Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 8 December 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded an increasing number of ceasefire violations around Donetsk airport. In Luhansk region, all explosions and gunfire heard were assessed as activities related to training or demining. The SMM followed up on reports of resumption of power supply across the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea. Its freedom of movement was restricted six times on both side of the contact line, resulting, in one instance, in the inability to reach the areas alongside the international border and border crossing points in areas not controlled by the Government*.

The SMM recorded ceasefire violations in several areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions[1]. Positioned at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard a total of 87 explosions and multiple bursts of small-arms and light-weapons (SALW) fire, 3-8km to the north, north-north-west, north-west and west. While 81 explosions were undetermined, six of them were assessed as being consistent with the impact of 82mm-calibre mortar fire – weapons that are restricted at this distance to the contact line. Whilst in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol), the SMM also heard multiple bursts and several single shots of small-arms fire, as well as eight undetermined explosions 3-7km north and north-west of its position.

All explosions and gunfire heard in Luhansk region were assessed as activities related to training or demining. For example, the SMM heard 12 outgoing explosions caused by artillery and 40-50 shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun (HMG) fire assessed to be part of training exercises occurring at the government-controlled Trokhizbenka training area (33km north-west of Luhansk). Positioned in “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Malomykolaivka (36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five to seven bursts of HMG fire assessed as training exercises in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk), as well as four explosions assessed as impacts of artillery fire at a firing range in “LPR”-controlled Shymshynivka (28km south-west of Luhansk).  In “LPR”-controlled Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard and saw one explosion 100m north of its position. Subsequently, the SMM went to the place where the explosion occurred and spoke to three civilian workers (men aged 40 and 50). They told the SMM that a demining team had conducted a detonation of a hand grenade which they had found without a safety pin inside an electrical transformer station.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling on both sides of the contact line. In government-controlled Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw four relatively fresh craters consistent with 120mm mortar rounds in a garden of the villa occupied by solders and assessed to have been fired from a south-easterly direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander told the SMM that shelling had occurred during the night of 6 December. In “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (50km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two relatively fresh craters 70m from a civilian house. The SMM assessed that they had been caused by 120mm calibre mortars fired from a northerly direction. Two armed individuals and one male resident told the SMM that the impacts had occurred during the night of 6 December.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces and “LPR” permanent weapons storage sites, the locations of which corresponded with the withdrawal lines. All previously recorded weapons were present.

In areas of beyond the withdrawal lines – but outside storage sites – the SMM observed the following Addendum-related weapons: one tank (T-64) loaded on a flat-bed track heading south in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city; two tanks at a training ground in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk); four tanks at a training ground in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk); 31 tanks at a training ground in “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of measures. “DPR” members have yet to provide the requested inventory of heavy weapons and locations of designated permanent storage sites for these weapons, as requested by the SMM on 16 October. Members of the “LPR” had provided the SMM with an inventory of heavy weapons, their serial numbers and the locations at which they are said to be stored, as requested by the SMM. The Ukrainian military authorities had earlier provided an inventory list of military equipment featuring weapons systems as well as their serial numbers, but not the locations where the weapons are to be permanently withdrawn to.

The SMM revisited “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage sites, the locations and inventory of which were provided to the SMM on 2 December. The site met the criteria outlined in the 16 October notification. The SMM observed that all previously recorded weapons were present.

The SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.

At such Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas, the SMM observed: 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 12mm), 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), and 12 anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm).

The SMM continued to observe Ukrainian Armed Forces presence in Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report 8 December), where it noted a number of military personnel and hardware. Staff of the village council and school teachers whom the SMM spoke to expressed their concern about the current situation, especially the presence of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and stated that since early December they had heard small-arms fire almost on a daily basis. During the night of 7 December they had heard six mortar rounds. The SMM observed that a number of residential houses in the village were occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable on-going repairs to critical infrastructure close to the contact line. In “LPR”-controlled areas south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed on-going repair work to power lines and demining, which had been suspended on 25 November for security reasons.

The SMM followed up on reports of resumption of power supply through one of the pylons damaged by explosions in the vicinity of the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea. According to the UkrEnergo website, the Kakhovka-Titan power line was energised with a 120MW load at 8:00hrs. At the site of the damaged pylons near Chaplynka (90km south-east of Kherson), the SMM heard the humming sound of electricity coming from the repaired Kakhovska-Titan power line. The SMM saw no activists or police officers (see SMM Daily Report 21 November).

In front of the Lviv regional administration building, the SMM observed a gathering of 100 people (including 20 women and 40 men in military uniform) expressing their dissatisfaction with current support measures for participants of the anti-terrorism operation (ATO). The demonstration, organized by Lviv Co-ordination Centre for Support to ATO Participants, passed off peacefully with 15 police officers present.

In Kyiv, the SMM also monitored several demonstrations – some of them with a high number of participants – in the vicinity of the buildings of the Cabinet of Ministers and Parliament, where the Vice President of the United States of America had paid an official visit. The SMM observed 2,500 people (mostly elderly women), not holding any banner and flags, walking from Independence Square (Maidan) to Marynskyi Park – across the street from the Cabinet of Ministers building. Meanwhile, a dozen participants whom the SMM spoke to had no idea about the purpose of the demonstration. The SMM noted that upon their arrival participants were receiving already prepared banners criticising the United States. At the same time, the SMM also observed a protest of 400 supporters of the Svoboda party (mostly men aged 30-40) expressing their discontent with the Government in the front of the main entrance of Parliament (Verkhovna Rada), where subsequently 70-80 supporters of the Party of Ordinary People arrived and joined the protest. The SMM noted 50 buses with 2,000 anti-riot police and National Guard officers around the locations of the demonstrations. These demonstrations passed off peacefully and at the end of the events the participants dispersed.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas adjacent to the international border in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

• In government-controlled Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol), the unit commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces refused the SMM entry to a military compound.
• At a checkpoint at the northern exit of government-controlled Hranitne (47km north-east of Mariupol), Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers prevented the SMM from passing through. They stated that the road leading north was impassable due to mines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs). 
• At a checkpoint near “LPR”-controlled Uralo-Kavkaz (45km south-east of Luhansk), three armed “LPR” members did not allow the SMM to proceed towards “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (53km south-east of Luhansk) alongside the international border, on the grounds that they were not able to read the SMM patrol plan written in English and that the SMM needed a written permission to pass.

Delay:

• In government-controlled Pavlopil (26km northeast of Mariupol), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel refused the SMM access for 34 minutes, before allowing it to enter a former agricultural compound used as a base.
• At a checkpoint south of government-controlled Hranitne (47km north-east of Mariupol), Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers held the SMM for 30 minutes before allowing it to pass.
• At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south of Donetsk), armed “DPR” members held the SMM for 40 minutes, demanding to see the SMM members’ national passports.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.