Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 1 February 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and fewer in Luhansk region.
- The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 25), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol).
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (60 explosions).
Disengagement areas[2]
On the evening of 31 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On 1 February, the same camera recorded an illumination flare in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
On 1 February, at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw that the some of the pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (tailfins of 120mm mortar rounds) which it observed for the first time on 30 January were no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019). A member of the armed formations told the Mission that they had been removed on 31 January.
On the evening of 31 January, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two muzzle flashes at an assessed range of 1-2km north (assessed as inside the disengagement area).
Positioned north and west of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
1 February
The SMM saw:
- two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
31 January
An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:
- seven stationary tanks (T-80) near Aslanove (85
- km south of Donetsk); and
- four anti-tank guns (MT-12), two tanks (T-64), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 1 February 2019).
1 February
The SMM saw:
- three tanks (T-64) near Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol);
- six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Dianivka (formerly Kirovske, 38km north-west of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018); and
- a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Holubivka (81km north of Donetsk).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
1 February
The SMM saw:
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Saxon) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk);
- two APCs (BTR-70) parked in the yard of a house near Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk); and
- an APC (MT-LB-variant) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas
31 January
The SMM saw:
- an APC (MT-LB) in Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk); and
- two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1 and a BMP variant) near Lozove (52km north-east of Donetsk).
Mine near Verkhnoshyrokivske removed
On 1 February, the Mission saw that a device it had seen fastened to a tree near a road about 1.4km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) on 7 November 2018 and assessed as a MON-100 anti-personnel type mine (see SMM Daily Report 8 November 2018) was no longer present.
SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and a water conduit near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).
Border areas not under government control
While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 19 cars (five with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) and five covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) exit Ukraine and four cars (one with Russian Federation and two with Estonian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates enter Ukraine.
While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the Mission saw two men and a woman (in their fifties) exit Ukraine and two men (in their forties and fifties) enter Ukraine.
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
- The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge.
Other impediments:
On 31 January, staff at two schools in Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM it needed permission from senior members of the armed formations to visit the facilities.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.