Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 29 December 2016

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of shelling in Troitske. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, but its access was restricted by the continued presence of mines and unexploded ordnance.* The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The Mission monitored the situation of civilians living close to the contact line and the movement of civilians across the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to essential infrastructure in Orikhove, Slovianoserbsk, and Myronivskyi. The SMM monitored three border crossing points currently not controlled by the Government.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including 84 explosions compared with about 100 in the previous reporting period, mostly in areas north-east of Donetsk city.

During the evening of 28 December, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, ten explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon (73mm), as well as 76 bursts and 28 shots of small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-west. The next morning, while in the same location, the SMM heard 20 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of an IFV (BMP-1) cannon 2-3km south-west. In the afternoon the SMM heard an explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar (82mm) round, as well as 20 bursts and 30 shots assessed as small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-west.

During the evening of 28 December, while in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 37 undetermined explosions 8-12km north-west.

The same evening, the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two illumination flares in flight from north to south, ten tracer rounds in flight from east to west, and two more illumination flares in flight from north to south, all 3-4km north-north-east of the camera.

On 29 December, positioned north of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 85 shots of small-arms fire 2km north-north-east and 13 shots assessed as small-arms fire 3km east-south-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period, including, however, a similar number of explosions. Positioned north of “LPR”-controlled Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions, assessed as impacts of mortar (120mm) rounds, about 3km north-west. (See also below, in relation to violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.)

The Mission followed up on reports of shelling in government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), which residents said had occurred on 23 December (see SMM Daily Report 29 December 2016). The SMM observed long cuts, assessed to be from shrapnel, on the bark of trees bordering a cemetery about 50m from a house. In the cemetery was an area of disturbed dirt assessed as caused by the impact of a round from an undetermined weapon.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM there were no plans for disengagement or demining activities that day. Positioned in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions about 2km north-west, assessed to be outside the nearby disengagement area.

On the “LPR”-controlled side of the Zolote disengagement area, accompanied by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the JCCC, the SMM observed a secondary road that an armed “LPR” member said had been demined on 28 December (see SMM Daily Report 29 December 2016). The SMM could not proceed due to poor road conditions. Positioned east of “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5, the SMM heard one shot assessed as small-arms fire about 2km west; the SMM could not assess whether it occurred inside the disengagement area.

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM noted a calm situation. Twelve armed “DPR” members in military-style clothing were standing together just north of the village, outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed two tanks (T-64) stationary near government-controlled Halytsynivka (29km north-west of Donetsk) and one tank (T-72) near government-controlled Sloviansk (95km north-west of Donetsk) on a flatbed transporter traveling west.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed six multiple-launch rocket systems (9A53 Uragan, 220mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and an anti-aircraft weapon in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: an armoured personnel carrier (APC; BRDM-2) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk); an APC (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on a truck near Troitske; an APC (GT-MU) near Novozvanivka (67km west of Luhansk), and seven IFVs (six BMP-2, one BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). All the vehicles were stationary. Near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve, the SMM observed six IFVs (BMP-1) and one APC (MT-LB) traveling north-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living close to the contact line. In government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel dismantling guardhouses and fortifications at a checkpoint about 35m from houses and 150m from a school previously affected by fighting in the area (see SMM Daily Report 23 November 2016).

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians walking across the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. At the government checkpoint north of the bridge, the Mission observed about 200 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 300 queuing in the opposite direction. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed about 400 pedestrians queuing toward government-controlled areas and about 200 people queuing in the opposite direction, including people transporting about 40 carts of produce.

The Mission continued to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. The Mission facilitated maintenance and repair works of a railway line near government-controlled Orikhove (56km north-west of Luhansk) and repairs to water wells and pumps in “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk). In government-controlled Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM facilitated and observed further repair works to the power line supplying government-controlled Troitske (see SMM Daily Report 29 December 2016).

The SMM monitored border areas, including three currently not controlled by the Government. During 1.5 hours at a border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 14 passenger vehicles (ten with Ukrainian licence plates, four with Russian Federation licence plates) and 24 pedestrians (eight female, 16 male; aged 13 to 55), enter Ukraine. The SMM also observed seven passenger vehicles (three with Ukrainian licence plates, one with Russian Federation license plates, and four at a distance from which the SMM could not see licence plates) traveling in the opposite direction. At a border crossing point in “DPR”-controlled Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed nine passenger vehicles (five with Ukrainian licence plates, four with Russian Federation licence plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. During the 30 minutes the SMM was present, one vehicle crossed the border. . During 15 minutes at a border crossing point near “DPR”-controlled Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM did not observe any movement across the border.

During 30 minutes at a border crossing point in government-controlled Taniushivka (137km north of Luhansk), the SMM observed two buses (each with Ukrainian licence plates and 50-60 passengers) enter Ukraine. The SMM observed 20 passenger vehicles (18 with Ukrainian licence plates and two with Russian Federation plates) queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Kyiv and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM was again unable to access areas other than the main road located in the disengagement area, as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present said he could not assist in ensuring the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines or UXO in those areas. The SMM informed the headquarters of the JCCC.

• In “LPR”-controlled parts of the disengagement area in Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM was again unable to proceed east toward a summer cottage area (inside the disengagement area), as no demining had been conducted in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was again unable to travel east into the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area using a secondary road east of government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk). A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that the area was mined. The SMM informed the headquarters of the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM could again not proceed west toward the disengagement area due to lack of security guarantees and potential mines and UXO on the road. The SMM observed mine hazard signs (outside the disengagement area), but did not observe any demining activities. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC told the SMM that mines were still present on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). As a result, the SMM was still unable to travel that route.
• The SMM again could not access the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel warned the SMM that mines remained in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was again unable to travel on the road between government-controlled Katerynivka and Popasna from both sides, as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present on each side said they did not have orders to allow the SMM to pass. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Two armed “DPR” members at a checkpoint prevented the SMM from entering “DPR”-controlled Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk), citing orders from their “commander”.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces unit commander denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area, saying he lacked permission from higher command. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said the area was outside the Anti-Terrorism Operation (ATO) zone, and thus SMM access was not authorized.

Other impediments:

• In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed about 15 armed “DPR” members, two of whom aggressively gestured at the SMM. One of the men hit an SMM vehicle with his hand, pointed his weapon at the vehicle, then departed the area.

[1] lease see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.