing point.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line. In government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) a resident (a woman aged 60) working in a school in government-controlled Zolote-3 told the SMM that since the start of the conflict the road between Katerynivka and Zolote-3 has been closed and she had to take a detour of 5km in order to reach the school, walking along non-paved roads where there were many mine hazard signs. She added two students also made the same journey to school every day.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate                                                                                   

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In a forest area near government-controlled Sviatohirsk (117km north of Donetsk) a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier prevented the SMM from entering a location beyond the road barrier, citing orders from his superiors. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Near government-controlled Bohorodychne (115km north of Donetsk) Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a field military encampment, citing orders. From the barriers to the encampment, the SMM saw military trucks and dug-in positions. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not reach the disengagement area in Petrivske from either side of the contact line. The SMM was not able to reach the disengagement area from government-controlled Bohdanivka as the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not facilitate security guarantees for the SMM. On the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM was prevented from proceeding to the disengagement area due to the presence of a concrete block and anti-personnel mines placed on an asphalt road connecting the village with the disengagement area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM observed mine hazard signs along the secondary roads which also prevented the SMM from accessing to the area outside the main road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the government checkpoint at the northern end of the closed crossing route near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM could not proceed further to cross the contact line due to likely presence of mines and booby traps, about which the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander present informed the SMM. The SMM saw mine hazard signs along the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• From “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote the SMM could not proceed further along the closed crossing route between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk and government-controlled Zolote due to mine hazard signs on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:

• On the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM had to abort two attempted mini-UAV flights due to continuous jamming. The SMM informed the JCCC.