Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 5 September 2017
This report is for the media and the general public.
The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM again asked armed forces and formations about the recommitment to cease fire, as well as instructions on interaction with the SMM; the majority of the interlocutors told the SMM that they had received orders and were informed – in one case they showed such orders to the SMM and in another one they provided copies. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in the disengagement areas and elsewhere.* It facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance to the Horlivka-Toretsk pipeline, a water pipe near Novotoshkivske, the Petrivske pumping station near Artema, water pipes near Nyzhnie, and the thermal power plant in Shchastia. It continued to monitor the situation at schools near the contact line on both sides. The Mission visited two border areas not under government control.
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 210 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (30 explosions).
On the evening of 4 September, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-4km west.
On the evening and night of 4-5 September, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from east to west, one undetermined explosion, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east, 54 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, one undetermined explosion, about 30 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, one undetermined explosion, one tracer round in flight from west to east, three tracer rounds in flight from east to west and two tracer rounds in flight from west to east, all at unknown distances north.
On the evening of 4 September, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-3km south-east, one undetermined explosion and one burst of small-arms fire 5-7km south, and two undetermined explosions 8-10km east. During the day on 5 September, the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions and 20 bursts of small-arms fire 2-6km south and south-east.
During the day on 5 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded one explosion, assessed as an impact, 3-5km east-south-east.
During the day on 5 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two explosions, assessed as impacts, 1-2km south.
Positioned for about two hours 1.1km north of government-controlled Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 145 explosions 2-4km north-west.
Positioned for about five hours at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion and 15 shots of small-arms fire 3-5km west, and three undetermined explosions 3-5km north.
Positioned for about four hours in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 2-3km north-west.
Positioned for about two hours in the Kuibyshevskyi district of “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city (5km west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and four shots of small-arms fire 2-6km at directions ranging from west to north-east.
Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion and 12 shots of small-arms fire 2-3km west.
Positioned about 3km south-east of “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an undetermined distance east-south-east and one undetermined explosion at an undetermined distance north-north-east.
Positioned for about two hours in government-controlled Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 explosions (four assessed as outgoing and the remainder undetermined) 5km south.
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 16 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions).
On the evening of 4 September, positioned at the northern edge of government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one burst of small-arms fire 2-3km north. During the day on 5 September, positioned at the north-eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 10km south-east.
Positioned 1.5km north of “LPR”-controlled Stepove (43km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 5-10km west.
Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 10-16km south.
Positioned in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 5-7km south.
The SMM asked armed forces and formations about what orders they had received following the recommitment to cease fire from 25 August, as well as instructions on interaction with the SMM.
A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at a checkpoint in Marinka told the SMM that he had received orders on 31 August about the recommitment to cease fire and instructions on the interaction with the SMM. He provided the SMM with copies of the related documentation.
At a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound near Ivanivka (59km south-west of Donetsk), the unit commander told the SMM that he had received written orders regarding the recommitment to cease fire and showed them to the SMM. He also explained that about two months ago he had received orders about interaction with the SMM.
At a checkpoint in Popasna, a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that he had received an order to cease fire; however, he said he was unable to show it to the SMM as he said it contained sensitive information and that the SMM had to submit a written request to see the document.
At a checkpoint in non-government-controlled Oleksandrivka (29km south-east of Donetsk), “DPR” members told the SMM that they had not been informed about the recommitment to cease fire and had not received instructions on interaction with the SMM.
In non-government-controlled Lukove (72km south of Donetsk), “DPR” members told the SMM that they had been informed about the recommitment to cease fire and had signed documents to indicate that they understood it. They also said that they had read and signed documents that outlined interaction with the SMM.
In non-government-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), “DPR” members told the SMM that they had been informed verbally on orders concerning both the recommitment to cease fire and interaction with the SMM.
At a non-government-controlled checkpoint south of the disengagement area near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), an “LPR” member told the SMM that he had been informed by his superior about the recommitment to cease fire but had not received a written order. At an “LPR” checkpoint in Zolote-5, an “LPR” member told the SMM that he had not received written orders about the recommitment to cease fire.
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*
During the evening on 4 September, while at the eastern edge of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 5 September, positioned 1km south-east of the bridge south of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
Positioned north of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM observed a calm situation.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.
The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance on both sides of the contact line, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to the Horlivka-Toretsk pipeline near government-controlled Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk), to the water pipes in government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), to the Shchastia thermal power plant, to water pipes near government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) and to the Petrivske water pumping station near government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to monitor the situation at schools near the contact line on both sides. In government-controlled areas, the SMM visited schools in Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk) and government-controlled Zolotyi Kolodiaz (72km north-west of Donetsk). The director of a school in Novoluhanske told the SMM that the number of students had increased (34 students) compared with the previous year (16-18 students).
In areas not under government control, the SMM visited schools in Petropavlivka (57km east of Donetsk), Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), Donetsk city’s Kyivskyi district (5km north-west of the city centre), Oktiabr area in Donetsk city’s Kuibyshevskyi district (7km north-west of Donetsk city centre), and Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol).
In a school in Petropavlivka, the deputy director told the SMM that among the 130 students enrolled in 2017, 80 were from nearby villages whose schools had been damaged due to shelling.
In a school in Kyivskyi district of Donetsk city, the deputy director told the SMM that the schools had been damaged by shelling in 2014 and 2015 and that some of the repair works were still ongoing.
Administrative staff in two schools in the Oktiabr area in Donetsk city’s Kuibyshevskyi district told the SMM that the schools had not been functional since 2014 due to damage caused by shelling, as the SMM observed, and security-related risks due to its proximity to the contact line.
The SMM visited two border areas not under control of the Government. At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), in about an hour, the SMM saw 54 cars (32 with Ukrainian and 18 with the Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “LPR” plates), six covered trucks (four with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “LPR” plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM saw seven cars (three with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates), one covered truck (with Ukrainian licence plates), two buses (with Ukrainian licence plates and approximately 70 people on board each) and one bus “Moscow-Luhansk” (with Ukrainian licence plates and about 50 people on board) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw nine cars (five with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates) and ten covered trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.
At a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk), in about one hour, the SMM saw eight persons exiting and nine entering Ukraine.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The SMM was prevented from accessing areas in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads north of the Zolote disengagement area. At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place over the previous 24 hours. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing side roads other than the main asphalt road south of the Zolote disengagement area. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the disengagement area told the SMM that no demining activity had been conducted in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing the road leading west from Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.
[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.