Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 4 December 2016

This report is for the general public and the media.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations between the night of 2 December and the evening of 3 December compared with the previous reporting period, and fewer on 4 December. In Luhansk region the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations on both 3 and 4 December compared with the previous reporting period. It continued to face restrictions of its movement in the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, as well as in other areas.* The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Horlivka and damage to civilian infrastructure in Luhanske and Horlivka.  The Mission continued to note long queues at entry-exit checkpoints on both sides of the contact line. It facilitated and monitored repair works near the Donetsk water filtration station. It monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government. In Kherson the SMM noted a calm situation at the administrative boundary line between mainland Ukraine and Crimea.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region in the reporting period between the night of 2 December and the evening of 3 December, including more than 300 explosions compared with 209 in the previous reporting period, and fewer on 4 December, including about 70 explosions.[1] Most of the ceasefire violations occurred north of Donetsk city, with the SMM camera in Avdiivka recording exchanges of fire at various times during the reporting period, and in areas west of Horlivka and east and south-east of Svitlodarsk.

During the night of 2-3 December, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded three indirect rocket-assisted projectiles from north-east to south-west, followed by an additional 19 undetermined explosions and 11 tracer rounds from east to west, 4-6km south-east. After a lull during the day, in the afternoon of 3 December the same camera recorded five tracer rounds from north to south, followed by other ceasefire violations that continued during the night of 3-4 December and during the day on 4 December. In total during this time the camera recorded: 66 undetermined explosions, 227 tracer rounds (105 from south to north, 27 from south-west to north-east, 44 from north to south, and 51 from south-west to north-east) and 56 projectiles (eight from north to south, 23 from north-west to south-east, eight from south-west to north-east, and 17 from north-east to south-west), all 3-6km east-south-east.

While in Donetsk city on the night of 2-3 December, the SMM heard 89 undetermined explosions 6-10km north-north-west. In the early morning hours of 4 December, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 6-8km north-west.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 2 December the SMM heard at least 115 explosions (40 undetermined, 67 assessed as outgoing artillery and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon or recoilless-gun (SPG-9) rounds, six as impacts of artillery rounds and two as impacts of mortar (120mm) rounds), as well as uncountable and overlapping explosions (both impacts and outgoing), all 3-6km south-west, west and north-west. While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 2 December the SMM heard 45 explosions (26 undetermined, nine assessed as outgoing rounds of IFV (BMP-1) cannon and recoilless-gun (73mm) fire, and ten as impacts of mortar (82mm) rounds), 4-7km east and south-east.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) at different times during the reporting period, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and uncountable bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5-10km north-west and west-north-west.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from undetermined weapons, seven tracer rounds from west to east, four undetermined explosions, two tracer rounds from east to west, at least 300 bursts of direct fire from west to east and at least 70 from east to west, all at an undetermined distance north and north-east of the camera. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove,  23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as outgoing mortar fire 200-300m north, and more than 100 single shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 0.2-2km south-south-west, west and north-north-west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations on 3 December, including 18 explosions, compared with 50 on 2 December. On 4 December the SMM recorded one burst of heavy-machine-gun fire. Positioned in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) on 3 December, the SMM heard five explosions assessed as mortar fire. Positioned in government-controlled Zolote-5 on 3 December, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 5km south-south-west (outside the disengagement area).

The SMM camera near the disengagement area in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded multiple flashes assessed as small-arms fire 0.3 to 2.2km south-south-east, south, south-south-west and south-west of the camera position, on the nights of 1 and 2 December (several of which were assessed as inside the disengagement area).

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty and damage to civilian infrastructure. At a hospital in Horlivka medical staff told the SMM that a 40-year-old man, who was reported wounded by a bullet on 2 December in the town, had died in the hospital. The medical staff did not provide further details saying that they needed permission of “DPR” members. Staff at the hospital morgue also said the same.

On 3 December in Horlivka, accompanied by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), the SMM observed damages to houses in Haharin mine area. The SMM observed fresh impacts in the roofs of two houses, one in Cherkasova and one in Richchya Zhovtnya Street, an impact on Poltavsky Street and another one on a small barn behind a house on Bunkernyi Lane, all assessed as caused by artillery fire from a south-westerly direction. The SMM noted several windows broken, as well as shrapnel damage to several houses (roofs, walls, gates and fences) on these streets. At another house in Pereiaslavska Street, the SMM noted damage to the walls, windows and concrete fence, assessed as caused by artillery fire from a north-easterly direction. Some 15 civilians (men and women, age 25-27) separately told the SMM that they had heard shelling at about 01:30 on 2 December.

In government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC, the SMM observed three fresh craters on Myra Street, assessed as caused by mortar (82mm) rounds fired from a south-south-easterly direction. Two craters were in the yards of two houses, one in each, and one on the street between them. The SMM noted broken windows and shrapnel damage to the walls and a fence. Residents said that they had heard shelling at around 22:00 on 1 December.

On 4 December, in “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed seven fresh impacts scattered around a checkpoint and assessed them as caused by recoilless-gun (SPG) fire from a south-westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The Mission’s access to most parts of these areas remained restricted. The SMM did not note any signs of further disengagement or any demining activity in the three areas during the reporting period.

The SMM camera near the disengagement area in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded ceasefire violations on the night of 1-2 December, some assessed as inside the disengagement area (see above). On 3 and 4 December, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in Stanytsia Luhanska told the SMM that they had no orders for disengagement or demining. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, inside the disengagement area, the SMM observed tracks of IFV (BMP) on the fresh snow.

The SMM noted a generally calm situation in and around the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area. The SMM camera in Zolote recorded one flare at an undetermined distance north-north-east, on 2 December.

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, an armed “DPR” member told the SMM on 3 December that, according to orders from his superiors, he was not authorized to answer SMM questions on demining activities or the presence of the JCCC. On 4 December, “DPR” members made the SMM wait for 30 minutes at a checkpoint north of the village until an armed man came to escort it to the observation post.* The SMM noted no demining activity in the area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed eight multiple-launch missile systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) present.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles [2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: three covered armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR), one near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) and two parked at a checkpoint in Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk); three IFVs (BMP-1) stationary at a Ukrainian Armed Forces position in Trokhizbenka, two stationary IFVs (BMP-2) between Popasna and Katerynivka (69 and 64km west of Luhansk, respectively) and another two in Popasna; and one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) at a checkpoint in Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk). The SMM saw one IFV (BMP-2) in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed on 2 December the presence of four armoured vehicles: one near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), one near government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), one near government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), and one near “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne.

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a canister probably of a surface-to-air-missile system (9K37, 400mm), a military-type truck and at least two armed men at a compound in an “LPR”-controlled area about 8km north-west of Luhansk city centre on 29 November.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The Mission noted that a piece of UXO (82mm mortar) in the middle of Donetska Street in government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk), last seen on 28 November, had still not been removed (See SMM Daily Report 29 November). The piece of UXO had been fenced with tape, bricks and concrete.

The SMM continued to note long queues at entry-exit checkpoints on both sides of the contact line. At a government checkpoint in Berezove, the SMM observed about 290 civilian vehicles, one bus and some 150 pedestrians queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and none in the other direction. On 4 December at a “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka, the SMM observed about 65 vehicles, four minibuses, and 35 pedestrians queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas; in the area between the same checkpoint and the government checkpoint in Maiorsk, the SMM noted 204 vehicles and 44 pedestrians queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 80 vehicles queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

On 3 December, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed “LPR” members carrying a 25-year-old man with a broken leg on a stretcher across the wooden ramps towards government-controlled areas. On 4 December, at the same checkpoint the SMM observed at 07:25 - prior to the opening of the checkpoint - 121 vehicles and five minibuses in a queue that extended some 2km south. At 08:00 the SMM observed some 1,000 people queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas. At 13:45, the queue consisted of 450 people waiting to walk towards government-controlled areas and 60 people queuing in the opposite direction.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to the power lines and water pipelines near the Donetsk water filtration station (12km north of “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre) by maintenance staff of utility companies. While in the area for about four hours, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, including one sniper shot 500m north-east and one single shot of small-arms fire 800m west. Water company employees later informed the SMM that they had completed the repair works.

The SMM visited two border areas currently not under government control. On 3 December, over one hour at the border crossing point in Dovzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 17 passenger vehicles (including one with “LPR” plates) queuing to leave Ukraine. Over one hour on 4 December at the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 71km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed 23 cars, one minibus, and two pedestrians entering Ukraine, as well as 28 cars (including one with “LPR” plates) and a bus leaving Ukraine.

On 2 December in Kherson region, the SMM monitored the situation on the coast of the Black Sea and at the administrative boundary line between the Ukrainian mainland and Crimea. The commander of the State Border Guard Service unit in Skadovsk (62km south of Kherson) described the situation as calm. Near Zaliznyi Port (62km south-west of Kherson) the SMM observed two MLRS assessed as (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) and a support truck.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Kyiv and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was not able to travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) due to lack of security guarantees. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel east from government-controlled Bohdanivka towards Petrivske via “DPR”-controlled Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said that the road was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 3 December, the SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area as armed “LPR” members said they could not guarantee the SMM’s security in adjacent fields and roads due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO. On 4 December, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC also said that the area was still mined, adding that he was not aware of demining activities. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 4 December, the SMM could not access the disengagement area from government-controlled Zolote-3 (60km west of Luhansk) as several concrete blocks and barbed wire blocked the road. The SMM also observed several mine warning signs on both sides of the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On both 3 and 4 December, the SMM could not proceed from the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) toward the railway bridge due to the threat of mines. The SMM observed a sign warning of mines on the road. Armed men at the checkpoint also said that the area had not been fully demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 3 December, anti-tank obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”) on the road west of Prince Ihor Monument (outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area) prevented the SMM from further travel. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On both 3 and 4 December, the presence of mines on the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) prevented the SMM from passing the government checkpoint north of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 4 December at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia bridge, an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that “LPR” de-miners had cleared the area of mines and did not prevent the SMM from proceeding. The SMM walked to the bridge and noted anti-tank mines covered by snow, yet still visible, on the tarmac, about 150m from a checkpoint. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 4 December the SMM could not travel on the road between Popasna and Katerynivka due to the presence of mines and barriers on the road. On another occasion Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the checkpoint, outside the disengagement area, told the SMM that he had no orders to allow the SMM to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• On 4 December, “DPR” members made the SMM wait for 30 minutes at a checkpoint north of Petrivske until an armed man came to escort it to an observation post.

Conditional access:

On 3 December, armed men at an “LPR” checkpoint in Molodizhne denied SMM access unless it would show the patrol plan. The SMM informed the JCCC. After 40 minutes of waiting another armed man approached the SMM asking again for its patrol plan. Upon refusal to show the patrol plan, he asked SMM members to exit the vehicles to count them. He also inspected visually the interior and the trunks of the SMM vehicles and allowed the SMM to proceed after another 15 minutes.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.