Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 3 June 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 1 and 2 June, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 2 and 3 June, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. Small arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Teplychne in Luhansk region. The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty near Panteleimonivka. The Mission saw fresh damage as a result of shelling to a house in Chermalyk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) as well as demining near the DFS. The SMM heard ceasefire violations near the DFS, despite security guarantees. It continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka, Almazna and Veselohorivka. In Kyiv, the SMM observed two peaceful public gatherings.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] between the evenings of 1 and 2 June, including, however, more explosions (about 140), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120). Between the evenings of 2 and 3 June, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 170), as compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 1-2 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from east to west, two projectiles from west to east and two projectiles from east to west, followed by totals of eight undetermined explosions, 75 projectiles in flight (50 from west to east, 22 from east to west, one from east south-east to west-north-west and two from south-east to north-west) and three illumination flares (two from south to north and one in vertical flight), all 0.5-2km south.

On the evening and night of 2-3 June, the same SMM camera at the DFS recorded, in sequence, four projectiles in flight from east to west, an undetermined explosion, three projectiles from east to west, a projectile from west to east and two undetermined explosions, followed by totals of an undetermined explosion and 32 projectiles in flight (23 from east to west and nine from west to east), all 0.5-3km south.

On the evening and night of 1-2 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 42 projectiles in flight from north to south, six projectiles from south to north, 15 projectiles from north to south, followed by totals of two undetermined explosions, 135 projectiles (51 from north to south and 84 from south to north) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 2-4km east.

On the evening and night of 2-3 June, the same SMM camera recorded, in sequence, 11 projectiles in flight from north to south, three projectiles from south to north and an undetermined explosion, followed by totals of two undetermined explosions, 160 projectiles in flight (15 from east-south-east to west-north-west, 7 from north to south, 21 from north-north-west to south-south-east, 13 from north-west to south-east, 27 from south to north, 30 from south-east to north-west, 41 from south-south-east to north-north-west and 6 from south-west to north-east) ), and four illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-4km east.

On the evening and night of 1-2 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of automatic-grenade-launcher and their subsequent impacts,  seven explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (calibre unknown) and four shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, all 2-6km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening and night of 2-3 June, while in the same location, the SMM heard, 21 undetermined explosions, six explosions assessed as impacts of mortar (120mm) rounds, five explosions assessed as outgoing IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) rounds, an explosion assessed as an impact of a rocket-propelled-launcher round and about 140 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-4 east-south-east and south-east.

On the evening and night of 2-3 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw 60 undetermined explosions and heard 11 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapon(s) as well as about 20 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 2-6km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north-north-west.

On 2 June, positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-6km east, south-east, south-west, and west.

On 2 June, positioned on the eastern edge of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-west. On 3 June, positioned in the same location, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions, 3-5km north-east and south-west.

On June 2, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-3km south-west and west. On 3 June, positioned in the same location, the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-west and west.

On 2 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions 2-3km at directions ranging from south-east to south. On 3 June, from the same location, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 2-5km east-south-east, south-east and south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[2] between the evenings of 1 and 2 June, including the same number of explosions (one), compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 2 and 3 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about five), compared with the previous 24 hours.

On 3 June, about 1.5km east of Teplychne (non-government-controlled, 8km west of Luhansk), while flying an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms fire 0.4km east of its position, which it assessed were directed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV and left the area.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. On 1 June, medical staff at a fist aid station in Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that a man (in his thirties) had been taken from the first aid station to Hospital no. 2 in Horlivka after he had crossed a tripwire in a field south of the village that had caused an explosion. On 2 June, the man’s mother and aunt told the SMM that he had crossed a tripwire while walking with his bicycle in a field near a pond about 5km south-west of Panteleimonivka that had triggered an explosion that had left him unconscious. They said he had been found by a passer-by and that when the man regained consciousness he had called his friend, who had called an ambulance. The man’s relatives told the SMM that an ambulance agreed to meet the man at a nearby cemetery, but could not come out into the field to pick him up, so he walked to the cemetery and met the ambulance. The man’s mother told the SMM that he had a concussion and shrapnel wounds to his upper left leg and had been discharged from the hospital in Horlivka the same day.

The SMM observed fresh damage as a result of shelling to a civilian property in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). At 39 Khmelnytskoho Street, the SMM saw a crater about 10m east of a single-storey house and about 5m east of the outhouse. The house had about ten shrapnel holes on its east-facing wall, and two east-facing windows had been broken and covered with plywood. The residents (89-year-old woman and her 63-year-old son) said they had been home on 31 May at around 09:00 when they had heard an explosion at the back of the house. The SMM assessed that the crater and damage were caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a north-easterly direction. The SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier in front of a neighbouring house about 70m south and camouflage netting over the side of that house.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 1 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 13 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west 4-15km south-south-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 2 June, positioned on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge in the disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-5km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 3 June, positioned near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation near the Petrivske disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, on 1 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Oleksandro-Kalynove (government-controlled, 47km north of Donetsk). On 2 June the SMM saw two military trucks each towing what the SMM assessed were anti-tank guns (MT-12) (two in total) near Berkhivka (government-controlled, 73km north of Donetsk).  

In a non-government-controlled area, on 2 June, the SMM saw four stationary multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 1 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12) near Yablunivka (49km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At two such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in an area outside of government control in Donetsk region and was unable to access the site as the site was locked and without a guard.* The last time the SMM visited the site, it had been abandoned. (See SMM Daily Report 2 March 2018.)

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns.[3] In non-government-controlled areas, on 3 June, the SMM saw 30 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB), ten of which were mounted with anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

In a government-controlled area, on 3 June, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a pick-up truck near Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM observed demining activities in Krasna Talivka (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Luhansk). On 3 June, the SMM saw two demining teams, each composed of ten workers wearing clothes bearing insignia of an international demining organization and demining an area near a cemetery. The SMM saw several mine hazard signs that read “Caution, demining work in progress” written in Ukrainian and Russian languages and bore the insignia of an international organization.

The SMM’s monitoring and facilitation of the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS was interrupted due to ceasefire violations and the presence of anti-tank mines across road H-20. On both 2 and 3 June, the SMM facilitated demining of the eastern side of road H-20 (the side used for vehicle traffic) up to the access road to the DFS by sappers from the Ukraine State Emergency Services as well as the demining of the intersection of roads M04 and H20 up to the gate of the DFS by sappers from non-government-controlled areas. On 2 June, the SMM observed at least 18 anti-tank mines across road H-20 about 3.5km south of Kamianka, which prevented the SMM from proceeding toward the DFS on this road. On 3 June, the SMM saw 13 anti-tank mines laid across the western lane of road H-20, 12 anti-tank mines laid parallel to the western lane, and ten anti-tank mines laid parallel on the eastern side of the road. On both days, positioned in five different areas 1.5-5km from the DFS as well as onsite at the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for thirty minutes, the SMM saw a man and a woman (both about 60 years old) entering Ukraine and did not see anyone exit Ukraine.

In Kyiv, on 2 June, the SMM monitored a “March for Protection of Children and Family”. The SMM saw about 7,000 people (mixed gender, aged 18-65), including representatives of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, as well of the Muslim community, gathered on Sofiivska Square. From there, the SMM saw that participants began a march which ended at the Parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street. The SMM saw about 20 police officers securing the gathering, which dispersed peacefully.

On 2 June, the SMM monitored a pre-announced gathering on Independence Square in support of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleh Sentsov, who has been in detention in the Russian Federation and has entered a hunger strike. On arrival the SMM observed some 300 people taking part in the protest (all ages and 60 per cent women). The SMM saw that many participants held photographs of Mr. Sentsov and placards with messages including “Free Oleg Sentsov”. The SMM did not observe any police presence at the event, which dispersed peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 2 June, at a permanent storage site in an area outside of government control in Donetsk city, the SMM was unable to access storage site as the gate had been locked, and there was no one present.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 2 and 3 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]
• On 2 and 3 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.4
• On 2 and 3 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• On 2 June, at a checkpoint near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer prevented the SMM from continuing on, saying that he needed permission from his superior. After 20 minutes, the SMM was allowed to proceed.  

Other impediments:

• On 3 June, positioned east of Teplychne, the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms fire in an area where it was flying a mini-UAV, assessed as directed at the UAV. The SMM landed the mini-UAV and left the area (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.