Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 27 June 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near and indications of new military presence in the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as at a border area outside government control in Luhansk region and in Markyne. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line. In Zakarpattia and in Lviv, the SMM monitored gatherings related to a recent attack against members of the Roma community in the latter. In Kyiv, it observed a gathering celebrating the Day of the Crimean Tatar Flag.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including at least 550 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions). About 80 per cent of the ceasefire violations were recorded at night time from the SMM’s forward patrol base in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and occurred in areas from south-east to south-south-east of Svitlodarsk.

On the evening and night of 26-27 June, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard four explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds 7-8km south-east, as well as 460 explosions (23 assessed as artillery rounds and the remainder undetermined) and about 1,875 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-8km south-east and south-south-east. During the day on 27 June, while at the same location, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of an artillery round 1-2km east-south-east and 19 undetermined explosions 4-8km at directions ranging from east to south-south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, five projectiles in flight from west to east and an undetermined explosion, followed by totals of 15 undetermined explosions and about 185 projectiles (about 155 of which from west to east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-2km south.

On the night of 26-27 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded eight undetermined explosions, 200 projectiles in flight (the majority from south-south-west to north-north-east) two illumination flares and three muzzle flashes, all 1.5-6km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

On 27 June, positioned 1km north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) for about five hours, the SMM heard 15 explosions (13 assessed as outgoing rounds, including three of automatic grenade launcher fire, and two undetermined) and about 65 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 2-4km at directions ranging from north to south-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 66 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 140 explosions).

On the night of 26-27 June, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 40 undetermined explosions 5-18km north. During the day on 27 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds 5-8km south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 2 June, the SMM camera in Petrivske[2] recorded 18 projectiles in flight from east-south-east to west-north-west 1-1.5km west-north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On the night of 26-27 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 23 undetermined explosions, four projectiles in flight and three bursts and two illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-10km at directions ranging from north-east to east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 26 June, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, inside the Zolote disengagement area, a newly dug trench (approximately 40m in length) located about 900m of the southern edge of the disengagement area and 950m from its eastern edge, near a previously observed footpath and trench (see SMM Daily Report 6 June 2018). It also spotted 27 craters assessed as impacts: two of 122mm artillery rounds and 25 of 82mm mortar rounds, all probably fired from a north-north-westerly direction) about 400m west of the newly dug trench (the new trench and craters were not visible in imagery from 7 June 2018). The mini-UAV also spotted 15 craters assessed as impacts: five of either 122mm or 152mm artillery rounds and ten of mortar rounds, (all probably fired from a north-westerly direction) about 800m from the disengagement area’s southern edge and 1.6km from its eastern edge (not visible in imagery from 7 June 2018) and two recently built firing positions (not visible in imagery from April 2018) about 220m from the southern edge and 2km from the eastern edge, all inside the disengagement area.

On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted seven craters assessed as impacts: three of 122mm artillery rounds fired from a north-north-westerly direction (not visible in imagery from 18 June 2018); one as the impact of an 82mm mortar round; and three assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds fired from a north-north-westerly direction (not visible in imagery from 7 June 2018), all inside the Zolote disengagement area about 600m from its northern edge and 1.5km from its eastern edge. The same UAV spotted a new 10m-long trench inside the disengagement area about 650m south of its northern edge and 1km east of its western edge.

On 27 June, positioned about 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-2km south-east, assessed as outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM observed that some partial removal of vegetation had taken place on the road between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations and noted that some previously observed mine hazard signs had fallen down and were no longer readable.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted, on 26 June, a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw two stationary multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) about 3km north-west of Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk) and ten stationary MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 26 June, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) on a flatbed truck heading south near Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on military-type trucks: one stationary south of Maksymivka (53km west of Donetsk) and one near Velyka Novosilka (74km west of Donetsk). On 27 June, it saw a tank (T-64) on a flatbed truck near Novoselydivka (38km west of Donetsk) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) south of Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw five stationary tanks (T-64) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) on 27 June.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. On 26 June, in storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed 34 tanks (T-64), including three present for the first time, as well as 12 MLRS (BM-21) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) present for the first time. It noted that the following weapons were again missing: 46 self-propelled howitzers (20 2S1 and 26 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 23 MLRS (BM-21) and four surface-to-air missile systems (two 9K35 and two 9K33), including 12 MLRS and a surface-to-air missile system missing for the first time, 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), ten self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm), 12 mortars (six 2B11 Sani, 120mm and six M120-15 Molot, 120mm), six towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 55 tanks (T-64).

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that six towed howitzers (one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm; and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), four MLRS (BM-21) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing. The SMM could not verify some of the weapons present as withdrawn as their serial numbers had been covered. At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft weapon[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted, on 26 June, two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (a BMP-1 and a BMP-2) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP-1) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Trokhizbenka. On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable APC (MT-LB) near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk). On 27 June, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Teple (31km north of Luhansk).

The SMM saw a new 250-300m stretch of trenches north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints. At the government checkpoint north of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM saw about 700 people in a queue to leave government-controlled areas. While on the bridge, the SMM saw several elderly people not being able to walk due to the heat and trying to rest in the shade. A woman and a man (about 80 and 70 years old) told the SMM that they were not able to continue walking due to the heat. A member of the Ukrainian Emergency Services told the SMM that ten people had fainted that day and received aid due to the high temperatures. A representative of the Ukrainian Border Guard Service told the SMM that on 26 June about 5,000 people had entered and about 5,600 people had left government-controlled areas.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to water pipelines near a coal mine near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), a Vodafone fibre optic line south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and at a water pumping station near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), and monitored repair works to a water pipe in Stanytsia Luhanska.  

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw three cars, a minibus and a motorcycle (all with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. An unarmed female member of the armed formations approached and told the SMM to leave the area, stating that “a restriction on the SMM’s presence was still in place”.*

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for half an hour, the SMM saw 11 covered cargo trucks, three cars and three buses (all with Ukrainian licence plates) queuing to exit Ukraine and three covered cargo trucks, two cars and a bus (all with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.

In Zakarpattia region and in Lviv the SMM monitored gatherings related to the attack on members of the Roma community on 23 June in Lviv city (see SMM Daily Report 26 June 2018 and SMM Daily Report 27 June 2018). In Uzhhorod (182km west of Ivano-Frankivsk), Zakarpattia region, on 25 June, the SMM saw 20 people (16 men and four women, aged 20-50), some of whom were holding posters with “We are against racism” written on them in several languages, gathered in front of the Regional State Administration building. The SMM saw two police officers and a police car present.

In Lviv, the SMM saw 30 people (mixed genders and ages) marching from the Taras Shevchenko Monument at Svobody Avenue to the Regional State Administration building. Participants in the event told the SMM that they wanted to express their solidarity with the Roma community after the attack. About 100 police officers were present. Both events ended peacefully.

In Kyiv, on 26 June the SMM saw approximately 200 people (mixed genders and ages) marching and carrying a large Crimean Tatar flag (approximately 30m long) from Bessarabska Square to Maidan as part of the celebration of the Day of the Crimean Tatar Flag. The event ended without incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• An unarmed member of the armed formations stopped the SMM at a checkpoint west of Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk) and denied the SMM access through the checkpoint citing orders from superiors to prevent civilian traffic. The SMM saw a barrier on the road.  

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]     Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.