Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 February 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.  
• A man reportedly died of natural causes while waiting at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka to travel to government-controlled areas.
• The Mission observed gunfire damage at a school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and inhabited houses in Pervomaisk, as well as fresh impact craters in Slovianoserbsk.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area and near the Petrivske disengagement area.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also denied in Dovzhanske, close to the border with the Russian Federation, as well as at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk regions, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 430 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including nearly 60 per cent of explosions, were recorded at directions ranging from east-south-east to west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and south-west and west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (five), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man reportedly died of natural causes at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka

At a morgue in Horlivka, staff told the SMM that a man in his fifties had been brought to the morgue on 7 February. The man’s wife (in her sixties) and son (in his thirties) told the SMM that the man had been waiting inside a bus to cross a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka to travel to government-controlled areas when he had died. They told the SMM that the man had a history of heart problems and recently suffered a heart attack.

Damage related to shelling and shooting at a school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and inhabited houses in Pervomaisk, as well as fresh impact craters in Slovianoserbsk

At a school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a 15cm hole in the outer pane of a north-facing double-paned window. In the wooden frame of an adjacent window, the SMM observed a hole and a fragment assessed as from a small-arms bullet. The SMM assessed that the damage was fresh and caused by small-arms fire. The school staff told the SMM that the impacts had happened earlier the same morning and that classes had been suspended until 13 February. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 February 2019.)

In Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), at 11 Polova Street, the SMM observed a hole (about 1m in diameter) on the western side of the roof of a single-storey house and a shattered west-facing double-paned window. At 9 Polova Street, the SMM observed two holes, one on the western and another on the north-eastern side of a barn located about 10m from a house. About 25m away from the house, the SMM observed two impact craters and metal fragments. At 16 Polova Street, the SMM observed an impact crater in the north-facing side of a house. At all three houses, the SMM assessed that the damage was fresh and had been caused by projectiles (unable to determine the type) fired from a north-westerly direction. Three local residents (a woman and two men, all in their sixties) told the SMM that shelling had caused the damage the morning of 8 February. They added that an elderly couple had been in their house at 16 Polova Street at the time of the incident and that the elderly man had been hospitalized with heart problems afterwards. On Polova Street (near single-storey houses no. 9, 11 and 16), the SMM observed three impact craters within four to seven metres of each other in the middle of the street. The SMM saw fragments and a part of a tailfin assessed as from a recoilless gun (73mm) round near the craters. Both the craters and the fragments appeared to have been altered. The SMM could not determine the type of projectile or direction of fire. 

On 10 February, about 1km south-west of Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two fresh impact craters in the snow on both sides of road P-66. The following day, the SMM saw a third fresh impact crater about 400m north-east of the abovementioned craters. The SMM could not make further assessments due to security considerations.

Disengagement areas[2]                                                                         

On the evening of 10 February, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5km-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the evening of 11 February, the same camera recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). 

During the day on 11 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Positioned about 2km north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard a single shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• three mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) being towed by military trucks about 6km north-east of Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) and
• four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) about 1km south-west of Lysychanskyi (77km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 February:

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a tank (T-64) near a house being used by the armed formations in Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• at least three tanks (type undetermined) at a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn: [4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

11 February:

The SMM noted that 39 towed howitzers (26 2A65 and 13 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

10 February:

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near a residential house in Zolote-3/ Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

11 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured recovery vehicle (BMP variant) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 15 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Sofiivka (60km west of Luhansk) and
• a surveillance and acquisition radar system (P-19) near Fashchivka (60km south-west of Donetsk).

10 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) (of which one was parked in the yard of a residential house) and a TORN radio intelligence system on a truck (KamAZ) parked near a residential house in Novohryhorivka.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a water conduit near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).  It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three cars (two with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw a bus (with “LPR” plates, approximately 30 passengers on board) and two vehicles (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine. After about 12 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound on the north-western edge of Donske (government-controlled, 57km south of Donetsk).
• At a border crossing point in Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area and that its monitoring was not “authorized”.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier and a private security guard denied the SMM access to the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place and that the road leading north was still mined.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations insisted on inspecting an OSCE trailer before allowing the SMM to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.