Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 10 November 2016

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period; however, the overall level of explosions remained high with over 800 and 200 in both regions, respectively. The Mission followed up on reports of damage from shelling in a residential area of government-controlled Troitske and an industrial area of “LPR”-controlled Almazna. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote, and Petrivske, and faced restriction of its freedom of movement in all three areas.* At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM followed up on reports of gunfire forcing civilians to take cover. A soldier handled a grenade without the safety pin in the presence of the SMM in Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM monitored the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In Luhansk region, the Mission visited one border area currently not under government control.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including approximately 870 explosions compared with more than 2,000 during the previous reporting period. While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, on the night of 9-10 November, the SMM heard 160 undetermined explosions 6-15km north-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), on the night of 9 November, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-3km south-east and south-south-east. During the day of 10 November, the SMM heard 244 explosions (42 undetermined, 65 undetermined assessed as mortar rounds 2-5km south-east, 129 assessed as impacts of mortar rounds 2-3km south-east, and eight assessed as outgoing infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) cannon fire (73mm) 2-3km south-east), 18 bursts of anti-aircraft fire (23mm), and bursts of heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-5km east, south-east, and south.

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), on the night of 9 November, the SMM heard 47 undetermined explosions and bursts of small-arms fire 3-10km, west, north-west, west-north-west, and north-north-west. During the day of 10 November, the SMM also heard 74 explosions (35 undetermined and 39 assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (122mm)), 29 bursts of anti-aircraft gun fire (23mm), 32 bursts of IFV (BMP-2) cannon fire (30mm), and multiple bursts of heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire 4-10km south-west, west-south-west, and west.

The SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) during the night of 9-10 November, recorded 44 explosions (37 undetermined and nine assessed as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons) and seven projectiles in flight from west to east, all from undetermined weapons, 4-6km east-south-east. Positioned in Avdiivka during three hours during the day on 10 November, the SMM heard 18 explosions (four undetermined, two outgoing and four impacts assessed as mortar rounds (120mm), five outgoing and one impact assessed as mortar rounds (82mm), and two outgoing assessed as IFV (BMP-1) cannon fire (73mm)), eight shots of IFV (BMP-2) cannon fire (30mm), and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-5km south, east, and south-east and five undetermined explosions 10km south and south-east. Also during the day, the SMM camera recorded four explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons and one illumination flare in flight from west to east, all 2-4km east and east-south-east.

The SMM camera in Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk) on the evening of 9 November recorded five projectiles in flight from west to east 10-13km north-east.

Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), during four hours, the SMM heard 174 undetermined explosions and multiple shots of small-arms fire and heard and saw one airburst,  3-10km south-south west, south-west, west, west-north-west, and north-north-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), during four hours, the SMM heard 55 explosions (44 undetermined and 11 assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 1-2km west), heard and saw one explosion assessed as an impact of an automatic grenade launcher round 1-2km west, heard multiple bursts and single shots of cannon, heavy-machine-gun, and small-arms fire 2-10km west-south-west, south, west, and south-west.

The situation north, east, and north-east of Mariupol remained volatile. The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), on the night of 9-10 November, recorded an exchange of fire that started with direct tracer fire from west to east and then the same from east to west (total from west to east was 596 and in the opposite direction 32), including eight explosions (four undetermined and four assessed as outgoing mortar rounds), all at unknown distances north-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk), during a ten-minute period, the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions at unknown distances west. Positioned in government-controlled Kalchyk (24km north of Mariupol), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10km west. Positioned in government-controlled Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions, bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and single shots of small-arms fire, all 1-10km south-east, east-south-east, south-south-east, south, and west-north-west. Positioned in government-controlled Orlivske (23km north-east of Mariupol), during a five-minute period, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and bursts of small-arms fire at undetermined distances south-east.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, including 225 explosions compared with approximately 700 during the previous reporting period. The majority was heard while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). On the night of 9 November, the SMM heard 128 explosions assessed as both impacts of and outgoing artillery fire 2-10km west. The highest intensity of fire was between 22:47 and 23:15 with 52 explosions recorded 2-5km west. Positioned on the outskirts of Kadiivka on 10 November, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 1-3km west.

Positioned on the “LPR”-controlled side of the Zolote/Pervomaisk disengagement area (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 50 undetermined explosions (15 assessed as mortar rounds (82mm), six assessed as mortar (120mm) or artillery rounds (122mm), 29 assessed as automatic grenade launcher rounds), bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and shots of small-arms fire 5km south-west. In the same location, during a three-minute period in the morning, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions assessed as mortar (120mm) or artillery rounds, (122mm) and bursts of heavy machine-gun fire 3km west outside the disengagement area.

Positioned north of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), during 30 minutes, the SMM heard 27 undetermined explosions 10-12km south-west. Positioned near “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10km west.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling damage in residential and industrial areas. Near the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two fresh impacts. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire or weapons used. The first impact was located about 15m from two houses on Ovsepiana Street, where the SMM saw broken windows and an external roof and wall damaged by shrapnel. The second impact was in an open field 60-70m from the houses. The checkpoint commander said their position had been shelled by mortars at 18:40 on 9 November. According to him, there were no civilian or military casualties. The SMM, accompanied by Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), visited the Ferro Alloy Plant 3km north of “LPR”-controlled Almazna (55km west of Luhansk). The SMM saw seven fresh impacts. Four shells had hit the area of the plant and three had hit the nearby water supply station. All impacts were assessed as caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from a north-westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. Contrary to the requirement of the TCG’s decision, the SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the three areas during the reporting period.

The SMM saw no disengagement activities in the Stanytsia Luhanska area. The Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC stated that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had received no order to start the disengagement process and no demining action would take place. Near the site of the SMM’s camera in Stanytsia Luhanska, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier, in the presence of an SMM patrol, was seen handling a hand grenade without its safety pin and then seen indicating that he was reinserting the pin as he walked away.

Early on the morning of 10 November, the SMM followed up on reports of gunfire at the pedestrian bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska. At approximately 06:00, upon arrival at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the checkpoint “commander” told the SMM that their positions and the bridge had come under fire from machine-guns and small arms around 05:00. The SMM spoke with three civilians (two female, one male, 60-65 years old) together outside the fortified “LPR” bunker at the foot of the bridge. They said they had been crossing the bridge but were forced to seek cover in the “LPR” bunker when they heard bullets striking the metal parts of the bridge. The SMM could not determine new bullet strikes due to the bridge’s damaged state. The SMM crossed the bridge and asked civilians coming from government-controlled areas about the incident. Several men and women (30-60 years old) separately said they had not heard anything because of the noise emitted by generators at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the north side of the bridge, which the SMM saw and heard operating. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the engagement started at 06:10 and lasted until 06:40.

Between 07:20 and 07:40, near the Prince Ihor monument, the SMM heard 95 shots of small-arms fire at an unknown distance north-east but assessed as inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. At 08:44, the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire at an unknown distance east, also assessed as inside the same disengagement area.

At the observation point immediately outside the Zolote disengagement area, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC said the situation in the area had been calm for the last 24 hours. While at the Zolote/Pervomaisk entry-exit checkpoint (closed to civilians), two armed “LPR” members told the SMM that the situation in the area had been calm for the last 24 hours. The SMM observed a calm situation in the area during its stay there. The SMM did not have full access to the area due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).

In Petrivske an armed “DPR” member said he did not have information on demining and requests should be made to his superiors. The SMM continued to note the absence of any JCCC officers in Petrivske. The SMM observed no ceasefire violations in Petrivske on 10 November. There was also no special military presence or movement noted, just the usual armed “DPR” members at the checkpoints. The SMM experienced a freedom of movement restriction due to the presence of mines as noted below.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside storage areas, the SMM recorded the serial numbers of one towed howitzer (D-30, 122mm) and six towed anti-tank guns (three MT-12 and three T-12 Rapira, 100mm) at a Ukrainian Armed Forces artillery unit in a forest near government-controlled Kremenivka (27km north-west of Mariupol). West of government-controlled Bakhmut (67km north of Donetsk), the SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces convoy, consisting of four flat-bed trailers carrying three tanks (T-72s) heading east.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. At Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed and recorded for the first time seven self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm). Also observed as present were the following previously recorded weapons: eight multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and 12 mortars (M120-15, 120mm). The SMM noted six previously recorded towed howitzers (D-20, 152 mm) as missing for the first time. The following weapons remain missing: 12 MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122 mm), and six towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 122mm).

The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations correspond with the withdrawal lines. The SMM observed 22 previously recorded tanks (12 T-72 and ten T-64) as missing, with two noted as such on 5 March, ten on 21 July, and ten on 10 November 2016. Also missing were four towed automatic mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm). The SMM also observed as present new weapons not previously recorded.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone.[2] In government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, on the H15 road south of Maksymilianivka (30km west of Donetsk), the SMM saw one military “ZIL” truck and one armoured personal carrier (APC; BTR-80) parked on the side of the road. In Luhansk region, the SMM observed one infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) stationary at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk). At the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-1) stationary in a bunker covered with a camouflage net.

The SMM visited one border area currently not under government control. At the border crossing point in Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), during 30 minutes of observation, the SMM saw 29 civilian vehicles (four with Russian Federation licence plates, the rest with Ukrainian licence plates) and two motorbikes queuing to enter the Russian Federation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), an armed “DPR” member told the SMM that he did not have information on demining and requests should be made to his superiors. The SMM noted there was no JCCC officer present in Petrivske. Due to the lack of security guarantees and potential mine threats, the SMM could not move westward from Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While north of the pedestrian bridge near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM was unable to proceed further south on a path leading towards the railway bridge due to the possible presence of mines. The SMM observed two mine warning signs on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• South of the pedestrian bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed a mine warning sign (“MINES. Do not enter” written in Russian) on the road leading south-east and close to the “LPR” checkpoint. An armed “LPR” member told the SMM that he could not guarantee its safety, as the road had not been demined and he did not know whether any demining action would be conducted. The SMM decided not to proceed further on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A group of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel (seven to eight) arrived in two vehicles at the observation point just outside the Zolote/Pervomaisk disengagement area and said they would use the point for their own purposes. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC was present at that location prior to the SMM arrival but did not intervene to resolve the situation.
• While stationary at the edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, the SMM asked the armed “LPR” member in charge of the “LPR” checkpoint whether the road leading to government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) had been cleared of mines and UXO. He said the road was passable by vehicle and it had been cleared of mines and UXO. He said he could not guarantee the security or safety of the SMM, due to the possible presence of mines or UXO in fields and other areas. The SMM did not consider it safe to enter any of those areas. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At 10:29, while at an observation point near government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard explosions south-west, in the area of Troitske village. The Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint personnel outside of Troitske advised the SMM not to continue to the village due to the recent shelling. The SMM decided not to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) bridge, the SMM told armed “LPR” members that it intended to proceed towards the bridge. They warned the SMM of the presence of anti-tank mines on the road. The SMM did not proceed towards the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in government-controlled Shchastia, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that there were land mines on the bridge. The SMM did not attempt to cross the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 6 November, the SMM was stopped at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint south of Vesnianka (155km south-east of Kherson) and denied access to proceed. The SMM asked the guard to pass so it could continue its patrol southwards over the dam, but the guard refused. After ten minutes, the company commander appeared and said he was under strict orders not to let any vehicle cross as both road shoulders on the dam were mined.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.