Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 15 August 2019

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A man from Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district was injured from shrapnel in April.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle near government-controlled Zolote-4/Rodina.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled Zernove.
• The SMM saw a new trench near the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at checkpoints near non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however a similar number of explosions (about 40), compared with the previous reporting period. Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) (assessed as part of a live-fire exercise inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including nine explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and east of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk).

Man injured from shrapnel from incident in April

In the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), on 15 August, the SMM saw a man (56 years old) with fresh scars, two on his right arm and another on his left elbow. The man said that he was injured on 6 April when a projectile had landed in his garden at 30 Maksymilianivska Street. The wife of the man told the SMM over the phone that she had been in the other side of the garden at that time and had found her husband with the abovementioned injuries. The SMM was unable to access the man’s house due to security considerations. On 7 April, at a hospital in the Petrovskyi district, medical staff told the SMM that a man (56 years old) from the Trudivski area had been admitted on 6 April with shrapnel-related injuries incurred that day in that area.

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zolote-4/Rodina

While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zolote-4/Rodina, the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km east, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which was flying about 2km east of the patrol. The Mission safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw vehicles, including a crane and a truck, belonging to the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine parked north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk).

Around 60m east of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw ten members of the armed formations burning tree branches and clearing vegetation, with some carrying metal detectors and prodding sticks. It also saw up to seven members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the bridge.[2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

In the early morning hours of 15 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (the SMM could not assess if inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). On the same day, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina, the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area and aimed at the UAV (see above).

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

14 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area south of Zernove (70km south of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

14 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five tanks (T-80) under a camouflage net near Paraskoviivka (75km north of Donetsk), about 1km from where small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-UAV (see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2019).  

Non-government-controlled areas

11 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 23 tanks in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019) and
• 22 tanks and 24 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 13 August 2019).

Other weapons observed[4]

On 11 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three towed howitzers or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (see above) (not seen in imagery from 28 July 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

14 August

The SMM noted that 13 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites[6]

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

14 August

The SMM noted that 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64), 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[7]

Government-controlled areas

14 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) (BTR variant) north-east of Zolote-4/Rodina.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP variant) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and
• three probable IFVs (BMP variant) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four IFVs (three BMP-2 and a BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-70) in a compound in Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol) and an IFV (BMP-1) under a camouflage net north of Chermalyk; and
• a new trench about 10m in length running from east to west from a bunker into a wooded area, with two members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside of it, on the western side of road H20, about 200m west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 31 May 2019) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2019).

15 August

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) in a concrete shelter north of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

Non-government-controlled areas

14 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three APCs (two MT-LB and a BTR variant) under a camouflage net on the south-eastern edge of Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

Border areas not under government control

On 14 August, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 16 cars (nine with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), 12 covered cargo trucks (ten with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and two buses with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 32 cars (five with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates and 16 with “DPR” plates) and 31 covered cargo trucks (13 with Ukrainian, three with Belarusian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 13 with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.  

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM facilitated the movement of Vodafone employees from non-government- to government-controlled areas through the checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka.  

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Calm situation at the crossing points between Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Crimea

On 14 August, the Mission observed a calm situation at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”.

Delays:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again delayed the SMM passage citing “orders from superiors not to let the SMM into non-government-controlled areas”, allowing it to proceed only after 40 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard small-arms fire about 1-1.5km east, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which it landed safely (see above).
• On the night of 14-15 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over Ivanopillia (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk), Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol) and Siedovo-Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 89km south of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).[8]
• On 15 August, an SMM mini-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as probable jamming, while flying over the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city. The SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it.9

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Kriakivka and Berezove were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[5] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[6] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[7] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[8] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.