Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 18 August 2019

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 16 and 17 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 17 and 18 August, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM continued to monitor the situation inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside of the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas.
• It saw self-propelled howitzers in violation of withdrawal lines near Mariupol.
• The SMM saw unexploded ordnance near Popasna, Novohryhorivka, Verkhnoshyrokivske, and Shyrokyne.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of essential civilian infrastructure at the Donetsk Filtration Station and the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near Kreminets where members of the armed formations behaved aggressively towards the Mission.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 16 and 17 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (52 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations, including most of the explosions, were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), north-north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 17 and 18 August, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Pyshchevyk and south-south-west of Svitlodarsk.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 16 and 17 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (four), compared with the previous reporting period (35 explosions). All of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west-south-west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), north-west of Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), and south-south-east of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 17 and 18 August, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, and no explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. All of the ceasefire violations were recorded east-north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 17 August, outside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw at least 15 deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine near the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk).

On both 17 and 18 August, inside of the disengagement area, the Mission saw between three and five members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them between the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations. [2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the night of 16 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded one projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 17 August, positioned in Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, at an assessed range of 4-6km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote but within its 5km periphery. During the day on 18 August, positioned on the eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard 12 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km east-north-east, assessed as outside of the disengagement area near Zolote but within its 5km periphery.

On 17 August, positioned north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the day on 18 August, positioned at the same location, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at a distance of about 5km south-west, assessed as inside of the disengagement area. Shortly thereafter, while at the same location, the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire at a distance of about 1km south-east, assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

17 August

The SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on a road about 1km north-west of Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

17 August

The SMM noted that two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

17 August

The SMM noted that 18 tanks (ten T-64 and eight T-72) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

16 August

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) on the eastern outskirts of Popasna and
• three IFVs (BMP-1), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) in a compound about 100m from residential houses in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

18 August

The SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

On 16 August, in a treeline beside a field between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations about 3km south-south-west of Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a new 110m-long trench running north-south (not seen in imagery from 21 April 2019).

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) near Novohryhorivka, Popasna, Verkhnoshyrokivske and Shyrokyne

On 16 August, in a field about 10m north of a road running west from Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) towards Pyshchevyk, which is commonly used by the SMM, the Mission saw a piece of an unexploded 82mm mortar round lying on the ground. About 150m east of the mortar round, the SMM also saw an anti-tank mine (TM-62) laid in the field for the first time. About 50-400m west of the mine, the SMM saw three unexploded rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7) in fields 2-5m north and south of the road. Additionally, about 1.5km west of the previously-mentioned mine, the SMM saw four pieces of unexploded armour-piercing incendiary projectiles in a field about 5m north of the road, assessed as recent. On the same day, the SMM again saw a piece of UXO assessed as a rocket-propelled grenade about 10m north of the road from Verkhnoshyrokivske to Pyshchevyk.

On the same day, at the intersection of two roads in Novohryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time an unexploded artillery round, assessed as not recent, embedded in the middle of the road about 20m west of residential houses.

On 17 August, on road T-0504, which is regularly used by the SMM, near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces south-east of Popasna, the SMM saw for the first time a round of a rocket-propelled grenade laying in the centre of the road and a tailfin from a 120mm anti-tank guided missile laying on the soft shoulder of the road, both assessed as recent. On 18 August, about 200m east-south-east of the previously-mentioned anti-tank guided missile, the SMM saw the unexploded remnant of an anti-tank guided missile launcher (9K111 Fagot, 122mm) rocket lying on the southern shoulder of the same road, assessed as recent.

On 17 August, on the road E-58 about 3km north-west of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol), the SMM saw an undetonated 23mm incendiary round, assessed as not recent, laying on the ground about 1m south of the road.

Demining activities near Maiorsk

On 17 August, the SMM saw six members of an international demining organization conducting demining activities in a field on the north-western side of road T-0513 about 4km north of the EECP near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

On 17 August, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for 45 minutes, the SMM saw 11 cars (four with Russian Federation licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates) and one bus with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 71 cars (17 with Ukrainian and 36 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 18 with “DPR” plates) and one bus with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

On 17 and 18 August, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 17 August, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations behaved aggressively towards the SMM by shouting and displaying their weapons and denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint. They told the SMM to address their questions to senior members of the armed formations.
• On 17 August, at a checkpoint about 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing demining activities in the area.
• On 17 August, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to non-government-controlled areas.
• On 18 August, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, on two occasions, two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to non-government-controlled areas, once citing “orders from authorities due to security considerations” and once citing “engineering operations in the area.”
• On 18 August, at a checkpoint north of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to the bridge.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 16-18 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that three such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.