Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 27 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Hranitne, Novolaspa and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], including about 100 explosions, as in the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions).           

On the evening and night of 26-27 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 34 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 0.5-4km south-south-east, south and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 26-27 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 160 projectiles in flight (mostly from south to north), 21 undetermined explosions, five muzzle flashes and one illumination flare in flight, all 3-5km east-north-east, east and south-east.

On the evening of 26-27 September, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 98 projectiles (mostly from west-south-west to east-north-east), one undetermined explosion, two muzzle flashes and nine bursts, all 2-4km east-south-east, south-east and south-south-west.

On the evening of 26 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 3-7km south-east and south. During the day on 27 September, while at the same location, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km south-east and south.

During the day on 27 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and 40 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km south-south-west, west-north-west and north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions).

On the evening of 26 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded 22 projectiles in flight (from north-west to south-east) and two muzzle flashes, all 2-4km south-south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the evening and night of 26-27 September, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded one burst and five projectiles in flight (four from north to south and one from south to north), all 2-4km east and east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as three projectiles 2-4km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted on 24 September two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37 Buk) near railway cars in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk) (for previous observation at the same site, see SMM Daily Report 26 September 2018). On 27 September, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 26 September, on a ridge north-east of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three new military positions (not visible in imagery from 25 September 2018), four men working in a 20m-long trench, as well as another four men doing trench work nearby (both trenches not visible in imagery from 25 September 2018). (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 26 September 2018.) On 27 September, the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) and a command vehicle (undetermined variant) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 26 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 30m-long trench (not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018) near residential houses in a northern part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed the presence of mine hazard signs. The SMM observed for the first time about 20 mine hazard signs reading “Danger Mines” (in Ukrainian and English) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km north-west of Luhansk), consisting of red and white square boards attached to 1.5m-high wooden poles, placed on the northern side of a road.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM observed a convoy of trucks marked “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” in Luhansk region. In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, a senior member of the armed formations refused to provide information to the SMM on reports of the arrival of a humanitarian convoy from the Russian Federation, citing the need for the SMM to write a letter in advance to the members of the armed formations. Later the SMM saw a convoy of ten white covered cargo trucks with “Humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation” in Cyrillic written on them heading south-east on road M04 (for previous observations of a similar convoy, see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2018). The convoy was followed by two technical support trucks and four cars (all with “LPR” plates). Later in the day, the SMM also saw a convoy of trucks in Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, non-government-controlled, 43km south-east of Luhansk), assessed to be the same convoy, heading east towards the border with the Russian Federation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a military compound near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), citing orders from his superiors not to allow access to anyone.
• Two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) five members of the armed formations (three visibly armed) stopped the SMM and allowed it to proceeded into the town only upon being escorted by another four armed members of the armed formations in a military-type van.

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference while flying near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).[5]
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV due to signal interference while flying in a government-controlled area between Petrivka (43km north of Donetsk) and Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk), and later while flying in a non-government-controlled area between Fedorivka (34km north-east of Donetsk) and Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.