Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. In the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM spotted two soldiers and an infantry fighting vehicle of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Its access remained restricted in the disengagement areas, near Leonove near the border with the Russian Federation, in an area of Luhansk region beyond government control, as well as, again, near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Zaichenko.* The Mission monitored electrical repairs near the Donetsk Filtration Station and continued to monitor repairs to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM continued to monitor the situation south-east of Kherson following reports of hazardous air pollution.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 24 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

On the evening and night of 10-11 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 55 projectiles in flight 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east. In the early morning hours on 11 September, the same camera recorded about 48 projectiles 2-4km east-north-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk recorded 14 undetermined explosions, six projectiles in flight and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km south-south-east and south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including six explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2]  (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 10 September, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, about 500m south of the area’s northern edge and about 2km of its western edge, near previously seen positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2018), as well as a probable infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) about 900m north of the area’s southern edge and 1.2km east of its western edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. (See also SMM Daily Report 11 September 2018.)

Positioned in the northern outskirts of Zolote during the day on 11 September, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-3km east, both assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 10 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Hnativka (39km north of Donetsk). On 11 September, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) loaded on a transporter in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 9 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70), an IFV (BTR-3) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) south of Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk). On 10 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured command vehicle (BMP-1Ksh Potok-2) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol). On 11 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (type undetermined) and an APC (MT-LB) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines. On 10 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time nine anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in a row across a road 1.7km north-east of Vodiane. The same UAV again spotted at least 12 mines laid out in two rows across road T0519 on the western edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM saw that construction works at the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska continued following its re-opening on 8 September. The Mission observed workers erecting a metal chain-link fence along the east side of the road leading to the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. During its presence, the SMM observed a smooth flow of pedestrian traffic through the entry-exit checkpoint and through the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable electrical repair works near the Donetsk Filtration Station following a power outage at the station on 6 September and to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM also saw a crane, two trucks and about 20 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers conducting repair works at a broken bridge on road T0504 south-west of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 16 July 2018).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation following reports of hazardous chemical air pollution in the area of Pershokostiantynivka (93km south-east of Kherson) and Preobrazhenka (90km south-east of Kherson) (see SMM Daily Report 10 September 2018). On 11 September, a representative of the Kherson State Administration told the SMM that on 30 August they had been informed about hazardous pollution from a nearby chemical plant. He said that on 11 September the level of air contamination was below the alarm levels according to the available testing equipment. A representative of the State Emergency Service told the Mission that following the information about hazardous pollution people had been advised to stay indoors in particular in the mornings due to the assessed higher risk associated with fog. The representative also told the SMM that the Emergency Service was using specialised equipment to decontaminate polluted locations.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint of the armed formation west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage for the fourth consecutive day (see SMM Daily Report of 11 September 2018).
• At a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• Two members of the armed formations did not allow the SMM to pass through a checkpoint 5km north of a border crossing point in Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, non-government-controlled, 82km south of Luhansk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), members of the armed formations allowed the SMM passage only after inspecting the SMM vehicles’ trunks.

Other impediments:

• In Horlivka, the SMM was denied access to one school, and at three other schools their staff refused to provide the SMM information.

[1]    For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]    Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.