Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 7 July 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions, in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period. In Luhansk city the SMM heard two explosions. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including in Olenivka and twice near Kreminets where, on one occasion, an armed man pointed a rifle at the SMM and demanded it to wait.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Zaichenko. The SMM visited three border areas not controlled by the Government in Donetsk region.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including 46 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 210 explosions).

Over 90 minutes on the evening of 6 July, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two undetermined explosions, three projectiles in flight from south to north, two tracer rounds in flight from north to south, two from south to north, two from north to south, two tracer rounds and four projectiles in flight from south to north and five projectiles from north to south, all 4-7km east-south-east. The following day, positioned in Avdiivka for over five hours, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 2-4km south-east.

After midnight on 7 July, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 8-10km west-north-west. On 7 July, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for over five hours, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions: six 3-5km and two 5-7km west, as well as 14 bursts and 40 shots of small-arms fire 2-5km west.

On the night of 6-7 July the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 71 tracer rounds and two rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from east to west, followed by one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east and five tracer rounds from east to west.

On 7 July, positioned about 2km south-east of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard six explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds  1-2km north-north-east and their subsequent impacts at an unknown distance north-north-east. Positioned at the north-east edge of “DPR”-controlled Kulykove (30km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard about 260 shots and two bursts of small-arms fire 2km north-north-west.

In Luhansk city the SMM heard two explosions in the afternoon of 7 July. At about 15:27, the SMM heard one explosion about 200m south-east of its position in the city, assessed as having occurred near a building used by “LPR” members as their headquarters, at 10a Heroiv Velykoi Vitchyznyanoi Viiny Square. Later the SMM saw that the place of the explosion, at 1-2 3-ya Donetska Street, was cordoned off by armed “LPR” members in police-type uniforms and the SMM was not able to see anything. After about 90 minutes, while in the south-eastern outskirts of Luhansk, the SMM heard another explosion, approximately 2km north-west; later assessed as having occurred at 6 Kotsyubynskoho Street, about 150m north of the previous explosion. The SMM is following up on reports that due to the explosions one person died and several were injured.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The SMM camera in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska recorded after midnight on 7 July a flash in the air 2.5-3km west-north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

While present in Zolote, the SMM observed a calm situation. The SMM remained unable to access its camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Memorandum, the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM saw two stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) with their barrels facing west near “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) on flatbed trucks heading north near government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. On 6 July, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) and one infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant) near government-controlled Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

In areas not-controlled by the government, on 7 July, the SMM saw one stationary APC (MT-LB variant) near Zaichenko.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints and noted that traffic and movement of pedestrians was generally flowing, with no long queues at the entry-exit checkpoints in government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol) and “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) in Donetsk region, and no queues of pedestrians at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge in Luhansk region. At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed that the waiting time for each car was no longer than 30 minutes. About 15 pedestrians (mostly men) told the SMM that the waiting time at that checkpoint had been shorter in recent days, at no more than half a day.

The SMM visited three border areas not controlled by the Government. Over 20 minutes at the border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 42 civilian cars (18 with Ukrainian and 16 with Russian Federation licence plates and eight with “DPR” plates) in a queue to leave Ukraine.

Over 20 minutes at the border crossing point in Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 60 civilian cars (including 25 with “DPR” plates), one truck with covered cargo area, with Ukrainian licence plates, and two buses with Russian Federation licence plates in a queue to leave Ukraine.

At the border crossing point in Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol), during 35 minutes, the SMM observed 34 trailer trucks with closed cargo area and 18 civilian vehicles (including three with “DPR” plates) in a queue to leave Ukraine and five civilian vehicles (three with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) enter Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.          

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in “DPR”-controlled Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk), an armed man pointed a rifle at the SMM and demanded it to wait. The SMM left the area 25 minutes later and informed the JCCC.
• Later in the day, an armed man denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Kreminets, citing orders from superiors. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area (3km north of Pervomaisk) told the SMM that that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission on side roads due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place over the previous 24 hours and that, due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• Armed men at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) – a checkpoint the SMM decided to use to return to Donetsk after access was denied at a checkpoint in Kreminets (above) - allowed the SMM to pass through only upon checking the trailer of an SMM vehicle. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.