Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 7 May 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. It recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area and its access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including at a border area near Izvaryne (near the border with the Russian Federation)*. The SMM continued to facilitate access to the Donetsk Filtration Station for Voda Donbassa employees and heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka, Almazna and Veselohorivka, and to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 220) compared with the previous reporting period (about 400 explosions).

On the evening and night of 6-7 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 200 undetermined explosions and about 500 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-7km at directions ranging from east to south-west.

On the evening of 6 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from south to north, 13 projectiles from north to south and 11 projectiles from south to north, followed by totals of two undetermined explosions and 35 projectiles (27 from north to south and eight from south to north), all 0.5-3km south. 

On 7 May, while in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and about 65 shots of small-arms fire, all 0.5-2km east-south-east to south-east.                      

On 7 May, positioned about 2km south-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions, two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and their subsequent impacts, and 16 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at undetermined distances north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions).

On the evening and night of 6-7 May, positioned in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 29 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of artillery, 2-6km in directions north-east and north-west.  

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 29 April, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded two undetermined explosions 1-2km west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On the evening of 5 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east, and two projectiles from north to south, 3-6km east-north-east and east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the evening and night of 6-7 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 20 undetermined explosions, 18 bursts of undetermined weapons from south-east to north-west, 14 projectiles in flight (seven from north-west to south-east, five from north to south, two from south-east to north-west), 36 tracer rounds from north to south and north-west to south-east, and seven rounds of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-8km in directions ranging from east-north-east to south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 6 May, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-4km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

On 5 May an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 13 probable self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Buhaivka (non-government-controlled, 37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in a government-controlled-area on 7 May an SMM mini-UAV spotted five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Vesele (66km south-west of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) in a compound in the vicinity of Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 5 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 18 probable tanks (T-64) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Buhaivka, and 12 tanks (T-64) near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk). On 7 May, the SMM saw seven tanks (four T-64s, three undetermined type) at a training area in Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. On 7 May, in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw 12 towed howitzers (2A36, Giatsint-B, 152mm) and noted that 101 towed howitzers (45 D-20, 152mm; 44 2A36, 152mm; and 12 2A65 Msta-B 152mm), 12 anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm) and 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) remain missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that 14 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) remain missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2], an unexploded ordnance and other signs of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed a mortar tail assembly (120mm) in the middle of the road just south of the entry-exit checkpoint at Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) which was previously seen for the first time on 6 May, six infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-1) in the vicinity of Novoselivka Druha (36km north-east of Mariupol) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Zolote-4/Rodina (60km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) near Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk) on 5 May. On 7 May, in Luhansk city, the SMM observed about 650 armed persons wearing military-type clothing and rehearsing marching drills and about 200 armed persons with clothing marked as “Police” controlling road access. Also in Luhansk city, the SMM observed around 1000–1500 people (about 6-15 years old) and 200-300 other people (mixed gender and age) gathered in front of the Shevchenko statue in the square on Radianska Street and in the road. The SMM saw ten older soviet-style flags with a red and yellow hammer and sickle and unidentifiable writing. The SMM also observed several senior “LPR” members give speeches. Throughout the event, the SMM observed a mini-UAV of unknown origin flying over the crowd. While present, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire about 600m east. The SMM observed an overall calm situation.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), as well as to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS in order to keep the station operational, as well as monitored de-mining activities around the DFS. Positioned in several locations close to the DFS on 7 May, the SMM heard – in addition to small-arms fire – five undetermined explosions, despite security guarantees having been provided by the sides.

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 101km south-east of Donetsk) for 25 minutes, the SMM observed five cars and a minivan with Ukrainian and four cars with Russian Federation licence plates exiting Ukraine, and two cars and a minivan with Ukrainian and a car with Russian Federation licence plates, and two cars and a bus with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for five minutes, the SMM observed a bus carrying about 70 passengers with Ukrainian licence plates and 11 pedestrians (four male, 35-45 years old, and seven female 35-50 years old) entering Ukraine, and 33 pedestrians (16 men, 17 women, ages 20-60 years old) exiting Ukraine. At a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 29 vehicles (18 with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, four with “DPR” and one with “Novorossiya” plates) stationary in the parking lot in the centre of the village, and three pedestrians (one female and two male, 20-40 years old) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kyiv, Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example see SMM Daily Report 4 May 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 7 May, while present at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations demanded that the SMM leave the area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka, Maiorsk and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.