Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 December 2016

This report is for the general public and the media.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. It continued to face restrictions to its movement in the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.* The SMM’s freedom of movement was further restricted on six occasions. It followed up on reports of civilian casualties. The SMM monitored one border area not controlled by the Government. The SMM facilitated and monitored repair works on both sides of the contact line. The SMM monitored a protest march in Kyiv.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 209 explosions compared with some 310 in the previous reporting period.[1]

While in Donetsk city on the night of 1-2 December the SMM heard 70 undetermined explosions 3-9km south-west and north-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 1 December the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 4-7km south and south-east.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 53 explosions, 26 of which it assessed as impacts of mortar (120mm) rounds, 16 as outgoing artillery rounds, four as undetermined explosions, one explosion assessed as an impact, five as outgoing rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds and one assessed as from an outgoing recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) round, and heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 4-6km west-south-west.

During the night of 1-2 December, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 43 undetermined projectiles in flight and 12 undetermined explosions all 3-6km east-south-east, beginning with ten undetermined projectiles in flight from east to west. Among the rest of the 33 undetermined projectiles the camera recorded 27 undetermined projectiles in flight west to east, and an additional six in flight from east to west. During the day on 2 December the SMM camera recorded six explosions and ten undetermined projectiles in flight, two from south to north, four from north-east to south, and four from north to south, all 3-6km east-south-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 1-3km south-east.    

Positioned south-east of “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 13 explosions assessed to be outgoing fire, 3km north-west.

In Luhansk the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including over 50 explosions compared with six in the previous reporting period. While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard over 50 undetermined explosions and over 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire approximately 10km south-west.

The SMM camera near the disengagement area in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded the use of mortars, under-barrel-grenade-launchers and small-arms on the night of 30 November-1 December. The camera recorded an explosion at 22:14 assessed as a mortar impact near a location consistent with an “LPR” position on the bridge south of the river (inside the disengagement area). An explosion at 23:27 was assessed as a mortar impact near a location consistent with an “LPR” position (outside the disengagement area). Two explosions assessed as mortar impacts were recorded near a location consistent with a Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position near the broken section of the bridge (inside the disengagement area) at 00:30 and 00:37. At 00:40, the flash of what was assessed to be an undetermined explosion was recorded (just outside of the camera’s field of view) in an area consistent with the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position within the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The Mission’s access to most of these areas remained restricted. The SMM did not note any signs of further disengagement or any demining activity in the three areas during the reporting period.

The SMM’s camera observation in Stanytsia Luhanska on the night of 30 November-1 December was restricted repeatedly when a searchlight was shone at it from an area about 1.4km south, assessed as from an “LPR” position.* The searchlight was shone at the camera on six separate occasions each lasting 10-15 minutes from about midnight to sunrise.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed 31 self-propelled howitzers (19 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and 12 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). The following weapons were missing: nine self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), two for the first time and seven as first observed on 19 September 2016; 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) as first observed on 19 May 2016; six towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) as first observed on 10 November 2016; one towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) as first observed on 15 February 2016; five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) as first observed on 3 March 2016; 30 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) as first observed on 13 August 2016; four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) as first observed on 13 August 2016; three towed anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm) as first observed on 6 April 2016 and 16 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm): one as first observed on 19 April 2016, five as first observed on 19 July 2016 and ten as first observed on 3 November 2016. The SMM observed that one site continued to be abandoned, with all 31 tanks (T-64) missing, as it has been since 4 February 2016.

The SMM observed an armoured combat vehicle[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed one stationary armoured personnel carrier (BRDM-2).

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. According to medical staff at the Trauma Hospital in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) a 61-year-old man, an employee of a civilian repair company, was admitted with a gunshot wound allegedly sustained while he repaired a power line in “DPR”-controlled Kruta Balka (16km north of Donetsk). They told the SMM that following surgery to remove the bullet from his hip, the man was moved to hospital in Donetsk city. Medical staff at the hospital in “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) told the SMM that a woman (aged 60 years old) was admitted on 30 November with a shrapnel wound to her shoulder and hand following alleged shelling in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km east of Shyrokyne) on the same day. According to staff, the woman was in a stable condition.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination. The SMM monitored adherence to ceasefire during repair works to pipelines near Pivnichne (formerly Kirove, 44km north-east of Donetsk) related to water shortages in government-controlled Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk). Positioned in the area the SMM heard nine explosions assessed as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher fire, eight shots from under-barrel-grenade-launchers (GP-25) and bursts of small-arms fire 2-3km east. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC later told the SMM that the repair works had been completed and the water pipe was operational. He added that it would take around half a day to refill and test the system. Employees of the water company told the SMM that around 54,000 people, who had been without running water since shelling damaged the pipeline on 23 November, will benefit. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable workers from a power company to conduct an assessment of electricity lines between “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) and government-controlled Svitlodarsk. When the assessment was completed and the workers were leaving the area the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 6-8km north-west. The SMM monitored work to repair water pipes and electricity lines at Donetsk water filtration station in Yasynuvata after it had been shelled on 1 December. The repair work will continue over the next three days. The SMM also monitored repairs to the water pipeline near “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited one border area currently not under government control. Over 70 minutes at the Izvaryne border crossing point (52km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed 38 cars and three buses queued to exit Ukraine; 24 cars and the three buses had Ukrainian licence plates, 12 had Russian Federation licence plates, and two had plates that were not identified. The SMM also observed 55 pedestrians queuing to exit Ukraine. The SMM observed 38 pedestrians, three vehicles with Ukrainian licence plates, and one covered cargo truck and two buses with Russian Federation licence plates enter Ukraine.

On Kyiv’s Maidan Square the SMM observed a protest led by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The SMM saw about 40 men (mostly aged 20-60 years old) arranged on steps on the Maidan, some of whom held flags of different groups including: White Hammer, OUN, Right Sector, Automaidan, New Fire and the Black Committee. Various speakers addressed a crowd of about 250 people (90 per cent men aged between 20 and 40 years old) and criticized the Government. The protestors then marched via European Square towards Bankova Street. One line of police officers (about 200 in partial riot gear) and another from the National Guard (about 200 in partial riot gear) followed the march. As the crowd marched, a protestor threw a flare into the compound of a building on Hrushevsky Street, which was secured by an estimated 200 law enforcement officers (half wearing riot gear). A barrier – and some 300 law enforcement officers in full riot gear – blocked Bankova Street. The protestors re-stated their demands at the barrier before returning (with police and National Guard escort) to Maidan, where they dispersed peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was not able to travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) as an armed “DPR” member did not guarantee the security of the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area (58km west of Luhansk) as armed “LPR” members said they could not guarantee the SMM’s security and Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC (on opposite sides of the area) said they could not assist in ensuring the SMM’s security in adjacent fields and roads due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not access the disengagement area from government-controlled Zolote-3 (60km west of Luhansk) as several concrete blocks and barbed wire blocked the road. The SMM also observed several mine warning signs on both sides of the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The entrance to the SMM observation post in government-controlled Zolote was blocked by a wooden barrier and barbed wire. The SMM left the area.
• The SMM could not proceed from the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) toward the railway bridge due to the threat of mines. The SMM observed a sign warning of mines on the road and was told by armed men at the checkpoint that they could not guarantee security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM observed that the road west of Prince Ihor Monument (on the edge of the disengagement area) was blocked by anti-tank obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”) preventing further travel. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) in either direction due to the possible presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.           
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces commander asked the SMM to show passports, provide the patrol plan and identify what weapons they wanted to observe before entering a heavy weapons holding area. The SMM refused and was denied entry. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a compound near Kremenivka (27km north-west of Mariupol) the Ukrainian Armed Forces denied entry to the SMM after they asked – and the SMM refused to reveal – if there were Russian nationals on the patrol. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to a compound near Donske (57km south of Donetsk). The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:

• A searchlight beamed at the SMM camera from an area about 1.4km south, from what was assessed as an “LPR” position south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, obscured the SMM’s visibility on the night of 30 November-1 December. The searchlight was shone at the camera on six separate occasions each lasting 10-15 minutes from about midnight to sunrise.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.  

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.