Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 May 2018
The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including in Leonove near the border with the Russian Federation and at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Avdiivka and Roty. The Mission continued to facilitate access to the Donetsk Filtration Station for Voda Donbassa water company employees; it heard ceasefire violations in the area despite security guarantees. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Almazna. In Kyiv, the SMM observed a group of people preventing a public discussion from taking place, and followed up on reports of vandalism to the office of a non-governmental organization. In Odessa, the SMM followed up on reports of an attack against a member of an anti-Maidan group and observed a gathering in front of the Russian Federation Consulate-General.
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 220 explosions).
On the evening and night of 10-11 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from south to north, two projectiles from north to south, four projectiles from south to north, two from north to south and a projectile from south to north, all 1-3km west.
During the day on 11 May, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four and a half hours, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and six shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km west and west-north-west, as well as 15 undetermined explosions 7-8km east-north-east.
On the evening and night of 10-11 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 24 undetermined explosions and 30 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-east.
During the day on 11 May, positioned 1km north-north-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard and saw an explosion assessed as an impact of an undetermined weapon round 1-1.5km north-north-east, and heard three undetermined explosions and over 150 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-3km east-north-east and south-east.
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions).
During the day on 11 May, positioned 4km west-south-west of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 8-10km west.
The SMM also observed fresh impacts near Staromarivka (non-government-controlled, 62km south of Donetsk). Near a checkpoint and a compound of the armed formations about 2km west of the village, the SMM saw a mortar tailfin embedded in a fresh crater in the asphalt and shrapnel damage to the surrounding asphalt, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction.
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*
In the early hours of 2 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded two tracer rounds in flight from east to west 1.5km west (assessed as inside the disengagement area). In the late afternoon of the same day, it recorded seven tracer rounds from west to east 0.5-1km west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).
On the evening of 10 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst from east to west 3-5km south, assessed as fired from an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), followed by three undetermined explosions 4-8km east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).
During the day on 11 May, positioned just north of the wooden ramps of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
The same day, positioned near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.
In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) towed by a truck heading west near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and a stationary surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Roty (66km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 9 May 2018).
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk), an APC (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Avdiivka, an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol) and four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk).
In a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS in order to keep the station operational. On 11 May, positioned at the DFS and in the nearby areas of Avdiivka, Yasynuvata and Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violations section above and ceasefire violations table below), despite security guarantees.
The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to high-voltage power lines near Almazna.
On 11 May, the SMM observed a march in Donetsk city. (See SMM Daily Report 10 May 2018.) The SMM observed about 60,000 people (men and women of different age groups) march along Artema Street, including about 6,000 members of the armed formations organized in about 30 formations (some of them armed) as well as members of groups representing different cities and industries from non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region. Some of them were carrying flags of the Russian Federation and non-government-areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Mission saw senior members of armed formations from non-government-areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions observing the march nearby. It heard an announcement that people from South Ossetia were also present. The SMM did not observe any incidents.
In Kyiv, the SMM observed a group of people preventing a public discussion from taking place. Between 19:00 and 21:00 on the evening of 10 May, at the Underhub centre (3 Mechnykova Street) where a pre-announced public discussion by a non-governmental organization (NGO) was to take place, the SMM saw a group of about 30 people (mostly men in their twenties), some of them known to the Mission as members of political party Svoboda and organizations such as Nemezida, Tradition and Order, and Right Sector present in the reception area and meeting room of the centre. As about 25 participants (men and women, aged 20-30) arrived to the event, the SMM heard the aforementioned group of people loudly expressing their opposition to homosexuality. Some of the participants told the Mission that they were intimidated and threatened by the group. The SMM initially saw three to five police officers and later about 25 police officers (some of them armed) present both inside and outside the centre. Some of the police officers were speaking with the group of people and members of the NGO. The public discussion did not take place and participants left under police escort. The SMM did not observe any further incidents. A police officer onsite told the SMM that an investigation into the incident would be launched.
On 11 May, the SMM followed up on reports of vandalism to a building where the office of the abovementioned NGO is located in Kyiv. At 3 Dehtiarivska Street, the SMM saw a swastika freshly spray-painted on the nameplate of the organization’s office building.
In Odessa city, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Russian Federation Consulate-General at 14 Haharinske Plateau. The SMM saw about 20 people (mostly men, aged 25-50) calling for the release of a Ukrainian filmmaker who they said has been detained in the Russian Federation since 2014. Some of them were holding a banner with messages such as “Free Sentsov”. About 20 National Guard and police officers were present. The gathering ended without incidents (for previous observations of a gathering held in the same context, see SMM Daily Report 14 July 2017.)
In the same city, the SMM followed up on reports of an attack against a member of an anti-Maidan activists’ group that regularly meet on Kulykove Pole Square. The member (woman, in her fifties) told the SMM that at around 22:00 on 6 May, an unknown young man, accompanied by another young man, called her a “separatist” and struck her face twice, cutting her upper lip. She stated that she was subsequently transported to a hospital and got stitches to her lip; the SMM saw a bandage on her lip.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- On the southern edge of Diakove (non-government-controlled, 70km south-west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a border area near Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, non-government-controlled, 82km south of Luhansk), saying that no one was allowed to access Leonove or a border crossing point near the village until further notice due to the presence of mines and UXO.
- Armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, saying that it could not enter without permission from other members of the armed formations.
Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
- The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
- The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
- The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that there had been no demining in the area in the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
Other impediments:
- The SMM temporarily lost communication with a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying over an area 2.5km north-north-east of Vesele (government-controlled, 21km north of Donetsk), assessed as due to jamming. The SMM was able to recall the UAV.
- The SMM temporarily lost communication with a mini-UAV flying over an area between Sarabash (formerly Komunarivka, non-government-controlled, 26km south of Donetsk) and Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk), assessed as due to jamming. The SMM was able to recall the UAV. (On 26 February, while flying its UAV over an area south-west of Sarabash, the SMM heard shots of small-arms fire, which it assessed as directed as the UAV. See SMM Daily Report 27 February 2018.)
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.