Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 6 July 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions, in Donetsk region, and more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions, in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted there and elsewhere.* In violation of the withdrawal lines, the SMM saw ten multiple launch rocket systems near Khrustalnyi. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Mykhailivka-Almazna high-voltage power lines near Pervomaisk and repair works to water wells in the Stanytsia Luhanska area. The SMM visited one border area not controlled by the Government in Luhansk region.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including more explosions (about 210), compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). Almost all explosions were recorded in the Donetsk airport-Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area and in areas north-east of Mariupol.

On the night of 5-6 July, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 36 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west.

On the evening and night of 5-6 July the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, five tracer rounds in flight from west to east, three tracer rounds in flight from north to south, ten tracer rounds and one projectile in flight from south to north, six projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east and one explosion assessed as an impact, all 2-5km east-south-east. On 6 July, the same camera recorded, in sequence, 31 explosions assessed as impacts, one projectile in flight from north-west to south-east, followed by aggregated totals of 15 projectiles in flight (one north-west to south-east, seven west to east, three west-north-west to east-north-east, and four east to west) and eight explosions assessed as impacts, all 4-7km east-south-east and east.

On 6 July, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions, seven bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and nine bursts and shots of small-arms fire 2-6km west and north-west and seven undetermined explosions at unknown distances west and north-west.

On the night of 5-6 July the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, 18 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, four tracer rounds in flight from west to east, 20 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, followed by a total of 134 tracer rounds (59 west to east, 60 east to west and 15 south to north), five rocket-assisted projectiles in flight (four west to east and one south to north) and 11 tracer rounds in vertical flights, all at undetermined distances north.

On 6 July, positioned 2.2km south-east of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an unknown distance north.

Positioned for about one and a half hours 2.5km west of government-controlled Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard one explosion, assessed as an outgoing mortar round 1km north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (11), compared with the previous reporting period (13 explosions).

On 6 July, positioned for about three hours 3.5km north of “LPR”-controlled Almazna (55km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 10km west and south-west.

Positioned for about half an hour 2.8km north-east of government-controlled Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 32 shots of small-arms fire 2km south-west, assessed as live-fire exercise inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

Positioned for about three hours in “LPR”-controlled Pryshyb (34km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions, 38 shots of small-arms fire and 16 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 2km west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 4 July, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded one undetermined explosion 3-7km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 6 July, positioned south of the bridge near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 5km north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Near the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw again Ukrainian Armed Forces working on trenches and a new infantry position covered with soil and wood. (See SMM Daily Report 28 June 2017).

The SMM remained unable to access its camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Memorandum, the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw ten multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near “LPR”-controlled Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM revisited an Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines, and observed as missing: one towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), one MLRS (BM-21), one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and one towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm). 

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the security zone. On 6 July, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw: a stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-variant) near the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge; one IFV (BTR-4), one armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BRDM) and an automatic grenade launcher (AGS-type) in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk). An SMM mini UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk); ten IFVs (four BTR-80, four BMP-1 and two BMP-2) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk).

On 6 July the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded an unmarked UAV flying east to west and returning in the opposite direction 4-5km east of the camera.

An SMM mini UAV spotted a total of 60 TM-62 anti-tank mines, previously observed, laid across the road between Petrivske and government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) and extending out into fields on both sides of the road. (See SMM Daily Report 17 March 2017).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor ongoing repairs, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), to the high-voltage Mykhailivka-Almazna power line near Pervomaisk. (See SMM Daily Report 6 July 2017)  The SMM also monitored repair works to water wells by Popasna Vodakanal near the government-controlled area of Stanytsia Luhanska. (See SMM Daily Report 5 July 2017) 

The SMM visited a border area not controlled by the Government. On 6 July, positioned for about one hour at the border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a total of 71 civilian vehicles (51 with Ukrainian licence plates, 16 with Russian Federation licence plates, two with “LPR” plates and two with “DPR” plates) and two buses (carrying signs “Luhansk-Yalta” and “Alchevsk-Rostov” with Ukrainian licence plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM saw a total of 31 civilian vehicles (15 with Ukrainian and 16 with Russian Federation licence plates) and three buses (carrying signs “Krasnyi Luch-Rostov”, “Luhansk-Rostov” with Ukrainian licence plates and “Horlivka-Moscow” with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw 12 civilian vehicles (five with Ukrainian licence plates, six with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) and one bus (carrying a sign “Moscow-Stakhanov” with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.             

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Delay:

• On 6 July armed “DPR” members delayed the SMM for 30 minutes at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in “DPR”-controlled Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk), saying that they were waiting for permission from their “commander” to allow the SMM access. Upon the “commander’s” arrival, the SMM was allowed through the checkpoint. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area (3km north of Pervomaisk) told the SMM that that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission on side roads due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours and that, due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.