Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 18 January 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission confirmed a civilian casualty in Zolote and observed damage from small-arms fire and shelling in Orlivske and Raivka. The SMM continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM visited one border area currently outside of government control. The SMM monitored the situation of internally displaced persons in Odessa and Zaporizhzhia regions.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including nearly 100 explosions compared with 81 in the previous reporting period.[1]

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 17 January the SMM heard two explosions assessed as caused by artillery rounds 3-5km east and small-arms and light-weapons fire 2-4km south-east and south-south-east. In the afternoon of 18 January the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds, two undetermined explosions, and small-arms and light-weapons fire 2-4km south and south-east.

While in Donetsk city centre later in the evening the SMM heard nine explosions assessed as caused by artillery rounds 9-12km north-north-east.

The SMM camera at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded an exchange beginning with two flares followed by one projectile in flight from south to north 6-10km north-east on the evening of 17 January. During the ensuing exchange the camera recorded a total of 18 undetermined explosions, 11 projectiles in flight from west to east, and two projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, all 6-10km north-east. On 18 January, in a nine-minute episode, the camera recorded 61 undetermined projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west and 25 undetermined projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, all 4-6km north-east of the camera’s location.

Positioned in government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol) on the morning of 18 January, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 2-4km north and north-north-east. On 18 January the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 12 undetermined explosions at an unknown distance north of the camera’s location.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded 24 explosions compared with 18 in the previous reporting period. Nineteen of the explosions were assessed as part of a live-fire exercise north-north-west of “LPR”-controlled Vrubivskyi (22km south-west of Luhansk) and west of “LPR”-controlled Illiriia, outside of the security zone. About 2km north-east of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion and 20 single shots of small-arms fire 5km north-east.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. In a government-controlled part of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable family members to recover the body of a man, in civilian clothes. The SMM saw a gunshot wound in the lower right back of the deceased man’s torso. A man told the SMM that the previous day he had found his brother (57 years old) dead in his brother’s backyard. The man said that he and other family members had been prevented from recovering the body by multiple warning shots fired from a part of Zolote not controlled by the Government.

The SMM observed bullet impacts near civilian infrastructure in areas not controlled by the Government and impact sites from shelling in a government-controlled area.

In government-controlled Orlivske (23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed eight impacts assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from an east-north-easterly direction. The impacts were as close as about 100m from a farm building and two windows were shattered. A resident told the SMM that the village had been shelled on the evening of 10 January.

In “LPR”-controlled Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed ten fresh bullet impacts on the north-facing walls of three buildings of a water pumping station. The SMM assessed that the bullets were fired from a 23mm anti-aircraft gun from a north-north-westerly direction. A worker at the station told the SMM that the impacts had been caused in the afternoon of 16 January. The SMM observed an “LPR” checkpoint about 300m south of the water pumping station.

In “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed a fresh bullet hole directly above the operator’s window of a rail vehicle. The SMM was shown the hole by workers who had been repairing a railway line near Donetskyi and had called the SMM about 25 minutes earlier to inform them that they were hearing small-arms fire near the repair site. They told the SMM that two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had yelled at them shortly before firing began. Earlier in the day the SMM had monitored the repair work to the railway line which had been co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).

The SMM observed a fresh impact site approximately 200m south of “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) on the edge of an asphalted road. The SMM assessed the impact as having been caused by a mortar. The SMM observed about 50 civilian cars and 20 civilians queuing to cross into areas not controlled by the Government at the same checkpoint later that day.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area the SMM observed four fresh impact sites south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position, 10m north of a shelter within which the Mission has regularly observed a parked infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1). The SMM assessed the impacts as caused by 30mm grenade rounds. The SMM observed fresh IFV tracks around the shelter.

The Mission observed a calm situation in the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near government-controlled Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk). In areas not controlled by the Government the Mission saw 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, in areas controlled by the Government, the Mission saw at least 28 tanks (T-64) near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (76km north of Luhansk) and one self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120m) near Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (66km north of Donetsk). In areas not controlled by the Government, the SMM observed two tanks (T-64) at a training area near Illiriia (30km west of Luhansk), seven tanks at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) and two additional tanks (T-64) near Myrne.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 16 towed howitzers (12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and four D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 12 multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1). The SMM noted that the following weapons were missing: six towed howitzer (2A36) first observed as missing in June 2016 and one self-propelled howitzer (2S1) first noted as missing in November 2016.

The Mission revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the relevant withdrawal line. Ten tanks (T-64) were missing as first noted in July 2016.

The Mission also revisited “DPR” permanent storage sites and noted that five tanks (T-72) were missing as first noted in December 2016.

The SMM observed IFVs and an anti-aircraft gun in the security zone. [2] Near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed 11 IFVs (five BMP-2 and the remaining not known) and near government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM observed an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck.

The SMM observed a small installation covered with camouflage netting near the Donetsk water filtration station located between “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) and government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk). Smoke was coming out from behind the netting.

The SMM asked the JCCC for an update on its co-ordination of mine clearance along several roads with a view to removing long-standing restrictions to the freedom of movement of SMM monitors and other civilians, including the following roads: E58 between government-controlled Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk); T0519 between “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk) and Mariupol; H20 near Yasynuvata northbound to government-controlled Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk); E40/M03 between Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve; the road connecting government-controlled Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partizan, 23km north-east of Donetsk), a municipal road connecting Zhovanka with the town of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk); and H21 across the bridge in Shchastia.

The SMM visited one border area currently not under the control of the Government. During about 1.5 hours in “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw one truck (with a Ukrainian licence plate) waiting to exit Ukraine and two trucks (one with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine, all with their cargo areas covered.

In Odessa and Zaporizhzhia regions the SMM observed conditions at two collective centres for internally displaced persons (IDPs). In Biliaivka district (39km west of Odessa) the Mission observed a poorly insulated two-room apartment, housing six adults, in a collective centre heated by two small, electric heaters. In Zaporizhzhia (70km south of Dnipro) the SMM observed four people living inside a single room at a temporary IDP collective centre.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to access areas other than the main road in the Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) disengagement area, as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present told the SMM that the area had not been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to travel on a path west of the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge due to the danger of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to travel through the Zolote disengagement area from the “LPR”-controlled side due to the danger of mines and UXO as indicated by mine signs in the disengagement area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to access secondary routes in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), near the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area (58km west of Luhansk), as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC could not ensure the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near government-controlled Katerynivka and denied further travel towards government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), claiming that the SMM required the permission of Ukrainian Armed Forces headquarters to be allowed to pass. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the Mission that it could not ensure the SMM’s safety if it travelled east from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) towards Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk).
• Armed men did not allow the SMM to enter “LPR”-controlled Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) citing a live-fire exercise in the area, outside the security zone. Later in the morning the SMM heard up to 19 undetermined explosions assessed as a live-fire exercise originating for the area of Shymshynivka. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was stopped by a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the entrance of Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk). He told the Mission that he had orders not to let it go any further. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint in Yasynuvata, an armed man told the Mission that they could not proceed without an escort. When the Russian Federation Armed Forces representative of the JCCC arrived at the checkpoint and passed through 45 minutes later, the SMM was allowed to pass as well, without an escort.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. 

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.