Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 12 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, with most concentrated in areas north-east and east of Mariupol and in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area. In Luhansk region the SMM also recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period, most of which occurred south-west of Katerynivka. It followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Krasnohorivka. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; the SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas. The SMM observed heavy weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines. It monitored one border area not under government control. The Mission monitored long queues of pedestrians at entry-exit checkpoints at Stanytsia Luhanska and the situation of internally displaced persons in Odessa.

The SMM recorded a higher number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including over 550 explosions compared with 355 explosions the previous reporting period. Over 500 explosions were recorded in areas north-east and east of Mariupol and some 34 explosions were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area.

During the night of 11-12 October, in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 32 airbursts and four explosions assessed as impacts, all caused by 82mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-west. While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-4km south-east.

On the same night, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded nine rocket-assisted projectiles (in sequence: six fired west to east, one south-west to north-east, one north-north-east to east and one north-north-east to north-east), all but one at an undetermined distance north-east and north-north-east.

The following day, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 33 explosions, all assessed as impacts of unknown projectiles at locations ranging from 4 to 6km east-south-east. The SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (“DPR”-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded one explosion assessed as an impact 3-4km north-east.

Positioned in areas north-east and east of Mariupol, the SMM recorded a total of over 500 explosions. Positioned in Zaichenko (“DPR”-controlled, 93km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard between 10:45 and 10:50 around 50 undetermined explosions assessed as caused by heavy weapons rounds at an undetermined distance south of its location. Between 10:35 and 10:58, the SMM heard 44 undetermined explosions all at locations ranging from 2 to 5km south-east and west. In the following two hours, the SMM heard over 100 undetermined explosions, mostly south and south-west. Around 14:00 the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions 5km south and south-west. Positioned in Sopyne (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol), within 40 minutes before noon the SMM heard 85 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 2 to 4km north and north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 18 explosions, compared with 15 during the previous reporting period. Positioned in government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk) (outside the disengagement area), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-7km east. Positioned in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk, outside the disengagement area), the SMM heard within ten minutes 17 undetermined explosions 2km south-south-west, assessed as occurring outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The JCCC, tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. As a result SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to monitor parts of them, including through the use of mini unmanned aerial vehicles.

On the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) again told the SMM the Ukrainian Armed Forces were ready to disengage once an order to do so was received. The SMM was not able to reach the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area) from either side of the contact line (on four separate occasions) or “LPR”-controlled areas south-west of the pedestrian bridge (inside the disengagement area) due to the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement).*

Positioned in three separate locations in and around the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM recorded one undetermined explosion (assessed as outside the disengagement area) (see above). Due to the lack of security guarantees that the area had been demined the SMM could not proceed through the potential Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route from either side.* In Zolote-4, the SMM saw an impact it assessed had been caused by a recoilless gun round (SPG) in the garden of a house, outside the disengagement area. The owner told the SMM the impact had occurred about 02:00 on the night of 11-12 October.

The SMM was not able to proceed from the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske towards the disengagement area as “DPR” members did not ensure safety and security for the SMM and the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM.* While in Petrivske, the SMM observed several armed “DPR” members walking around in the village (outside the disengagement area). In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM was not able to proceed east towards the disengagement area as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM because, according to him, mines on the road leading to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) had yet to be removed and he had no information on when that would happen.* 

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. On 11 October, at the morgue of the district hospital in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), the SMM saw the remains of a woman (about 40 years old) reportedly killed in the village. According to the doctor the victim died due to injuries sustained when a tracked military vehicle ran her over. A relative stated that the incident had occurred on the night of 7 October, while she, her son and the victim had dispersed after hearing the movement of tanks and other heavy vehicles as they were walking home.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: one self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk); one self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk); and two towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) being transported north near Makedonivka (16km north of Mariupol).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: 20 tanks and four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) being unloaded at a train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk), nine tanks loaded on military trucks in Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk), four surface-to-air missile systems (two 2S6 Tunguska, 220mm; and two 9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near Novoaidar and one surface-to-air missile launcher (9K33 Osa, 210mm) near Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk), in Novooleksandrivka (64km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw one static anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), in the yard of the former school.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) for the first time, which had previously been stored at a different holding area, as well as 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 12 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). The SMM noted for the first time that six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were missing and that one site had been abandoned, with 14 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) missing, six of which were last noted present on 28 September. The SMM also noted as missing: 36 anti-tank guns (30 MT-12 Rapira, 100mm; and six D-48, 85mm), 19 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), and 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm).* In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm).

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines and observed that 11 tanks (T-64) were missing, including two which were noted as missing for the first time, eight noted as missing since 18 July and one since 4 April.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two stationary armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR-3) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) and one stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) near Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area). In government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) the SMM observed three stationary IFVs (BMP-1).

Near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw a cargo train travelling east to west with 41 wagons (35 loaded with coal and six loaded with light-coloured boxes in partially visible wooden pallets). Later in the day, positioned 3km south-east of government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a cargo train with 42 wagons loaded with coal moving east to west.

The SMM observed a calm situation in the Novoazovsk border area currently not under government control (101km south-east of Donetsk) and saw seven covered cargo trucks (with Russian Federation licence plates) queuing to exit Ukraine.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At 09:00 at the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw 1,500 pedestrians queuing to travel in the direction of government-controlled areas. At the same time the SMM saw 25 pedestrians waiting to pass the checkpoint in the opposite direction. In the morning at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw some 200 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and a similar number queuing to travel in the opposite direction. The SMM continued to note no repairs being done to the wooden ramp at the collapsed part of the bridge, which remains in poor condition.

At a “DPR” checkpoint 3km north of Horlivka (“DPR”-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 54 civilian vehicles waiting to travel toward government-controlled areas at 15:00. The queue reduced to 31 vehicles by 16:30, half an hour before the closing time of the checkpoint. The SMM spoke with two men in the queue who said they were from Luhansk region. One of them emphasised that although Luhansk was only 20km away from his destination government-controlled Shchastia, he had had to drive almost 400km to complete the trip.

The SMM monitored the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs). On 11 and 12 October, the SMM continued to monitor the situation of IDPs still residing at the Kuialnyk sanatorium in Odessa city (see SMM Daily Report 6 October 2016). On 11 October, the SMM spoke to the facility manager, who said that there were currently 80 IDPs left at the building. He clarified that all utilities would be disconnected on 15 October and the SMM saw a notice to that effect at the sanatorium.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, on two separate occasions, the SMM was unable to proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area as the Russian Federation officer at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In government-controlled Bohdanivka, the SMM was not able to proceed east towards the disengagement area as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM because, according to him, mines on the road leading to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) had yet to be removed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed further from both sides of the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two separate occasions on the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska (inside the disengagement area) the presence of mines and mine hazard signs restricted SMM’s freedom of movement. The SMM was not able to proceed further to a summer cottage area (neighbouring to the railway bridge) as it continued to observe a mine hazard sign east of the parking lot near the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the bridge. On each occasion the SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two separate occasions on the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area the possible presence of mines and UXO impeded SMM’s attempt to reach the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area). While on foot patrol on Moskva Donbas Street the SMM was not able to proceed further to the railway bridge due to the presence of mines and contamination with UXO. On Donetska Street, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel advised the SMM not to proceed further to the railway bridge due to the presence of mines and booby-traps. The SMM also observed mine hazard signs. The SMM informed the JCCC. 
• At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia bridge the SMM could not proceed towards government-controlled areas as “LPR” members present on the spot informed the SMM that demining had not taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM was unable to proceed from the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the bridge towards the “LPR”-controlled side as the commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces engineering and demining unit present told the SMM that mines and UXO were present. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At 15:06, while heading to government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) from Katerynivka (60km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM encountered three Czech hedgehogs and a mine sign on the road. When approaching these obstacles, the SMM observed one armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier (approximately 50m beyond the hedgehogs) who signalled with his hand for the SMM to stop. The SMM informed the JCCC. (See SMM Daily Report 7 October 2016.)
• An armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access through the checkpoint 300m south of government-controlled Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk). He told the SMM it needed prior approval in order to visit the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer prevented for the second time the SMM’s entry at three heavy weapons holding areas, citing a requirement for an order from his superiors (see SMM Daily Report 14 September 2016).

Delay:

• On 11 October, armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM at the first “DPR” checkpoint near Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) saying that it had to first pass through another checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in “DPR”-controlled Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk) and return in order to be able to proceed towards Oleksandrivka. The SMM complied, but enquired with a “DPR” member at the second checkpoint about the rationale behind the forced 6km detour. He said he had received orders that all vehicles, including the SMM’s, were to follow this route. The SMM was delayed for 20 minutes. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Armed “DPR” members delayed the SMM for 27 minutes at a checkpoint near Verhknoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, “DPR”-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) asking to see the SMM’s patrol plan. The SMM did not comply and informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.