Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 29 September 2016

This report is for the general public and the media.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. It was restricted in its freedom of movement, including in the areas of Petrivske and Zolote. The SMM observed the presence of mines and saw demining being carried out. The SMM monitored the situation of civilians in areas near the contact line.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, with 198 explosions compared with the previous reporting period (144 explosions) [1]. All but ten of the 198 explosions were recorded in the area of Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport.

On the night of 28-29 September the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded ten undetermined explosions and 27 shots of tracer fire (in sequence: eight south to north, four north to south, 15 south to north) 3-6km east-south-east. During the day the camera recorded 70 undetermined explosions assessed as impacts 5-7km south-east of its position.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka, the SMM heard two outgoing explosions assessed as mortar (82mm) 3-4km north-north-east and three undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south-south-west. Positioned in DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 31 undetermined explosions, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-7km west and west-south-west. 

At a position approximately 2km east of government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 shots of small-arms fire at 09:47 and, at 09:58, and five bursts and three shots of small-arms fire at an undetermined distance south-south-west of its position. The SMM could not determine if the firing was from within the disengagement area.

While stationary near “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 68 undetermined explosions and hundreds of shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, heavy-machine-gun and anti-aircraft-gun fire (ZU-23mm) 2-10km north and west-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 222 explosions compared with six the previous day. Positioned at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge to government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions approximately 5km north-east (outside the disengagement area).

Whilst stationary in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM heard, between 13:06 and 13:48, five undetermined explosions 4-6km west, north-west, north-north-west, and north-east of its position. The SMM could not determine if the explosions were inside the disengagement area.

Positioned at an observation point near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint south-west of government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion approximately 8-10km south-west of its position and, a short time later, two undetermined explosions 5-7km south-west.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard a continuous intensive exchange of fire 7-10km west-south-west and west-north-west. The exchange involved around 100 explosions assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17), approximately 14 mortar explosions (six 82mm and eight 120mm), about eight explosions assessed as artillery (122mm) and uncountable bursts and shots from anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine-gun and small arms.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Malomykolaivka (36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 15 explosions 5-10km north-west and two explosions 10km north-east, assessed as artillery and tank fire. The SMM assessed the direction and estimated distance to be consistent with the location of the known training areas near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) and Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk), both outside of the security zone.

While 1km north of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard approximately 30 explosions approximately 10-12km west of its position and two explosions 8km north-west. From a position in “LPR”-controlled Obozne (18km north of Luhansk) the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions more than 10km north-east.

Positioned on the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed Pervomaisk-Zolote crossing route (58km west of Luhansk) (and disengagement area) the SMM observed a demining team thought to be from the “LPR”-controlled side. The SMM retreated to a safe distance 3km away and observed five detonations within the disengagement area in a 30-minute period.

The SMM continued to monitor and verify the disengagement process in the general areas of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), government-controlled Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), and “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September.

On the eastern side of Petrivske, the SMM saw one military-style truck with approximately ten armed “DPR” members heading west. On the western side of Petrivske the SMM observed a mine sign on a road heading south. The SMM saw armed “DPR” members using this road, some were walking while others travelled in a car; one armed “DPR” member carried a heavy machine-gun towards a barn in the area.

The SMM was prevented from travelling east from Bohdanivka to Petrivske due to the presence of mines on the road north of the disengagement area.* The SMM observed two rows of anti-tank mines: 27 mines and another ten mines 70m further east. Barbed wire traversed the road between the rows of mines. The Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM of their intention to demine the road in the coming days.

On the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed Pervomaisk-Zolote crossing route, the SMM observed construction of a new checkpoint within the disengagement area. At least 14 armed “LPR” members were present, along with cranes and tractors arranging concrete pillars.

The SMM observed seven unarmed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel unloading a URAL truck of its cargo of 4m-long wooden stumps in an area approximately 400m north-west of the railway bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, within the disengagement area. The SMM observed an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) near a house in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska inside the disengagement area and in violation of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed six tanks at the known training area in “LPR”-controlled Myrne.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and observed that 11 were missing, as first observed on 12 June. All nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) declared were missing, as first observed on 16 July.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone: an IFV (BMP-2) in the yard of a house in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside of the disengagement area; two armoured personnel carriers (one BTR-3 and one BTR-4) with a mounted heavy machine-gun (30mm) and two armoured vehicles (KOZAK) - one of which was mounted with a heavy machine-gun in government-controlled Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM observed the presence of mines and saw demining being carried out. The SMM observed mine signs and warning tape marking off a section of beach near Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol). Two lengths of fishing line protruded approximately 20m into the water. In the village the SMM saw an unattributed sign on a shop door that warned of the danger of approaching the coastline or entering the sea. The SMM observed a community meeting of approximately 100 residents of the area. Village council members complained about the presence of sea mines that they said posed a threat to residents. A letter from Anti-Terrorism Operation representatives was read which explained that the defence of the Mariupol coastline was made in response to threats from “DPR” members.

In “LPR”-controlled Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk), an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) observed an “LPR” demining team carry out three controlled detonations on anti-tank mines.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line. In Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), two women in their fifties told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces no longer allowed them to travel to government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). They also said that a group of eight residents of the village, who had travelled to Popasna two weeks ago, were still unable to return. The deputy head of civil-military administration in Popasna told the SMM that the passports of Novooleksandrivka residents had been collected and would be checked by the police, prior to the issuing of travel permits for residents. The SMM observed a covered military position in a government-controlled area less than 100m from houses in the village.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction to the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM could not proceed from “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk into the Zolote disengagement area because of the risks of mines and unexploded ordnance. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the SMM that the road between government-controlled parts of Zolote and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk was possibly contaminated with “explosive devices”. The SMM turned back and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from travelling east from Bohdanivka to Petrivske due to the possible presence of mines on the road north of the disengagement area.
• Anti-tank mines on the road near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) prevented the SMM from travelling further. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Two lines of anti-tank mines on the government-controlled side of the bridge near government-controlled Shchastia prevented the SMM from travelling further. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Armed “DPR” members at a checkpoint in Sosnivske (35km north-east of Mariupol) denied the SMM access to the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• Armed “DPR” members delayed the SMM for 19 minutes at a checkpoint in Prymorske (39km north-east of Mariupol) before allowing passage to the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members at a checkpoint in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) checked the trunks of SMM vehicles. The SMM was allowed to proceed after five minutes.