Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 5 February 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous 24 hours and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including in Kreminets and Naberezhne.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Sievierodonetsk and Khrustalnyi. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair and maintenance works on essential civilian infrastructure near Shchastia, Artema, Kalynove, Mykhailivka-Almazna, and Slovianoserbsk. The Mission visited five border areas not under government control. The SMM observed gatherings in Kharkiv and Odessa, and followed up on reports of an incident at the building where the Zakarpattia Hungarian Union is located in Uzhhorod.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] including about 200 explosions compared with the previous 24 hours (290 explosions).                                                

During the day on 5 February, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded ten projectiles in flight from west to east 0.5-1.5km south.

During the day on 5 February, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for over three hours, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and 18 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 2-3km west and north-west.

During the evening on 4 February, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 34 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (27 recorded 3-5km south and seven recorded 4-6km west), an explosion assessed as an impact of an artillery round as well as eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-6km at directions ranging from south to west. During the day, on 5 February, while at the same location, the SMM heard 30 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds, all 4-7km south and south-west.

During the day on 5 February, positioned 1km north-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) for about one hour, the SMM heard 63 undetermined explosions, all at unknown distances at directions ranging from north-east to south-south-east.

During the day on 5 February, positioned in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions, two impact explosions, and four explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds at unknown distances, as well as eight shots of small-arms fire, all at undetermined distances at directions ranging from north-east to south-west. Positioned at the same location, the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire at unknown distances south-west assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations; in the previous 24 hours the SMM had recorded ceasefire violations, including one explosion.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 5 February, positioned in Petrivske (non-government-controlled), for one hour and twenty minutes, the SMM heard 45 undetermined explosions, all 1-3km north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

In the eastern part of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM observed a man in military-type attire carrying a helmet and assault rifle. The SMM spoke separately to four local residents who all told the SMM that Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel were living in the eastern part of the village again.

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas the SMM saw 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk). In non-government-controlled areas the SMM saw ten multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) in Tymofiievka (39km north-west of Donetsk) on 1 February.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government‑controlled areas, the SMM observed seven self-propelled mortars (2S9) as present, and 31 tanks (T-64) as present for the first time. The SMM observed that 21 anti-tank guns (18 MT-12 and three D-48, 85mm), 13 self-propelled howitzers (six 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and seven 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 34 tanks (T-64), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa), six anti-tank guns (MT-12) and 12 mortars (six PM-120, 120mm and six 2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing; and 21 tanks (T-64), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S3) and three self-propelled mortars (2S9) were missing for the first time. The SMM noted that four areas continued to be abandoned with ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), and 23 mortars (nine PM-38, 120mm; 12 2B11; and two 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) continuing to be missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that six towed howitzers (one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1), and four MLRS (BM-21) continued to be missing. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed an abandoned permanent storage site with 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12) continuing to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns[2] and an unmanned aerial vehicle in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) just north of the disengagement area near Zolote, four IFVs (BMP-2) near Zolote, an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk) and three IFVs (BMP-2) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

Positioned in non-government-controlled Petrivske, the SMM heard and saw a mini-UAV flying at a distance of 100-500m from west to east, and then from east to west.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair and maintenance works to the power plant in Shchastia and to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). Near Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM monitored and facilitated repair works to the Mykhailivka-Almazna power line which provides electricity to the western parts of the Luhansk region. The SMM also monitored and facilitated repair works on water wells located south-east of Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited five border areas not under government control. Positioned at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about half an hour, the SMM observed no traffic entering or exiting Ukraine.

At a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about half an hour, the SMM observed no pedestrians and no vehicles exiting or entering Ukraine.

At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 45 minutes, the SMM saw about 50 pedestrians (20 men, 30 women) and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

At a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM observed two women entering Ukraine.

At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about one hour, the SMM saw ten cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates and around 30 passengers aboard) and four pedestrians (two men and two women) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also observed 19 cars (nine with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates and two with “LPR” plates) and five pedestrians (three men and two women) entering Ukraine.

The SMM monitored gatherings in front of the Polish Consulates in Kharkiv and Odessa. According to the organizers who are known to the SMM as Svoboda in Odessa and Svoboda and the National Corps in Kharkiv, participants (aged 20-60, 80 percent male, in both gatherings) were protesting the adoption on 1 February by the Polish Senate of the amendment to the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance. In Kharkiv, the SMM observed approximately 50 people, and several National Corps, Svoboda party and red-and-black flags as well as banners expressing criticism of the law. In Odessa, the SMM saw 30 participants in civilian clothing holding three Svoboda flags, two Right Sector flags and a Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists flag. During both gatherings, speakers addressed the crowd with messages critical of the law. Both events lasted about 30 minutes and ended without incidents.

The SMM followed up on media reports of an improvised incendiary weapon thrown at the building where the office of the Zakarpattia Hungarian Union is located in Uzhhorod (182km west of Ivano-Frankivsk) during the night of 3-4 February. The duty officer of the Zakarpattia regional police confirmed the incident to the SMM and stated that no one was hurt, but that one of the building’s windows had been damaged. The officer said that an investigation was ongoing. The SMM will continue to follow up on the incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Kyiv, Lviv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.       

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 February 2018.) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• In Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), two armed “DPR” members in military-style attire stopped an SMM patrol and ordered it to leave the village.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3] 
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.[3]

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint on road H15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), on two occasions, a “DPR” member in military-type clothing stopped the SMM and demanded to check an SMM trailer. The SMM was allowed to proceed only after he inspected the trailer. (The Mission faced a similar restriction at the same checkpoint on 1 February (See SMM Daily Report 2 February 2018).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. Two SMM cameras continue to be tested until the end of February 2018. Video streams to SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka, Maiorsk and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the entire reporting period.  Video streams to SMM cameras at Donetsk Filtration Station, Oktiabr Mine, Prince Ihor monument, Zolote, and Stanytsia Luhanska were not operational until 5 February at 10:30. 

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.