Facilitating dialogue - Interview with Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk

Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk has been Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference since January 1997 and prior to that was Acting Personal Representative from July 1996. He previously served as a senior Polish diplomat in Cuba and in Zimbabwe, where he was Ambassador and head of the embassy.

The high-level contacts and intimate knowledge of the region that Ambassador Kasprzyk has built up over the past years are invaluable for achieving a peace settlement consistent with the reality on the ground. In February 2010, he reflected on his work, answering questions by OSCE Spokesperson Virginie Coulloudon. 

Virginie Coulloudon: An important part of your mandate is the monitoring of the cease-fire. You have drawn attention on many occasions to cease-fire violations. Has the situation improved over the years? Has there been any progress on the withdrawal of snipers from the front lines as recommended by the Minsk Group Co-chair countries at the Helsinki Ministerial? 

Andrzej Kasprzyk: The situation on the front lines has not changed dramatically since the cease-fire was agreed.  There are unfortunately a number of casualties each year – approximately 30 (occasionally civilians) – as a result of shooting incidents on the Line of Contact and the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. In 2009, the number of fatalities decreased to 19, almost certainly as a result of the intensity of the negotiations. Each casualty is a tragedy and should be avoided, especially considering that a cease-fire is in place. With regard to the withdrawal of snipers, unfortunately no agreement has been reached on this issue as yet. 

The international community has traditionally regarded the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as frozen or protracted. Had the conflict been considered “hot”, would this have elicited more resources and political will from the international community?

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict cannot be considered “frozen”. In fact, only the solution is frozen. Since last year we have seen the most intensive phase of the negotiation process to date: the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan met six times in 2009, three times in expanded format with President Medvedev, and once so far in 2010, again in the presence of President Medvedev. The personal involvement of President Medvedev resulted in the first-ever statement on Nagorno-Karabakh signed by the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan – the so-called Moscow Declaration of November 2008. 
If this conflict were in fact to become “hot” and hostilities to resume, obviously the international community would be involved even to a greater extent.   

Since the Madrid Document containing Basic Principles for a settlement was presented to Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2007, the parties have been saying that there are only a few obstacles to be overcome in the mediation process before a peace agreement can be reached. The negotiation curve is often uneven, with the parties’ expectations rising high at times and suffering severe setbacks at others. Can you describe your work in support of the Minsk Process?

I am responsible for keeping the Chairperson-in-Office informed and up-to-date on the situation on the ground and the current state of the talks. Acting on his behalf, I work in support of the peace process, maintaining contact with the parties, promoting confidence- and security-building measures. I also participate in the Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ visits and their meetings with the leaderships. One of the most important parts of the process is maintaining dialogue. Facilitating that dialogue is one of my main functions. My knowledge of the situation on the ground is also used occasionally by the mediators. Since I am on the ground, I occasionally convey information on behalf of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs to the leaderships and vice versa.  The monitoring conducted by my Office has on occasion decreased growing tension that could, in turn, have obstructed the negotiations. 

From the onset, you have chosen to be publicly discreet about the negotiation process and have very rarely talked to the media. Is such a policy of confidentiality a key element in confidence-building?

Confidentiality is crucial to any such process. A certain element of trust has to be fostered so as to maintain a dialogue between leaders of countries that technically remain in a state of war with each other. Before an agreement is reached, it would be difficult to put it up for public discussion, as this could torpedo the process. For that reason, the leaders have requested that the process be completely confidential. The extent of what can be disclosed has to be carefully measured. Above all, one also has to look at the mandate. The negotiations are mandated to the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. I am a silent witness. However, I would like to underline that the Presidents of the Co-Chair countries, when they gathered in L’Aquila for the G8 Summit in July 2009, disclosed the fundamental elements of the Basic Principles that are being negotiated. The so-called “L’Aquila Statement” outlines the main elements of the talks at the moment. 

One could argue that confidentiality is a double-edged sword and that the absence of public debate on the substance of the negotiations risks fuelling rumours on both sides. What do you tell critics who argue that rumours are detrimental to the peace process and that more public transparency is needed?

The Minsk Group Co-Chairs and successive OSCE Chairmanships have on numerous occasions called upon the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders to do more to prepare their publics for the necessity of compromise.  Both parties accept that compromise is a necessary part of the process. Public transparency will certainly be needed when the populations are asked to accept the results of the final negotiations. The leaderships will have to convince their populations of this, in order to get the necessary support for the implementation of the measures to be taken. 

In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there is arguably a tension between the principle of self-determination and that of territorial integrity. Such an apparent contradiction can also be found in the Helsinki Final Act and the Decalogue. What is your view of how this can be reconciled in the settlement process?

With the help and support of the mediators, it is up to the parties to find a balance between the various principles being discussed. 

The L'Aquila Statement issued by the Presidents of the Co-Chair countries on the occasion of the G8 summit in July 2009 stresses that conflicts tend to recur if insufficiently addressed by the international community. Do you feel that there is currently enough political will to address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

As I said earlier, 2009 saw an enormous increase in activity related to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  The L’Aquila Statement is evidence of the involvement of the Co-Chair countries at the highest level. Each successive OSCE Chairmanship is actively engaged. Already this year the Chairperson-in-Office, Kazakhstan's Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kanat Saudabayev visited Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution was very high on his agenda. The OSCE is using all the resources at its disposal in its engagement in the resolution process. It is a complicated process and has its own specific challenges.  Clearly, a great deal of political will is required for the parties to be able to make the necessary concessions to achieve a lasting settlement. 

We know that the High-Level Planning Group (HLPG)’s operational plans are based on possible scenarios. Depending on the option, the Group estimates that a peacekeeping operation would need between 1,500 and 4,500 personnel. Since no agreement has been reached and negotiations between the parties are strictly confidential, how do you keep the HLPG well enough informed to be able to carry out its strategic planning?

All three elements of the Minsk Process – the Minsk Group, the HLPG and the Personal Representative and his Office – being part of the same process, co-operate closely.  Co-operation among the three has always been excellent.  It is the task of the Chairmanship to give directives to the HLPG, also taking into account suggestions from the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. 

How would you describe the secret of a successful mediator?

Based on my experience, to be a successful mediator one obviously has to be an impartial, balanced and transparent broker. Anybody with a hidden agenda or one’s own interests involved will sooner or later be rejected by the parties. Confidence is therefore one of the basic conditions. To be successful means being able to achieve progress and that depends on the willingness of the parties, their political will enhanced by the mediator’s ability to present reasonable, acceptable solutions and persuade them that their acceptance would benefit everybody involved.