Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 5 July 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed fresh damage from gunfire to a house in Yasynuvata. It continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was restricted again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne, as well as in Kruta Balka and at a weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Starolaspa and Marinka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), including through monitoring the security situation around the station; it heard explosions close to the station despite explicit security guarantees. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure. It monitored the situation of civilians at the entry-exit checkpoint near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and noted again that the wooden ramps on the broken part of the bridge were unstable.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (33, including some which may have been heard simultaneously by SMM patrols positioned in different locations), compared with the previous reporting period (36 explosions).

On the evening and night of 4-5 July, the SMM camera at the DFS, recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from west-north-west to east-south-east, three projectiles from east to west and 14 projectiles from west-north-west to east-south-east, followed by an undetermined explosion, nine projectiles and a flare in vertical flight, all 1-2km south, as well as a projectile from east to west, assessed as an anti-tank guided missile 0.7-1.5km south.

On 5 July, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five and a half hours the SMM heard and saw five explosions assessed as impacts (including two of 120mm mortar rounds) 1.8-2km south-west and west, and heard seven undetermined explosions and six bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 0.5-10km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded two explosions (see below). In the previous reporting period it recorded about 60 ceasefire violations, including two explosions.

The SMM observed fresh damage from gunfire. On Slovianska Street on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata, a female resident (aged 40-41) showed the SMM a hole in a north-facing window of her house. The SMM also observed small splinters of glass and assessed the damage as fresh and caused by gunfire from a north-westerly direction. The SMM saw an unexploded 12.7mm incendiary round in the flower bed north of the damaged window. The woman said that she had been at home with her three children on the evening of 4 July when the bullet had hit the house. The SMM had observed trenches north-west of Yasynuvata (see SMM Daily Report 28 June 2018), about 300m north of the abovementioned house.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the early hours of 5 July, positioned in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 12-15km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in and near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, respectively, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, on 4 July, eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk). Also in violation of withdrawal lines, on 5 July, the SMM saw three tanks (T-64) on flatbed carriers heading west on a road south-west of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 4 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near a residential area of Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed, on 2 July, the presence of 12 tanks (type undetermined) near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 17 tanks (type undetermined) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). In the latter area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 80 armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined).

Aerial imagery taken on 2 July also revealed the presence of 18 pieces of towed artillery (type undetermined) near Buhaivka.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the SMM saw four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and noted that four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing. The SMM also noted that three anti-tank missile systems (9P149 Shturm-S, 130mm) were present for the first time.

The SMM visited a Ukrainian Armed Forces weapons permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region and observed that eight tanks (T-64) were again missing.*

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[2], newly dug trenches and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 4 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP-2) south of Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk). On 5 July, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk), three IFVs (BMP-1) on flatbed carriers near Marinka, and an APC (BTR-70) south-west of Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 4 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) near Styla (34km south of Donetsk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an APC (MT-LB) near Petrivske, and an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) in Starolaspa. On 5 July, the SMM saw fresh tracks of armoured combat vehicles on a road between Yasynuvata and Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk).

In Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) the SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces position 300m from a functional school building.

Aerial imagery taken on 4 July revealed the presence of new trenchesand positionsin a south-eastern part of Zaitseve (49km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 16November 2017), new defensive positions and four fresh impact sites near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018), and numerousfresh impact sites between Bezimenne and Samsonove (101km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018).

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at the entry-exit checkpoint near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. At the government checkpoint, three people (two women and a man in their sixties) told the SMM that they had to wait one hour at the abovementioned checkpoint to enter government-controlled areas. Three other people (women in their sixties) said that they had waited four hours to exit government-controlled areas. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, ten people (three men and seven women of various age groups) coming from government-controlled areas separately told the SMM that it had taken them three hours to pass through both checkpoints. The SMM observed that the handrails of the wooden ramps on the broken parts of the bridge were unstable and that the ramp was bouncing due to the high number of people walking on it.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema, a water channel in Stanytsia Luhanska and demining activities to allow for the repair of a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 5 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security reasons”.
• Eight armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint 2.5km north-west of Bezimenne prevented the SMM from continuing west on the road towards Sakhanka and Pikuzy.
• An armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• Six armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• The SMM lost communication with a midrange UAV flying over areas near Sakhanka, assessed as due to jamming. The SMM recovered the UAV undamaged.[4]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.