Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 5 June 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Windows damaged by small-arms fire in a residential area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The Mission observed for the first time about 160 anti-tank mines near government-controlled Krasnohorivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted near Novoazovsk and Hryhorivka, as well as at a checkpoint near Shevchenko and at a permanent storage site, all in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), as well as at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

During the day on 5 June, positioned in Svobodne (non-government-controlled, 73km south of Donetsk), the SMM recorded 12 explosions, assessed as outgoing (120mm) mortar rounds, as well as their subsequent impacts, at an assessed distance of 2km north. The Mission assessed the explosions as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including also fewer explosions (14), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). Most ceasefire violations, including all explosions (of which three were assessed as outgoing artillery rounds), were recorded at south-westerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Windows damaged by small-arms fire in a residential area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 4 June at 8 Dundycha Street, in an area close to the main square of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a hole in a north-facing window pane of a two-storey house. At 10 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw a hole in a north-facing window pane, a hole in a west-facing window pane, as well as a shattered west-facing window of a two-storey house. The SMM assessed the aforementioned damage to both houses as caused by (7.62mm) rounds. Six people (four men and two women, aged 30-65), who introduced themselves to the SMM as residents of the houses at 8 and 10 Dundycha Street, told the SMM that they had heard small-arms fire in the area during the night of 4-5 June.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 4-5 June, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-2.5km east-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and seven projectiles at an assessed range of 0.5-2km east and south-east (assessed as within 5km of the area’s periphery). During the day on 5 June, positioned about 3km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the night of 4-5 June, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard a burst of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-east (assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery).

During the day on 5 June, positioned on the north-western edge of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-4km east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Petrivske disengagement area).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

4 June

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 5 June 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

1 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) 80m from a functioning school in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk).

4 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted six tanks (T-72) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

5 June

The SMM saw 22 tanks (T-72) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Rubizhne.

Non-government-controlled areas

2 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 47 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 May 2019) and
• 22 tanks (types undetermined), 18 pieces of towed artillery (types undetermined) and nine pieces of self-propelled artillery (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 May 2019).

5 June

The SMM saw 21 tanks (T-64 and T-72) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region[4]

5 June

The SMM noted that 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) continued to be missing.*

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

4 June

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMD-2) near Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk).

5 June

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Popasna;
• an IFV (BTR-4) in Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) in Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol); and
• an APC (BTR-80) near Hnutove.

Non-government-controlled areas

4 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five IFVs (three BMP-1 and two BMP-2) and four APCs (three MT-LB and one BTR-80) in Luhansk city.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP variants) in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

Presence of mines near Krasnohorivka

On 30 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a total of 160 anti-tank mines (next to 245 previously reported anti-tank mines) in fields about 2.5km east of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), as well as to power lines between Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). While monitoring the repairs in Spartak, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations in the area (it heard and saw an explosion assessed as an impact and heard three undetermined explosions, all at an assessed range of 3-4km west-north-west and north-north-east), despite security guarantees being provided for a localized ceasefire.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk). Positioned at the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), it also monitored the security situation in the area to enable demining activities as part of a preparatory phase for repairs to a damaged pipeline about 500-600m north-west of the station.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 20 cars (four with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 23 cars (seven with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation, as well as seven with “DPR” plates), five covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates, a bus with Russian Federation licence plates and about 30 passengers on board, as well as three pedestrians (all women in their forties) exiting Ukraine.

Convoy carrying humanitarian aid travelled to non-government-controlled areas

At the checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a convoy consisting of two cars and nine trucks transporting humanitarian aid to non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM could not access a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as the gates were closed and no one was present to open it.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol) after the SMM refused to show its patrol plan.
• In Hryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing orders from his superiors not to let the SMM stay in the village without permission. 
• On the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, thus preventing it from visiting a hospital to follow up on a case of an alleged civilian casualty, saying that the SMM could proceed only if accompanied by members of the armed formations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.