Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 10 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas, and noted that trenches in the Petrivske disengagement area had been recently extended. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas as well as, again, near Verkhnoshyrokivske, and near Izvaryne on the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM continued to monitor repairs to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Pervomaisk.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (155 explosions).

On the evening of 9 September, the SMM Camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, about 20 projectiles in flight, eight explosions (two airbursts, the remainder undetermined), an illumination flare, five projectiles, three undetermined explosions and about ten projectiles, all 0.2-5km south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 9-10 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and about 130 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south and south-east.

During the day on 10 September, positioned near the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 240 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-3km at southerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations (but no explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours (three explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2]  (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 8 September, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in the south-western part of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. On the evening of 9 September, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded three muzzle flashes, 1‑2km north-east assessed as inside the disengagement area. While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska on the same evening, the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire 3-5km west-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 10 September, positioned north of Petrivske, the SMM heard and saw an explosion assessed as an impact 2-3km south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. It also heard two undetermined explosions and about 60 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-6km south and south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 10 September, the SMM observed an armoured vehicle (KrAZ Cougar) travelling within the Zolote disengagement area, near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

Aerial imagery of 5 September available to the SMM revealed that trenches assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces within the Petrivske disengagement area had been extended by approximately 65m in southerly directions, and firing positions in the trenches had been upgraded with sandbags, compared with imagery taken on 23 August.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) at a military compound near Zatyshne (government-controlled, 64km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. Beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas in Donetsk region, the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), nine towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) and four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-30 Smerch, 300mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 8 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (probable BMP-1) parked near civilian houses and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (type undetermined) in Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk). On 10 September, the SMM saw two APCs (a BRDM and an MT-LB) in the yard of a house in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) in Stare (58km west of Luhansk) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM again saw demining activity near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM saw people were wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization carrying out demining activities.

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Pervomaisk.

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM observed no cross-border traffic before being told by members of the armed formations to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM observed three men and a woman (30-60 years old) exiting Ukraine, as well as 12 men and 11 women (30-60 years old) entering Ukraine.

The SMM observed freight wagons in non-government-controlled areas. At a railyard in Sukhodilsk (38km south-east of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted 61 empty freight wagons (50 open and 11 boxcars) and two tank wagons. At a railyard near Novosimeikine (33km south-east of Luhansk), the same UAV spotted a train connected to 31 loaded freight wagons (contents could not be identified).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage for the third consecutive day (see SMM Daily Report of 10 September 2018).
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, members of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• An SMM long-range UAV was jammed while flying near Komisarivka (non‑government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Azarivka (non-government-controlled, 32km south-west of Luhansk) and Teple (formerly Krasnodon, non‑government-controlled, 33km south-east of Luhansk). [5]

[1]    For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]    Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5]    The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.