Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 22 November 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. In Donetsk region most ceasefire violations concentrated in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area and areas north-east and east of Mariupol. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and faced restrictions of its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM’s freedom of movement was further restricted on seven occasions (three in government-controlled areas and four in areas not under government control). In Marinka the SMM saw school children and staff moving from classrooms to a shelter after they had heard explosions; during its observation in the school the SMM also heard explosions in close proximity. The SMM monitored two border areas currently not under government control. On the evening of 21 November in Kyiv, the Mission continued to monitor a public gathering, where incidents were registered.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including more than 460 explosions compared with the previous reporting period (118 explosions). Nearly 220 explosions were recorded in areas north-east and east of Mariupol and over 100 explosions were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area.

In the morning while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre the SMM heard, within half an hour, 15 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west. Positioned in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM heard, within eight minutes, 18 undetermined explosions 2-4km east.

During the night of 21 November the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 61 undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east. During the day of 22 November positioned in Avdiivka for more than four hours, the SMM heard 17 explosions: two assessed as the impacts of 82 mortar rounds 3km south-east, one explosion assessed as an outgoing round from recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) 3km south-east, and 14 undetermined explosions 3-8km south-east and south-south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for more than five and a half hours, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 3-7km south-west, west-south-west and west.

On the night of 21 November while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing 122mm artillery rounds  6km north-west, and 34 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) or a 73mm cannon of an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) 1.5-3km south-south-east. During the early afternoon hours of 22 November while at the same location the SMM heard three explosions assessed as the impacts of 122mm artillery rounds, 20 explosions assessed as the impacts of 120mm mortar rounds, and six explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) or a 73mm cannon of an IFV (BMP-1), all 2-4 south-east.

During the day positioned 3km south-east of government-controlled Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 35 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance south-south-east. 

The SMM noted that the security situation in areas of north-east and east of Mariupol remained volatile, with nearly half of all explosions recorded in the region during the reporting period. During the night of 21 November, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded in sequence one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from south-west to north-east, 33 bursts of tracer rounds in flight from east-south-east to west-north-west, and one undetermined explosion at an undetermined distance north-north-east and north-east.

During the day  positioned 2.5km north-east of government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 3-4km south-south-east. Positioned in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) the SMM heard, within five minutes, at least 40 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance east. Positioned at two different places in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 153 explosions mostly at locations ranging from north-north-east to south-south-east at an undetermined distance. Of those, 66 explosions were assessed as outgoing rounds from unknown weapons, 52 explosions as the impacts of rounds from unknown weapons and 35 explosions were undetermined.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 27 explosions, compared with one in the previous reporting period. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard three explosions assessed as the impacts of rounds from unknown weapons 3km south-west. Positioned near “LPR”-controlled Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 explosions, ten of which were assessed as caused by tank rounds 2-5km south-south-west, and assessed as a live-fire exercise (outside the security zone).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.  The Mission’s access to most of these areas remained restricted. Contrary to the TCG’s decision, the SMM did not note any signs of the required disengagement or any demining activity in the three areas during the reporting period.

The SMM did not note any signs of disengagement in the Stanytsia Luhanska area. At 09:36, positioned at the Ukrainian Armed Forces southernmost forward position north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 1km east (assessed inside the disengagement area). The SMM noted that previously observed unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see SMM Daily Report 15 November 2016) had been removed from a pile of tyres covering the shelter near the said position. The Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier present told the SMM that a demining team had arrived and removed the UXO the previous day.

The SMM crossed the Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route (closed to civilians) in the disengagement area from north to south and back. At the government checkpoint north of the disengagement area the SMM saw 35-45 border guard officers with a number of support vehicles and media representatives. A member of the State Emergency Service present at a tent for first aid told the SMM that they had enough emergency supplies and resources to deal with up to 40-50 people in the tent. At 11:35, positioned near an “LPR” checkpoint at the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 10km west of its position (assessed outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (outside the disengagement area) for five and a half hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-4km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and three undetermined explosions 8-10km south (outside the disengagement area). Positioned in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) for nearly four hours, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an undetermined distance  east, one undetermined explosion at an undetermined distance and an undetermined direction, and one undetermined explosion at an undetermined distance south (the SMM was not able to determine whether they occurred inside the disengagement area). At the western outskirts of Bohdanivka the SMM observed 11 fresh craters in fields – eight located north of a road and three located south of the road, all 20-100m from the road. The SMM assessed two of the three craters south of the road as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, but was not able to determine the direction of fire. Aerial imagery available to the SMM spotted on 22 November ten impacts in a field west of Bohdanivka, which were not spotted on 12 November.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines the SMM observed six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in government-controlled Zhelanne (36km north-west of Donetsk). Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed two multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm), one about 3km south and the other approximately 6km south-east of Bohdanivka on 22 November.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) each loaded on a transporter heading north-east near Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk); two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) each loaded on a trailer heading north, and one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and one tank (T-64) each loaded on a trailer  heading south near Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk). In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw nine stationary tanks (one T-64, two T-72 and six unknown model) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 12 towed-howitzers (D-20, 152mm), and four mortars (2B9, 82mm). The SMM noted as missing: 21 self-propelled howitzers (18 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm observed missing as of 14 March, and three 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm observed missing for the first time), and six anti-tank guns(D-44, 85mm observed missing as of 18 February).

At a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area, an armed man allowed the SMM to observe weapons only from a 15m distance*. The SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) but was not able to take their serial numbers. An armed man denied access to another “DPR” heavy weapons holding area.*

The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations correspond with the withdrawal lines. The SMM noted that two sites continued to be abandoned (one observed abandoned as of 9 December 2015 and another as of 14 March 2016) with the following weapons missing: 32 tanks (31 T-72 and one T-64), 18 mortars (12 2B9, 82mm and six 2B11, 120mm) and one anti-tank gun (D-44, 85mm).

The SMM revisited an “LPR” permanent storage site whose location corresponds with the withdrawal lines and noted that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft weapon in the security zone.[2] The SMM observed in government-controlled areas: six IFV (BMP) heading south near Krasnohorivka; two stationary IFVs (BMP-2) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); and one stationary IFV near Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area). Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed ten armoured vehicles near government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) on 19 November.

The SMM monitored the situation at schools near the contact line. At a school in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), upon arriving at 12:10 the SMM observed children and staff moving from classrooms to the school’s basement to take shelter along with those who already had. The director of the school told the SMM they decided to move children and staff after hearing strong explosions. While the SMM was present in the school, it heard six undetermined explosions 1-3km north-east. The SMM noted a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint 200m north from the school (see SMM Daily Report 1 November 2016). In government-controlled Krasnohorivka, the director of School no. 2 told the SMM that the school was temporarily closed as the heating system for the school has not worked since the beginning of the conflict in 2014 when the gas supply system was damaged. According to the interlocutor during the winter all children attending the school were relocated to School no. 5 which has a coal heating system.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At 08:00 at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed about more than 1,500 pedestrians waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and no queue in the opposite direction. At 09:16 at the government checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM saw 100-150 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas and about 40 pedestrians waiting to walk in the opposite direction.

The SMM monitored repairs, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre of Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), to the water pipe in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (32km north of Luhansk). The SMM saw some ten employees of a water company working. The SMM also monitored repair works on power lines in Svitlodarsk.

The SMM monitored two border areas currently not under government control. While present at the border crossing point in Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for half an hour, the SMM observed one trailer cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates), five civilian cars (four with Ukrainian licence plates and one with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine. At the pedestrian border crossing point in Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) during its one-hour observation the SMM observed three women (aged 30-55) crossing  into Ukraine and two women (aged 37 and 46) exiting Ukraine.

On the evening of 21 November in Kyiv, the Mission continued to monitor a public gathering (see SMM Daily Report 22 November 2016). After 19:00 the SMM observed some 1,000 people (men and women different age groups) gathering on the Independence Square and several hundred law enforcement officers present nearby. The SMM also saw some people carrying flags of various political parties and movements: Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Black Committee, Right Sector, White Hammer, New Fire and the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People's Self-Defence. At around 19:30 the SMM saw some participants burning several tyres in the street. At 19:45 the SMM observed that some 1,000 participants started moving to the Lev Tolstoy square, where at around 20:15 some of them smashed the windows of the ground floor of a business building near the square and threw several burning torches inside. On the square the SMM noted more than one hundred special police officers in anti-riot gear, who did not intervene. Shortly after the SMM saw that several participants demolished the office of a bank on the square, and the police officers responded and cordoned off the building. Subsequently, participants dispersed and moved towards the Independence Square.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was not able to proceed further to the railway bridge south of Stanytsia Luhanska from the parking lot east of an “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, as it saw mine hazard signs and armed “LPR” members present at the checkpoint told the SMM that no demining had taken place in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At an “LPR” checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, the SMM was not able to access fields and areas other than roads located in the disengagement as armed “LPR” members present did not guarantee the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines or UXO in those areas. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was not able to travel further west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) as an armed “DPR” member present did not guarantee the security of the SMM and the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the JCCC did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM could not proceed on the road to Viktorivka (42km south of Donetsk) as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM and mines were still on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel on the road leading from government-controlled Popasna to government-controlled Katerynivka due to the presence of a wooden barrier with some concrete enforcement on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed across the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from either side to the other. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present at a checkpoint told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. Armed men at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge said the same. The SMM informed the JCCC.

-Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a compound near government-controlled Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol). The SMM informed the JCCC.

-An armed man denied the SMM access to a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area. The SMM informed the JCCC.

-At a “DPR” heavy weapon holding area, an armed man allowed the SMM to observe weapons only from 15m distance and the SMM was therefore unable to take the serial numbers. The SMM informed the JCCC.

-In “LPR”-controlled Shymshynivka armed men prevented the SMM from proceeding to a training area citing an ongoing live-fire exercise. While the SMM present at the village, it heard explosions (see above). The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.   

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.