Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 17 August 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, compared with the previous reporting period in Donetsk region. It recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The SMM observed fresh impact sites in residential areas of Dokuchaievsk and Holmivskyi. The SMM continued monitoring all three disengagement areas; it saw a man wearing military-style clothing entering the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Kostiantynivka and Sopyne. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Luhansk region on both sides of the contact line.                  

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], however, fewer explosions (115), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions).

On the evening and night of 16-17 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), recorded nine explosions (one assessed as an outgoing mortar round, one as an impact of a mortar round and the remainder undetermined) and about 80 projectiles in flight, all 1-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

On the evening and night of 16-17 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions and about 140 projectiles in flight, all 3-5km south-east, south-south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 16-17 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east and south.

During the day on 17 August, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw seven explosions assessed as impacts 2-3km south-west and west-north-west; it also heard 13 undetermined explosions and about 190 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km south and south-west.

Positioned about 2km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw an undetermined explosion 3-4km south; it also heard 35 undetermined explosions and 15 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, as well as a total of 35 minutes of uncountable overlapping shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km east and south.

Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw three undetermined explosions 1-2km south-east; it also heard 22 undetermined explosions and about 220 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-4km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. During the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded seven ceasefire violations (all explosions).

The SMM observed fresh impact sites in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) and Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

In Dokuchaievsk, at 6 Oktiabrska Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole in both layers of a double-pane south-west-facing glass window on the second floor of a two-storey apartment building. The SMM assessed the hole as caused by a bullet fired from a south-westerly direction (it could not assess the calibre). On the same day, the SMM saw fresh tracks assessed as those of armoured combat vehicles along Oktiabrska Street.

In Dokuchaievsk, at 35 Pionerska Street, the SMM saw a hole in the east-facing window of a one-storey residential building. The SMM assessed it as caused by a bullet (it could not assess the calibre or the direction of fire). (Aerial imagery from 1 February 2018 revealed that the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations on the western outskirts of the town were approximately 800m closer compared with their positions in imagery from 10 December 2017. At one point, they are about 350m from each other.)

In Holmivskyi, at Mykytivska Street 11, the SMM saw a fresh impact on the second floor of the north-facing façade of a two-storey apartment building. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon or the direction of fire.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 17 August, the SMM saw an armed man wearing military-style clothing walking entering the Zolote disengagement area on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas during the day on 17 August, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 16 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) travelling from the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) to a compound in Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk). Inside the compound, the same UAV spotted three additional stationary anti-tank guns (MT-12). On 17 August, the SMM saw a stationary surface-to-air-missile system (9K35, Strela-10) 1km north of Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 16 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 13 stationary tanks (T-72), three of which were loaded on transporters and six anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) travelling from the railway station in Kostiantynivka to a compound in Oleksandro-Kalynove (see above). (The same UAV also spotted 57 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.) On 17 August, the SMM saw four stationary towed howitzers (probable D-20, 152mm) near Novomaiorske (64km south-west of Donetsk) and 30 tanks (T-64) parked at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns[3] and other indication of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 15 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near the north-eastern part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-2) near Mykolaivka Druha (55km north of Donetsk). On 17 August, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) in Avdiivka, an IFV (BTR-4) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4, Shilka, 23mm) near Sopyne.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 16 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 400m-long trench south of Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 5 July 2018). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and eight IFVs (BMP-1) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-2) and three APCs (two BTR-80 and one BTR-70) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to a water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water pipelines near Zolote and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) as well as to a water channel junction near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 17 cars (five with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates, a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and approximately 15 passengers on board, as well as 24 pedestrians (mixed age and gender, including a child) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates and 12 pedestrians (mixed aged and gender) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM observed no traffic in either direction. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two separate occasions, at a checkpoint on the western edge of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage. On one occasion, one of them told the SMM that he had received “orders” not to allow the SMM to access areas near Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its midrange UAV flying over Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming. The SMM landed the UAV safely.[5]
• In Obozne (nongovernment-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), medical staff at a hospital told the SMM that they could not provide information to the SMM without the permission of senior members of the armed formations.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.