Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 2 May 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed fresh damage to civilian properties caused by shelling in Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted there as well as at a heavy weapons holding area and a permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Novoselivka. The SMM continued to facilitate access to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) for Voda Donbassa water company employees; it, again, heard ceasefire violations in the area despite security guarantees. It also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka. In Odessa, the SMM monitored the commemoration of the events that took place on 2 May 2014.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including more explosions (about 170), compared with the previous reporting period (36 explosions).

On the evening and night of 1-2 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from south to north, an undetermined explosion, four projectiles from south to north, 11 projectiles from north to south and six projectiles from south to north, all 0.3-3km west. During the day, positioned at the DFS for about four hours while facilitating the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the station (see below), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3km south-west and a burst of small-arms fire 1-2km north-west, despite the provision of security guarantees.

The same day, positioned on the western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), about 2km west of the DFS, for three and a half hours, the SMM heard and saw six explosions 3-5km south-west and south-south-west, and heard four shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-south-west. Positioned in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), 1.3km north-east of the DFS, for six and a half hours, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and about ten shots of small-arms fire 3-5km south-west and west. Positioned in the south-western part of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), about 3km west of the DFS, for about three hours, the SMM heard and saw four explosions 1-1.5km east. Positioned 1.6km south of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), about 3km north of the DFS, for about six and an half hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 5-6km south-east and 15 shots and bursts of small-arms fire 1km east and south-east.

On the evening of 1 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about ten shots of small-arms fire, all 6-8km south-west. While in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions and about 80 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km south-east and south.

On 2 May, positioned on the southern edge of Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM heard and saw 30 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) cannon (73mm) fire and their subsequent impacts, all 2-2.5km west.

Positioned in Samsonove (non-government-controlled, 83km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions assessed as having occurred in a training area north of Svobodne (non-government-controlled, 73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including seven explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions).

On 2 May, positioned in Shymshynivka (non-government-controlled, 27km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 15km south-west, assessed as part of live-fire training in Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk).

On 1 and 2 May, the SMM observed fresh damage to civilian properties caused by shelling in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk).  At 2A Svobody Street, the SMM saw that two first-floor windows (west- and north-north-west-facing) on the first floor and a second-floor north-north-west facing window a two-storey house were covered with plastic sheeting. It also saw fresh shrapnel damage to a north-north-west-facing side of a nearby fence, assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon round (unable to determine the direction of fire). At 2B Svobody Street, the SMM saw one shattered first-floor and another shattered second-floor north-facing windows of a two-storey house, assessed as caused by an explosion of an undetermined weapon round (unable to determine the direction of fire).

At 1B Svobody Street, the SMM saw that two first-floor west-facing windows and a second-floor south-facing window of a two-storey house were covered with wooden panels. It also saw a fresh hole in the west-facing side of a summer kitchen 7m west of the house, several fresh holes in the west-facing side of a metal fence of the house and in the south-facing side of a wooden fence in the yard. The SMM observed shrapnel pieces in front of the west-facing side of the fence and assessed that all damage had been caused by an explosion of an undetermined weapon round (unable to determine the direction of fire).

At 2G Svobody Street, the SMM saw that two west-facing windows of a one-storey house were covered with plastic sheeting. It also saw three fresh holes in the west-facing side of a fence near the house and in the west-facing side of a wooden fence in the yard. The SMM assessed that all damage had been caused by an explosion of an undetermined weapon round (unable to determine the direction of fire).

At 14A Svobody Street, the SMM saw a destroyed summer kitchen with only its external surrounding walls left standing, apart from the collapsed south-western part, and concrete blocks scattered around, which it assessed as caused by either a tank round or a round of anti-tank grenade launcher fired from a south-westerly direction.

At 35 Lenina Street, the SMM observed a fresh crater in a garden 5m north-east of a one-storey house, with five of its windows (two west-, one east- and one-south-facing) covered with plastic sheeting and a fresh hole in its west-facing side. It also saw fresh shrapnel damage to a doghouse 3m west from the crater (unable to determine the direction of fire). The SMM assessed that all damage had been caused by an explosion of an undetermined weapon round. At 35A Lenina Street, the SMM saw 11 shattered south-east-, north-west- and north-east-facing windows of a two-storey house, assessed as caused by the aforementioned explosion at 35 Lenina Street.

At 37 Lenina Street, the SMM saw two south-south-east-facing windows of a two-storey-house covered with plastic sheeting as well as fresh shrapnel damage to the south-south-east-facing side and front door of the house. It also saw a fresh crater 25m south-west of the house, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from an undetermined direction. A resident of the house told the SMM that his two granddaughters (three and seven years old) had been sitting next to the south-south-east-facing side of the house when shelling had started at around 09:00 on 28 April.

In the asphalt of Lenina Street, approximately 5m south-west of a one-storey house at 20 Lenina Street, the SMM observed a fresh crater, assessed as caused by a round of an undetermined round fired from a south-westerly direction. The SMM observed that four south-west-facing windows of the house were shattered.

Near the junction of Svobody and Lenina streets, the SMM saw two fresh craters in the street and its sidewalk as well as fresh shrapnel damage to a south-facing wall surrounding a house at 1A Svobody Street, assessed as caused by 120m mortar rounds fired from undetermined directions. Two metres south of these craters, the SMM saw an apparently abandoned building with broken windowpanes and debris scattered in front of its west-facing side of the building, as well as parts of its roof collapsed. It assessed that a 120mm mortar round fired from an undetermined direction had exploded either on impact with the roof or after it penetrated the building. At an adjacent compound surrounded by a concrete wall and sandbags, the SMM observed the presence of armed members of the armed formations and noted that all impact sites, including those observed on 29 April (see SMM Daily Report 30 April 2018), are located within a 250m-radius of the compound.

At least six local residents separately told the SMM that the damage was the result of shelling that occurred in the area between 09:00 and 10:30 on 28 April.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 1 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight from north to south 4-7km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

In the early hours of 2 May, positioned at the eastern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 4-6km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening and night of 26-27 April, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded a burst 300m south (assessed as outside the disengagement area), followed by a projectile in flight from east to west 1-2km (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 1 May, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted for the first time five heavy-machine-gun positions and four mortar firing pits inside the Petrivske disengagement area, located about 700m east of its western edge and about 300m south of its northern edge, assessed as having been dug between 1 February and 25 March 2018. The UAV spotted again at least 109 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a 500m-long row leading from a road just north of the disengagement area to an area near the abovementioned positions (about two-thirds of them were inside the disengagement area). (See SMM Daily Report 28 March 2018.)

On 30 April, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck inside the Zolote disengagement area on its southern edge and, about 450m further north, at least 200 anti-tank mines laid in three rows from either side of a road into fields. (See SMM Daily Report 11 April 2018.)

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled-area, the SMM saw three stationary tanks (type undetermined) in a training area about 2km south-east of Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw six towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and noted that 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again missing. At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area in Donetsk region, armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a part of the area.*

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[2] and other indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, an SMM mini-UAV on 30 April spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck inside the Zolote disengagement area on its southern edge (see above). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a newly dug underground bunker 1.5km south of Naberezhne (77km south of Donetsk). It also spotted at least 30 craters assessed as fresh about 3km north of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), an area where the SMM, positioned 1km north-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) on 30 April, heard 13 undetermined explosions (see SMM Daily Report 1 May 2018.) On 2 May, the SMM saw three IFVs (BMP variant) near Novoselivka (see above).

In government-controlled-areas, the SMM on 1 May saw eight IFVs (seven BMP-1 and one BMP variant) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) as well as seven Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, some of them armed and entering and exiting a house in Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), and fresh tracks assessed as those of armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and IFVs (BMP-1) in the house’s yard.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS in order to keep the station operational. Despite security guarantees having been provided, positioned at the DFS and in Yasynuvata, Avdiivka and Kruta Balka and near Kamianka, the SMM recorded over 50 ceasefire violations in the area (see above).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km southeast of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates and five with “DPR” plates) parked nearby and observed no pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

In Odessa, the SMM monitored the fourth commemoration of those who lost their lives during the events that took place on 2 May 2014. The SMM saw that about 1,000 law enforcement officers, including 40-50 police officers in riot gear, were present at and around the Kulykove Pole Square which was cordoned off by police tape and closed off to vehicular traffic. Throughout the day, the SMM observed up to 400 individuals (men and women of different age groups) visiting the square for the commemoration, with at least 100-200 individuals consistently present – including police, journalists and about 15 people (including one woman) with Right Sector insignia on their T-shirts. It saw several instances of police officers with “preventive communications police” written in Ukrainian on their jackets facilitating dialogue after elderly women repeatedly taunted some of the participants – on one occasion two women were escorted from the square by the police. During its presence, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Later in the day, the SMM monitored about 1,500 pro-Maidan activists (mostly men, age 20-40) marching from Shevchenko Park through Odessa city centre; about 400 of them wore dark clothes and grey camouflage shirts. It observed the march stop at a memorial near Soborna (Cathedral) square, where some of the participants gave speeches. The SMM observed about 200-300 law enforcement officers, including 100 police officers in riot gear,  present throughout the duration of the event and noted a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.                                                

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 May 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a part of a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region (see above).
• The SMM could not access a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as the gate was locked and no guards were present to open it.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• In Davydo-Mykilske (non-government-controlled, 38km east of Luhansk), an “LPR” member denied the SMM access to a building and an adjacent school, saying it needed permission from other “LPR” members.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.