Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 16 August 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
- The SMM continued observing demining activities inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.
- The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to gas pipelines, power lines, and the drilling of the water wells.
- Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however, more explosions (52), compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas south of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). The ceasefire violations registered at the latter area were assessed as part of a live-fire exercise inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (35), compared with the previous reporting period (nine explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
In the evening of 15 August, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area, but within its 5km periphery.On 16 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw up to seven deminers of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine conducting demining activities on the eastern side of the road north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).
The SMM saw up to 16 deminers from non-government-controlled areas, cutting trees and clearing vegetation on the eastern side of the road south of the broken section of the bridge, with some carrying metal detectors and prodding sticks. Inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw a member of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them.[2]
In the morning of 16 August, at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM observed about 700 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 400 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas. The Mission saw that the EECP closed at 17:30 leaving about 60 people in the queue to exit. A representative of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGSU) informed the pedestrians that according to the SBGSU website, the EECP closes at 17:30. At 18:15, the SMM saw that the people had left the vicinity of the EECP. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw a steady flow of people traveling in both directions throughout the day.
Other disengagement areas[3]
On 15 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted at least 30 anti-tank mines laid in three rows in a field inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), about 90m south of its northern edge and about 70m east of road T-1316, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. During the same day, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM saw two soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in two trenches. On 16 August, positioned at the northern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.
Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
16 August
The SMM saw two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Lysychansk (75km north of Luhansk).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region
16 August
The SMM noted that 21 tanks (16 T-72 and five T-64), 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 12 mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm), 21 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), a mortar (BM-37, 82mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
16 August
The SMM noted that 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and 50 towed howitzers (2A36) and 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.
Weapons permanent storage sites[5]
At permanent storage sites in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
16 August
The SMM noted that 51 tanks (T-64) and six mortars (M120-15) remained missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]
Government-controlled areas
16 August
The SMM saw:
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) in Stanytsia Luhanska; and
- an APC (BTR-70) near Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk);
The SMM saw a non-SMM UAV landing 300m south-west of the SMM’s position on the eastern edge of Popasna.
Non-government-controlled areas
15 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted five armoured combat vehicles near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).
An SMM mini-UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1) under camouflage netting near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).
16 August
The SMM saw an (APC) (MT-LB) on the northern outskirts of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).
Demining activities on the road between Popasna and Molodizhne and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Khreshchatytske
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate demining activities on the road between the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern edge of Popasna and a checkpoint of the armed formations south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk). For about two hours, five deminers from non-government-controlled areas conducted demining activities. At two different locations near the said road, the SMM heard two explosions, assessed as controlled detonation of explosive devices.
In Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw two pieces of UXO in the ground near the Pervomaiska Street where on 16 July the SMM observed damage from artillery rounds to residential buildings (for previous observations, see SMM Daily 16 July 2019).
SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure
The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to gas pipelines and to power lines near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).
The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- On two separate occasions, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage citing “an ongoing anti-terrorist operation in the area”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- On the night of 15-16 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over Ivanopillia (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over Bila Hora (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).[7]
- An SMM mini-UAV and an SMM mid-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as caused by probable jamming.8
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Kriakivka and Berezove were not operational during the reporting period.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.
[5] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.
[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.