Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 22 May 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of a casualty in Marinka near the contact line. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, where it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including at a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees and others to the Donetsk Filtration System to assess damage and facilitate repair works which were completed by 17:00. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka, Almazna, and Veselohorivka. The Mission also monitored a gathering in Kharkiv in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 200 explosions,  compared with the previous reporting period (about 580 explosions).

On the evening of 21 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 12 undetermined explosions, two projectiles in flight from east-north-east to west-south-west, an undetermined explosion and a projectile from north to south, all 0.2-1km south-west and west-south-west, followed by totals of three explosions assessed as impacts less than 50m west-south-west, nine undetermined explosions, an airburst and four projectiles (two from north to south and two from west to east), all 0.2-3km west-south-west and a projectile from east to west within 200m west-south-west.

On the evening and night of 21-22 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 0.5-1km north, 31 undetermined explosions and about 60 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-8km south and south-south-west, and five undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-west.

On 22 May, positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun fire 2-7km east, east-south-east and south.

Positioned in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 1-5km south-west and west. 

Positioned in Novoselivka (non-government-controlled, 37km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions 2-4km east, assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

Positioned in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 2-4km north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, but more explosions (18) compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions).

The SMM followed up on reports of a casualty in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), reported in the media on 21 May. On 22 May, in Avdiivka, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) confirmed the report. In Marinka, a representative from the Civil/Military Administration told the SMM by phone that on 21 May at 18:00, a resident of Marinka (man, aged 36) was killed on the outskirts of Marinka near the contact line and that the circumstances of his death were currently under investigation. Medical staff of the hospital morgue in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) told the SMM by phone that the body had been admitted late in the evening of 21 May with multiple wounds containing bullet fragments.

The SMM followed up on reports of fresh damage to an aid station inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk). In the disengagement area, in the parking lot south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, a member of the armed formations (male, aged 30) approached the SMM and requested that it observe shrapnel damage to the mobile centre for “social assistance and administrative services”, which is located 85m south-west of the nearest armed formation checkpoint and about 300m south-west of the bridge. The SMM saw a fresh hole in the vinyl ceiling under the north-eastern section of the centre’s roof, another fresh hole inside the centre in its western wall (panelling over corrugated metal) as well as a piece of metal lodged between the panelling and the outside metal of the western wall. A dent approximately 3cm wide was also observed on the exterior metal wall of the structure. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by fragmentation from a mortar or grenade round fired from a north-easterly direction, which had penetrated the north-eastern section of the roof and the western wall. A mobile centre worker (woman, aged 35) told the SMM that when she had arrived at the centre in the morning, she had seen a hole in the north-east section of the roof and a single piece of shrapnel lodged in the western wall of the structure.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 22 May, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an explosion 1-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 21 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 24 bursts and a projectile, all 4-9km south and south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). In Katerynivka (government-controlled 64km west of Luhansk, inside the Zolote disengagement area), the SMM saw a military vehicle (UAZ) with two uniformed persons on board (neither insignia nor weapons were visible) and a military fuel truck (ZIL type) with two uniformed persons (neither insignia nor weapons visible) on board.

On 22 May, positioned in Petrivske, the SMM heard eight bursts and shots of small-arms fire 1-2km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 17 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded two tracer rounds in flight (trajectory undetermined) 0.5-1km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw three tanks (one T-64, two undetermined) at a training area in Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and recently dug protective berms in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 21 May the SMM observed an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) and two infantry fighting vehicles IFVs (BMP-1) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 22 May, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol) and an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three IFVs (BMP-2) near Zalizne (42km north-east of Donetsk), three IFVs (a BMP-1 and two BMP variants) and an armoured personnel carrier APC (BTR-80) near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 22 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 400m of protective berms near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk) (not visible in aerial imagery from 29 April). The SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed demining activities and a mine hazard sign. Positioned on the south-eastern outskirts of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw four military vehicles (one UAZ and three KRAZ) and 25 Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel engaging in demining activities. Near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on road T0519, the SMM observed three Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel clearing the adjacent minefield of anti-tank mines. Four anti-tank mines were observed beside the area being demined on road T0519. The SMM observed a mine hazard sign for the first time in the eastern outskirts of Petrivka (government-controlled, 27km north of Luhansk) on the road T-1309 with “Mine” written in Cyrillic.

The SMM continued to facilitate access of Voda Donbassa water company employees and others to the DFS to assess damage and facilitate repair works. On 21 May, an electric company representative told the SMM that power supply lines leading to the DFS along road M04 on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) were damaged. On 22 May repair works were conducted near Kruta Balka. The DFS chief electrician told the SMM that the repairs had been completed and would be tested once the electricity had been switched on. A DFS representative later told the SMM by phone that electricity to the DFS had been restored.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM observed 55 cars (22 with Ukrainian and 17 with Russian Federation licence plates, and 16 with “DPR” plates), three vans (one with Ukrainian and one Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), nine trucks (four with Ukrainian, two Russian Federation and two Belarusian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), and one bus with Ukrainian licence plates, all exiting Ukraine. During the same period, the SMM observed 22 cars (five with Ukrainian, ten Russian Federation and three Lithuanian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates), two mini-buses with Ukrainian licence plates, three tank-trucks (with “BITUM” written on the tanks) and a bus with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. While at a border crossing near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about half an hour, the SMM observed two pedestrians (women, aged 55-60) with bicycles entering and one pedestrian (woman, aged 35) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Kharkiv. The SMM observed 40 people (28 men and 12 women, aged 25-55) carrying Ukrainian national flags, chanting “Free Sentsov!” and “Free political prisoners!”, and singing the Ukrainian national anthem. The SMM observed about 50 police and National Guard personnel near the consulate. The protestors dispersed without incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint stating that he needed approval from his superiors.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.