Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 16 October 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. Small arms were again fired near an SMM patrol and towards an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near Mykolaivka Druha. The Mission observed weapons in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka, Novoazovsk, Zaichenko and Siedove, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and maintenance of critical infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, as well as demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in relation to electoral legislation.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1]including about 260 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 420 explosions).

While conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight on the morning of 16 October near Mykolaivka Druha (government-controlled, 55km north of Donetsk), an SMM patrol heard three bursts of small-arms fire 1km south-east, followed four minutes later by five shots of small-arms fire approximately 100-200m south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV, which was undamaged, and departed the area.*

On the evening of 15 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 13 explosions (one assessed as an impact of an undetermined weapon and the remainder undetermined) and about 85 projectiles in flight (mostly in vertical flight), all 1-4km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-south-west. 

On the evening and night of 15-16 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 30 undetermined explosions and about 280 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and south to north), all 2-5km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-east.

On the evening and night of 15-16 October, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 13 explosions (one assessed as an impact of an undetermined weapon and the remainder undetermined) and about 210 projectiles (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east and from east-north-east to west-south-west), all 1-4km at southerly and easterly directions.

On the evening of 15 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 38 undetermined explosions and about 30 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km south-east and south-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). 

Positioned on the north-western outskirts of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions and about 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km north-east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 15 October, positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 5-7km south-south-east and five shots of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) fire 3-5km south-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the evening of 15 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three projectiles in flight from south to north 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area), followed about 15 minutes later by two projectiles from east-north-east to west-south-west 2-4km south-south-east and a projectile from north-east to south-west 2-4km south (all unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). On the morning of 16 October, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a wheeled military-type vehicle (type unknown) inside the disengagement area, in its north-eastern part.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. 

In violation of withdrawal linesin a non-government-controlled area, on 14 October, aerial imagery revealed the presence of 20towed howitzers (undetermined variants) and 19 self-propelled howitzers (undetermined variants) in a training area about 2km south-east of Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal linesin government-controlled areas, on 15 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted six tanks (T-64) near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk). On 16 October, the SMM saw two towed howitzers (a probable D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and a 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Smolianynove(61km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in non-government-controlled areas, on 14 October, aerial imagery revealed the presence of 16 tanks (undetermined variants) and four surface-to-air missile systems (undetermined variants) in a training area about 2km south-east of Buhaivka, 12 tanks (undetermined variants) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk), 30 tanks (undetermined variants) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk), 20 tanks (undetermined variants) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) and 59 tanks (undetermined variants) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations in these areas, see SMM Daily Report 4 October 2018).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in government-controlled areas, on 16 October, the SMM saw four tanks (T-64) in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk),five anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk) and a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Rodynske (59km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 14 October, aerial imagery revealed the presence of an ACV near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014, and an ACV near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk). On 15 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near houses in Petrivske, aninfantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Petrivske, an APC (BTR variant) andtwoIFVs (BMP-1) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk)and anIFV (BMP-1) near Styla (34km south of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV near Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk). On 16 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP variants) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk). On 16 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) being towed by a truck near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

In government-controlled areas, on 15 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), a probable ACV and an IFV (probable BMP-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-2) and an ACV near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk) and six ACVs (type undetermined) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk). It also spotted two IFVs (BMP-2), an APC (MT-LB) and three ACVs near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), two ACVs near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk), three ACVs and an IFV (BMP-1) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Olhynka (40km south-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).On 16 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4)near Novobakhmutivka and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On the asphalt road between Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), about 1.5 km east of Pyshchevyk, the SMM saw for the first time an anti-tank mine (TM-62M) without fuse as well as more than 15 anti-tanks mine fuses scattered (two of them recently and the remainder partly burned) on the southern part of the main road.

The SMM saw demining activity. At the intersection of roads P-22 and T-1309, 4km south-west of Shyrokyi (government-controlled, 38km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw people wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization carrying out demining activities.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to electrical infrastructurein Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk)and to water distribution infrastructure in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about ten minutes, the SMM saw three cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence places) entering Ukraine and two cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in favour of the adoption of a new electoral code before the next parliamentary elections. Around 150 people (mixed ages and genders) carrying flags of various political movements and paper signs with messages critical of the current electoral system blocked entrances to the Parliament building at 18 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street and 3A Sadova Street. The SMM observed about 50 police officers and 75 National Guard officers standing around the premises of the Parliament and near Mariinskyi Park. The protest ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, seebelow). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “demining and engineering works ongoing in the area”. 
• At a checkpoint near Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing an “event going on in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, two members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through, citing “orders from their superiors”.
• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Zaichenko and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint north of Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the need to obtain a “permission”. After 16 minutes, the SMM was allowed to proceed but was told “not to launch any UAV flights within 200m of any armed formations positions”.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after visually inspecting its trailer.

Other impediments:

• During the evening of 15 October, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal on five occasions, assessed as due to jamming[5], near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), Zoloti Pisky (government-controlled, 12km north-west of Donetsk), between Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske, between Bohdanivka and Buhas (government-controlled, 44km south-west of Donetsk) and between Liubivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south of Donetsk) and Semenivka (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Donetsk).
• In the morning of 16 October, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming7, near Stepanivka.
• In the morning of 16 October, an SMM mini-UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming7, near Starohnativka. 
• Onthe morning of 16 October, whileconducting a mini-UAV flight near Mykolaivka Druha, the SMM heard three bursts of small-arms fire 1km south-east, followed four minutes later by five shots of small-arms fire approximately 100-200m south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV.
• Staff at a school in Pervomaisk refused to provide the SMM information without prior approval from senior members of the armed formations.

[1]For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5]The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.