Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 13 September 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region (including 275 explosions recorded) compared with the previous reporting period (including 57 explosions recorded), with many concentrated in Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded eight explosions, which were attributable to a live-fire exercise outside the security zone, compared with no ceasefire violations recorded during the previous day. The Mission followed up on reports of non-civilian casualties. It observed long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. It encountered impediments to its freedom of movement on six occasions on both sides of the contact line. 

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] (including 275 explosions recorded) in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period (including 57 explosions recorded), with many concentrated in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded  in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area, including 195 explosions.

Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions at locations 3-6km ranging from west-north-west to north of its position.

On the night of 12 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 12 explosions assessed as caused by impacts of undetermined weapons and one airburst 2-6km east-south-east of its location. The following day, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 157 explosions (11 of which were assessed as caused by mortar rounds) and multiple bursts and single shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire all 1-5km west-north-west of its position. Positioned in Avdiivka the SMM heard 21 explosions: 11 explosions were assessed as caused by mortar (82 and 120mm) rounds 3km south-east; and ten explosions assessed as caused by outgoing rounds from 120mm mortar (five explosions), recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) (two explosions), and automatic grenade launcher (three explosions) 1km south of its position.

On the evening of 12 September, positioned at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 4-5km north-east of its position. During the night whilst in Horlivka the SMM heard 60 undetermined explosions 5-6km south-west of its position. At 18:03 on 13 September, at the south-easternmost checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two single shots of small-arms fire 40m east of its location.  The SMM immediately left the area accompanied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).

On the night of 12 September whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-5km north-east followed by multiple single shots of small-arms fire and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km north-east and south-east of its location.

On the night of 12 September, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, within four minutes, four outgoing mortar rounds fired from west to east 2km north-north-west of its location and one rocket-assisted projectile fired from west to east at an undetermined distance north-north-west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded eight undetermined explosions which were attributable to a live-fire exercise, compared with no ceasefire violations recorded during the previous day. Positioned near government-controlled Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk) the SMM heard eight explosions of tank fire 2-5km south-west-west of its position, assessed as a live-fire exercise at a known training ground outside the security zone.

The SMM followed up on reports of Ukrainian Armed Forces casualties, which had been reportedly registered in government-controlled Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk) on 12 September. At a hospital in government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk) medial staff told the SMM that three Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel with wounds (two were injured in the upper legs by small-arms fire, the third one in the shoulder) had been brought to the hospital at 02:00 on 13 September, adding that after receiving medical treatment there, they had been transported by a helicopter to a hospital in Kharkiv. According to the interlocutor the three wounded personnel were first taken to a hospital in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) together with two other wounded Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel but the two were considered non-transportable patients, therefore they were not brought to a hospital in Novoaidar.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with criteria set forth in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter three separate heavy weapon holding areas, stating that he had received an order, but instead had some weapons carried outside of the holding areas;* the SMM checked the serial numbers of 12 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), which it had previously observed. The SMM continued to observe as missing: 26 howitzers (12 towed D-20, 152mm, and 18 self-propelled 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and six anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm).

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS, BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw two armoured personnel carriers (BRDM-2) heading south-east near Bakhmutivka (39km north-west of Luhansk). In a “DPR”-controlled area, the SMM saw four light armoured vehicles (BTR type) heading north in Donetsk city’s Voroshylovskyi district (1km north of Donetsk city centre). In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) towed by a truck heading north near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk), and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) towed by a stationary truck near Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk), both on 12 September. Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 12 September of nine armoured vehicles near “DPR”-controlled Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor the repair work of water pumps in the power plant in government-controlled Shchastia, as well as the repair work of water pumps in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning of 12 September, at two “DPR” checkpoints in Horlivka, the SMM observed a total of 250 cars and 430 people queuing towards government-controlled areas, and 48 cars and 17 people waiting to travel in the opposite direction. The SMM noted that most of the people in the queue were the same people it saw there the previous day during closing hours of checkpoints. People in the queue told the SMM about an increasing number of residents in Luhansk region trying to pass through the Horlivka-Maiorsk checkpoints. The SMM observed that almost half of the queuing vehicles had Ukrainian licence plates registered in Luhansk region. In the afternoon, at the southernmost government checkpoint before the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed approximately ten pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 450-500 pedestrians queuing to travel in the opposite direction. A woman (in her fifties) told the SMM that she had been waiting in the queue more than three hours.

The SMM monitored one border area currently not under government control. On 12 September, at the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (53km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed 61 civilian cars, two buses and seven cargo trucks queuing to cross into the Russian Federation. Forty-three cars, all the buses and all the trucks had Ukrainian licence plates, 17 cars had Russian Federation licence plates, and one car had “LPR” “licence plates”. During its two-hour observation, the SMM saw that approximately 30-40 people and 25 vehicles crossed into Ukraine.

The SMM monitored the situation at schools near the contact line. In government-controlled Malynivka (25km west-northwest of Mariupol), the SMM observed a former kindergarten building being used as a military hospital, located 250m from a building currently being used for a kindergarten and a school. According to a former staff member (man, aged 60) of the school, the school management had decided to relocate the kindergarten to the school building, and after the relocation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had reached an agreement with the Nikolske district administration to use it as a military hospital since July 2015. The SMM also noted at least eight armoured vehicles and 15 soldiers in the direct vicinity of the school and kindergarten building.

The SMM monitored the situation of supply of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) in Donetsk city. The SMM observed a queue of approximately 50-60 civilian vehicles in front of a fuel station in “DPR”-controlled Petrovskyi district (15km south-west of Donetsk city centre). A man (aged 60) standing in the queue told the SMM that there was a shortage of LPG in Donetsk. Out of 15 fuel stations in the area, the SMM saw signs indicating no available LPG at 12 fuel stations and queues of civilian vehicles in front the other three including one mentioned above.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter three heavy weapon holding areas, citing an order from his superiors.
• At a checkpoint on the highway M-04 2.5km west-north-west of government-controlled Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk), while the SMM was heading to Avdiivka, Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers stopped the SMM and told not to proceed further, citing security concern. The SMM had to detour. The JCCC was informed.
• At a temporary checkpoint 2.5km west of government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers prevented the SMM from proceeding  to government-controlled Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk), citing an ongoing special operation. The SMM had to detour. The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• On the late morning of 12 September, at a checkpoint on the eastern entrance to “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to pass the checkpoint on condition that the SMM vehicles would be ‘escorted’ by a “DPR” member walking in front of the vehicles and be videotaped by a “DPR” member. The JCCC was informed.
• In the afternoon, the SMM was again escorted by an armed “DPR” member walking in front the SMM vehicles through Petrivske.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint on the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), armed “DPR” members delayed the SMM for 21 minutes while they sought approval for the SMM’s access from their “superiors”. The JCCC was informed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.