Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 25 March 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Heavy machine-gun fired in the direction of an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle flying near non-government-controlled Dovhe. The UAV was not damaged.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage to a residential house due to shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure and an assessment of residential houses damaged by shelling in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including at checkpoints near Zaichenko and in Horlivka.*

Heavy machine-gun fired in direction of SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)

At 16:30 on 20 March, an SMM long-range UAV was flying over an area about 3km south-east of Dovhe (non-government-controlled, 22km north-west of Luhansk), about 3.5km south of the contact line. Subsequent analysis of imagery recorded by it has revealed a heavy machine-gun (type undetermined), 1.4km west-north-west of the ground location over which the UAV was flying, firing at least 14 bursts assessed as aimed at the UAV. The UAV was flying at an altitude of approximately 2,500m at the time of the incident and was not damaged. The SMM had, per established procedure, given notice of the UAV flight in the general area.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 160 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 65 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), easterly and south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and near the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (four explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in northerly directions of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and south of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63 km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage to a residential house due to shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 24 March, at 6 Turhenieva Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a broken window (covered with a wooden plank) on the south-facing side of a one-storey house, as well as a fresh crater 2m south of it. The Mission assessed the damage as caused by a mortar (type undetermined) round fired from a southerly direction. The owner of the house (a woman, about 65 years old) said that on the morning of 21 March, while inside the house, she had heard an explosion in her yard.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 24 March, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) and again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (probable BMP-1) near the road bridge west of road T-1316, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The same UAV again spotted about 34 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in a field near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces just north of the disengagement area.

The UAV also again spotted about 70 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in nine rows in the southern part of the Zolote disengagement area, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

During the day on 25 March, positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk, the SMM heard about 25 undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km north-north-east (all assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area).

On 25 March, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk),[3] the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP variants), a Ukrainian national flag and a red-and-black flag near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 600m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area and about 2.5km east of its western edge.

The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

25 March

The SMM saw two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 25 March 2019).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• eight multiple launch rocket systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 March 2019) and
• two tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 15 March 2019). 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas

19 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk), as well as 58 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) (type undetermined) [4] in the same training area (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019), and
• 20 tanks (type undetermined) and 23 pieces of artillery or mortars in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), as well as 73 ACVs (type undetermined) in the same training area.

20 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• four tanks (type undetermined) and five pieces of towed artillery or mortars in a training area near Miusynsk (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 March 2019);
• 12 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 March 2019); and
• 24 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 20 March 2019).

Other weapons observed:[5]

On 19 March, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 20 pieces of towed artillery or mortar and seven pieces of self-propelled artillery in a training area near Buhaivka (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

23 March         

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk).

25 March

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
• two IFVs (BMP-2) in Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk) in the yard of a house where seven Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers (three of them armed) were present, about 50m from the nearest house inhabited by civilians.

The same day, the SMM also saw a helicopter (MI-8) flying from east to west at an altitude of 100m about 4.5km north of Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk) and three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers flying a black mini-UAV on the north-western edge of Stanytsia Luhanska. In the area of the entry-exit checkpoint of Marinka, the SMM observed a newly-built wooden structure surrounded by sand bags on the southern side of road H-15 about 10m south-east of the most forward checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Non-government-controlled areas

23 March

An SMM-mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk).

25 March

The SMM saw an APC (probable MT-LB variant) near Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk).

Presence of explosive devices

On 25 March, the SMM saw for the first time 11 blocks assessed as explosive reactive armour components of a tank 2m south of the road between the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and the checkpoint of the armed formations near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol).

SMM facilitation of operation and inspection of civilian infrastructure

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of water wells at the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an assessment of residential houses damaged by shelling in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 27 February 2019) as well as to enable demining activity near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk). During the demining activity, the SMM recorded about 20 ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees (see the ceasefire violations table below).

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At 10:15, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 20 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. At 11:10, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM saw about 400 people queuing to exit and about 500 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. At the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces representatives of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). They told the Mission that their presence was related to possible repairs at the bridge.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road T0513 on the north-western edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), four members of the armed formations (three of them armed) denied the SMM access to the area of the checkpoint, saying that the SMM was not allowed to pass without permission from their superiors. The Mission intended to monitor the security situation and passage of civilians crossing the checkpoint on the road leading to the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Other impediments:

• Analysis of imagery recorded by an SMM long-range UAV while flying over an area near Dovhe (non-government-controlled, 22km north-west of Luhansk) on 20 March showed a heavy machine-gun firing bursts, assessed as aimed at the UAV.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.