Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 6 September 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a higher number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region (including 62 explosions compared with five during the previous reporting period) and a higher number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region (including 42 explosions, compared with none during the previous reporting period). The SMM confirmed the death of a woman from shelling in Shchastia on 30 August. The SMM continued to observe heavy weapons missing from Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas and the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone in non-government-controlled areas. The SMM monitored the precarious situation of civilians travelling across the contact line at the damaged Stanytsia Luhanska pedestrian bridge. The SMM observed military presence at a building previously housing an orphanage in Avdiivka. The SMM monitored a calm situation at four border crossing points in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It observed the presence of mines in various locations along the administrative boundary line between the mainland of Ukraine and Crimea.

The SMM recorded a higher number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including 62 explosions recorded, compared with five explosions recorded during the previous period.

During the night of 5 September, at 22:18, while at the SMM forward patrol base in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), two explosions were heard 3-4km north-west and in the afternoon of 6 September, the SMM heard a burst of heavy machine-gun fire 1km north of its positions. On the same night, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded eight illumination flares 6-7km east-south-east of its location. In the afternoon, the SMM camera recorded one explosion assessed as an impact of a round from an unknown weapon 4-5km east-south-east of its location.

Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), between 12:57 and 14:20, the SMM heard nine explosions and one explosion assessed as an impact, all from an unknown weapon and several single shots of small-arms fire 2-10km north-north-west, north-north-east, and west-north-west of its location.

At the “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata railway station (16km north-east of Donetsk), between 12:35 and 14:00, the SMM heard 18 explosions from an unknown weapon, with three assessed as outgoing rounds, and 187 single shots of small-arms fire 2-7km west-north-west, west-south-west, and west of its position.

Positioned at the government-controlled checkpoint at Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 30 explosions from an unknown weapon 4km south. At the “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka/E58 junction (24km east-north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard one explosion from an unknown weapon 5-7km north of its position.

The SMM recorded a higher number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, including 42 explosions recorded, compared with no explosions recorded during the previous reporting period.

On 5 September, between 19:45 and 23:53, while at the forward patrol base in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard and saw an engagement, which lasted approximately four hours, 3.8km south-west of its position in the area of the pedestrian crossing bridge. At the start of the exchange, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions from an unknown weapon and several bursts of small-arms fire. About two hours later, the SMM heard multiple bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire that gradually increased in intensity. For the next 90 minutes, the firing reached its peak and the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions, assessed as 82mm mortar rounds (82mm); 23 shots assessed as outgoing automatic grenade launcher rounds (AGS-17/SPG-9); 19 explosions assessed as automatic grenade launcher rounds (AGS-17/SPG-9); 74 shots, assessed as cannon fire (30mm); and multiple bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire. The direction of fire was both north-to-south and south-to-north. During this time the SMM was in communication with the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in an effort to calm down the situation. The SMM also followed up on the incident on 6 September at the headquarters of the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty caused by shelling on 30 August in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). The head of the police informed the SMM that a woman (28 years old) had been critically wounded in the head by shrapnel on 30 August and died on 4 September. She was a resident on Haharin Street where shelling took place and a nurse who worked at the local hospital.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas, the SMM observed 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) near Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, near south-east of government-controlled Smolianynove (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw one trailer transporting a tank (type unknown) moving east towards government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. At Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas, the SMM observed in total 12 towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) missing, as first noted on 19 December 2015; five towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and two automatic mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) missing, since last recorded on 4 March 2016; and 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsia, 152mm) missing, with one first noted on 3 February 2016 and ten more noted on 13 July 2016. The SMM observed as present two towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and 12 MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm).

The SMM revisited “DPR” permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. All previously recorded weapons were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the security zone. An SMM mini UAV recorded the presence of an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (40km south-east of Donetsk) on 2 September. The UAV also recorded a refurbished Ukrainian Armed Forces observation point and more than 0.5km of upgraded trenches near the same location. While approximately 300m east of “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) the SMM observed one armoured combat vehicle (BMP-2) in a field travelling west from its position. Near government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw an armoured vehicle (MT-LB), with armed personnel seated on the roof, entering the south-eastern entrance to the power plant compound. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in a government-controlled part of Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC; Kraz Cougar) with a mounted 12.7mm heavy machine-gun. In “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard and saw one unidentified UAV with small fixed wings approximately 2km south-west of its location, flying from north-east to south-west direction, at an altitude of less than 1km.

The SMM continued to monitor for military presence in proximity of schools and social institutions. According to a local official in government-controlled Avdiivka, buildings used as an evening school and a former orphanage were occupied by security or military forces. The SMM visited the first site on Komunalna Street, and observed a two-storey building with no military equipment or vehicles nearby but still in use as a school. At the second site on Molodezhna Street, the SMM observed a partly damaged building with no glass windows and saw two camouflaged military vans in the adjacent yard and camouflage nets; however, according to a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer during a visit to the same location on 22 August, the orphans had been relocated due to the conflict in 2014.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repair work to railway tracks by the Ukrainian railways operator in government-controlled Orikhove (56km north-west of Luhansk) and the power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians travelling across the contact line at the pedestrian bridge near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). In the morning, approximately 150 people (mixed gender and ages) were observed waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas at the last “LPR”-controlled checkpoint before the bridge and approximately 150 people were queued at the last government-controlled checkpoint before the bridge waiting to cross in the opposite direction. The SMM continued to observe the poor condition of the wooden ramp extended across the broken portion of the bridge. The SMM has seen broken wooden planks, loose nails, broken stairs, and holes in the tread planking. Approximately one quarter of the tread boards of the ramp were seen as broken, cracked, or missing, especially near the top where the risk of falling is greatest. The tread planking is badly worn from heavy pedestrian traffic and the hand rails need reinforcement. Approximately 15 civilians (mixed gender and ages) expressed concern that the rainy season followed by winter snows may increase the risk of collapse. The “LPR” checkpoint commander complained to the SMM about the dangerous condition of the ramp for commuters. The SMM observed two men nailing wooden planks over holes in the ramp across the bridge; they said they are working on a voluntary basis.

The SMM observed the removal of unexploded ordnance (UXO) at the pedestrian bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska, where a Ukrainian Armed Forces demining team removed one mortar (82mm) and one rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the “LPR” positions closest to the bridge. Checkpoints on both sides of the bridge were closed for approximately 30 minutes during the demining operation.

The SMM monitored two border areas currently not controlled by the Government and two border areas in government-controlled areas. At the border crossing point near “DPR”-controlled Uspenka (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 83 cars (most with Ukrainian licence plates) and 47 covered transport trucks (39 with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation, and two with Belarussian licence plates) queuing to travel to the Russian Federation. The SMM spoke to two men (in their fifties) who said they had been waiting in line for over five hours and had moved approximately 100m. A man and woman (in their fifties) said they had also been waiting in line for several hours. At the “DPR”-controlled border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed two men and two women (in their fifties) walk toward the Russian Federation.

In government-controlled Lantrativka (174km north of Luhansk), the commander of the Ukrainian border guard office informed the SMM that Russian Federation citizens must use the border crossing point located in government-controlled Taniushivka (137km north of Luhansk). At the border crossing points in government-controlled Syrotyne (182km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw Ukrainian border guards on duty and no pedestrians or vehicles crossing in either direction. The SMM confirmed the border crossing point at Demyno-Oleksandrivka (180km north-west of Luhansk) remained closed to traffic in both directions.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. The SMM observed the presence of land mines in various locations along the administrative boundary line. The SMM observed calm situations at the crossing points near Chaplynka, Kalanchak, and Chonhar (67, 77, and 162km south-east of Kherson). While near the last Ukrainian border guard control post outside Chonhar and near the bridge leading to Crimea, the SMM observed the movement of five armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR-80) manoeuvring in an area some 500m west of the customs terminal. In Nadezhdivka (82km south-east of Kherson), the SMM observed three radar systems and one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in a farm compound.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM was asked initially by one unarmed man and later on by two armed men, all wearing military-style clothing, to move away from the checkpoint and keep a distance of at least 300m.The SMM complied and continued to observe at this location. The JCCC was informed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.