Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 28 September 2016

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 144 explosions, more than half of them recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area, compared with 187 explosions in the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including six explosions, compared with one single violation in the previous reporting period. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process near Stanytsia Luhanska, Petrivske, and Zolote, and it noted a relatively calm situation. The Mission was restricted nine times in its freedom of movement, including on both sides of the Shchastia bridge and in the disengagement areas near Petrivske-Bohdanivka and Zolote-Pervomaisk. It was also blocked by a crowd at a “DPR” checkpoint near Horlivka. The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor repair works in Luhansk region. The SMM monitored one border area not controlled by the Government. In Odessa the SMM continued to monitor the security situation surrounding the protest against the mayor and followed up on an alleged arson attack on one of the protestors’ tents.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 144 explosions compared with 187 explosions in the previous reporting period. More than half of the recorded explosions occurred in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area.

On 27 September, between 19:20 and 20:30, while in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 5-10km north-west of its location. At 20:28, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three explosions assessed as outgoing and one explosion assessed as impact 3-4km south-east of its location.

During the late night hours of 27 September, whilst in “DPR” controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard over the course of 11 minutes, 15 undetermined explosions 6-8km north-west and north-east of its location. The SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, within five minutes, six undetermined explosions 3-6km south-east of its location.

On 28 September, between 07:00 and 19:00, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 15 undetermined explosions, three airbursts, and five illumination flares 3-6km east-south-east and south-east of its location. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard over 60 undetermined explosions, accompanied by sporadic and sometimes intense shots and bursts of small-arms fire (nearly 500 ceasefire violations), as well as over 200 single shots assessed as 30mm cannon fire, at locations ranging from 2 to 5km north-west, west and west-south-west of its position.

At 10:34, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (8km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 2-4km south of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka, between 10:38 and 12:52, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km north-east and south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Bessarabka (85km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3km north-west. Between 13:00 and 13:15, positioned at “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 5-7km south-west assessed as occurring outside the Petrivske disengagement area.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, including six explosions compared with the previous reporting period (one single violation). Between 10:26 and 10:33, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Malomykolaivka (36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions assessed as live-fire exercise 5-7km north-west of its position, outside of the security zone.

The SMM continued to monitor and verify the disengagement process in the general areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), and Petrivske (“DPR”-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September.

In all three areas, the SMM noted a relatively calm situation, but faced a restriction of its freedom of movement inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and could not access the actual disengagement areas between Petrivske and Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and between Zolote and Pervomaisk (“LPR”-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk).*

Accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM visited the government position north-east of the railway bridge east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

At the “LPR” forward position north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, inside the disengagement area, the SMM observed fresh damage: wooden boxes with splinters, tyres shot through and holes in sand bags. The SMM observed fresh pieces of shrapnel and assessed the damages as caused by 30mm rounds fired from the north-west. An “LPR” armed member said that at 22:30 on 27 September, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had fired from the government-controlled forward position north of the bridge, located 300m away. On a location between the forward positions of “LPR” and Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM observed fresh damage to a concrete electrical pillar near the bridge; the SMM was not able to assess the cause of the damage since the pillar was broken too high up. 

Near the disengagement area around the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed two new “LPR” positions. South-east of the bridge the SMM observed a new “LPR” checkpoint manned by an “LPR” armed member who said that he was not authorized to permit the SMM to proceed further without permission from his superior.* Adjacent to the checkpoint the SMM observed a directional, anti-personnel mine (MON 90) armed and with a detonator connected. South of the bridge, the SMM observed a crane lifting concrete blocks, constructing what it assessed as a new position (a rectangular construction) on the west side of the road, supervised by an armed “LPR” member.

At the government checkpoint at the northern end of the closed crossing route near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM could not proceed to access the disengagement area due to the presence of concrete blocks on the road and the likely presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) along the road.* The Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC in charge of the disengagement area informed the SMM that there is a demining plan of the Zolote-Pervomaisk road, planned immediately after the establishment of a fortification for an observation point. He added that a Ukrainian Armed Forces engineering unit was ready to start construction of the fortification. Near an “LPR” checkpoint at the junction south of the "LPR"-controlled side of the Pervomaisk disengagement area the SMM observed two construction vehicles and eight unarmed “LPR” members cleaning the road leading to the crossing point. On the side of the road, the SMM observed a military-type truck parked with two armed “LPR” members inside. At the crossing point three armed “LPR” members told the SMM that after the removal of the concrete blocks (see SMM Daily 28 September) the demining team had not undertaken any actions and that the road was heavily mined.*

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as the SMM expressed its intention to proceed on the main road which leads west towards government-controlled Bohdanivka, the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC advised not to use the road to Bohdanivka citing the presence of anti-personnel mines placed on the tarmac and informed that he was unable to contact his Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC counterpart to assist in ensuring safe access. When the SMM reminded him that it was the responsibility of the sides to demine, a “DPR” member present, removed a mine-warning sign and threw it away, starting to walk ahead of the patrol towards Bohdanivka. After approximately 400m he and other armed “DPR” members present stopped and said they were afraid of the mines and warned the SMM not to continue.*

At the western edge of Petrivske the SMM conducted two mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights. The SMM observed a makeshift barricade featuring a mine sign blocking the road at the extreme western end of Petrivske, as well as at least two anti-tank mines on each side of the road 2-3m west of the barricade. At 20-30m west from the barricade and beyond the mines, the SMM saw a line of 12 small poles (30-50cm high) with a round object each, assessed as anti-personnel mines (POM-2), on the concrete road. Later, a local “commander” warned the SMM not to talk to his armed men, as this would be a violation of their rules. The SMM observed at least 14 armed “DPR” members in military-style clothes, including two snipers, walking up and down the road in Petrivske. The situation was calm. The SMM also conducted two UAV flights on the south eastern edge of the Petrivske disengagement area. Two kilometres south of “DPR”-controlled Styla (34km south of Donetsk), the SMM noted that previously reported tree-mounted mines had been removed (see SMM Daily 15 March).

At a government position east of Bohdanivka, the SMM requested assistance in ensuring security guarantees from the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer and the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC to proceed to the easterly forward position. The JCCC officer informed the SMM that it could not assist in ensuring its safety if it moved further along the road, and that Ukrainian Armed Forces claimed that they had discovered mines with anti-tamper devices on the road to “DPR”-controlled Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk).* The SMM flew its mini-UAV and the analysis of the images revealed three rows of anti-tank mines with eight mines in each row at the line of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position. A second flight also revealed concrete blocks in the middle of the road leading to Viktorivka from Bohdanivka (although the concrete blocks were not blocking the road). “DPR” positions were also observed inside the disengagement area, but their status could not be verified as abandoned or active.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM observed at least five mortars (120mm) in a field near “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south of Donetsk), as well as 120 armed “DPR” members carrying small arms and heavy machine-guns, assessed as taking part in a live-fire exercise, outside the security zone. In “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), in a known “LPR” training area, the SMM observed ten static tanks (T-64s).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed 15 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) noted for the first time, twelve self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and 11 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS, BM-21 Grad, 122mm). The SMM noted as missing 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm); 16 towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm); 13 MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT12 Rapira, 100mm) as previously noted; as well as 15 mortars (ten 2B11, 120mm; three BM37, 82mm; and two 2B9, 82mm), noted as missing on 22 July. The SMM observed that one site continued to be abandoned, as first noted on 26 February, with 12 MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The SMM observed a parked infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) near the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the bridge at government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, inside the disengagement area. At the government checkpoint north of the bridge Stanytsia Luhanska, inside the disengagement area, the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-1) covered from the top with camouflage on the side of the road.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mine hazard signs. On 27 September, in the north-western part of “DPR”-controlled Vuhlehirsk (49 north-east of Donetsk), the SMM noticed a warning sign painted on a concrete block, reading “mines” in Russian. The SMM did not observe any mines, UXO or any suspicious devices in the area.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works. In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM monitored, the water canal cleaning works at the Shchastia power plant.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 28 September at the government-controlled crossing point at Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 40 pedestrians and 40 cars queuing to exit government-controlled areas and 200 cars and 70 pedestrians waiting in queue to enter. At the last “DPR” checkpoint before the contact line near “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM was blocked by a group of protestors for almost two hours.*

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians travelling across the contact line at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. Between 08:35 and 10:00 at the first government checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM observed approximately 355 pedestrians queuing to exit government-controlled areas and approximately 280 pedestrians waiting to enter. At 07:30 at the first “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed approximately 1,200 pedestrians waiting to travel toward government-controlled areas. At 14:30 the SMM observed about 500 pedestrians waiting to walk towards government-controlled areas, and approximately 300 people waiting to travel in the opposite direction. During their observation period the SMM assessed that around 300 pedestrians per hour had passed through the “LPR” checkpoint towards government-controlled areas. 

The SMM monitored one border area not controlled by the Government. At the pedestrian border crossing point in Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) over 45 minutes the SMM observed eight pedestrians leaving and two pedestrians entering Ukraine.

In Odessa the SMM continued to monitor the security situation of the protest against the mayor and followed up on an alleged arson attack on one of the tents of the protestors. On 27 September the SMM observed how 15 men in camouflage uniforms (between 30-50 years old, known to the SMM to be Anti-Terrorism Operation veterans) and a Member of Parliament raise a second tent near the tent erected by protestors on 19 September in the square near the city hall (see SMM Daily Report 20 September). The Mission observed 30 riot police and 20 municipal guards on the scene, as well as 20 supporters of the mayor (25 -50 years old, 60 per cent men and 40 per cent women) quarrelling with the anti-mayor protesters; the SMM did not observe any physical violence. On 28 September a police officer informed the SMM that during the night of 27 September (at approximately 02:30) one of the two tents had been set on fire without causing any injuries, an unknown suspect had escaped the scene and a criminal procedure had been started. A known leader of the protest movement confirmed the incident to the SMM, and said that an inflammable liquid was poured from the opposite side of a fence separating the square from a port embankment, adding that the five men inside the tent when the incident occurred were unharmed.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• While in the disengagement area, at a new “LPR” checkpoint, approximately 1km south-east of the bridge to government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), one armed “LPR” member did not allow the SMM to proceed further stating that he was not authorized to grant access without permission from his superior.   
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM could not proceed west of the village, towards the disengagement area, due to the likely mine contamination. Armed “DPR” members told the SMM they could not guarantee its safety from the danger of mines and unexploded ordnance. A Ukrainian Armed Forces Officer at the JCCC failed to assist in ensuring the SMM’s security to proceed.
• While in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM was not able to reach the disengagement area of Petrivske. A Ukrainian Armed Forces Officer at the JCCC told the SMM that a Ukrainian Armed Forces patrol had discovered mines on the road to Petrivske, and he could not assist in ensuring guarantees for the SMM’s security to proceed.
• Near the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, at the government checkpoint at the northern end of the closed crossing route near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM could not proceed further to cross the contact line due to the presence of concrete blocks on the road. The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel informed the SMM about the likely presence of mines and UXO along the road. The SMM could not see any mines, but it observed some wires on the road and three mine signs along the road (manufactured, red with white text “mine” in Cyrillic). The SMM informed the JCCC.

• On two separate occasions, near the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, the SMM could not proceed from “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote further along the crossing route between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Zolote due to a likely presence of mines and UXO. The JCCC was informed on both occasions.
• At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), in order to cross from government-controlled area to “LPR”-controlled area, the SMM was accompanied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint commander and Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC, and had to stop at non-controlled zone due to the presence of two lines of anti-tank mines. The Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint commander stated that only a demining team could remove the mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “LPR”-controlled checkpoint south of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), while attempting to cross the bridge towards government-controlled area, two “LPR” armed members told the SMM that there were anti-tank mines on the road. When the SMM asked them to remove the mines so that the SMM could proceed, they replied that the mines had been laid by Ukrainian Armed Forces and that it was not their task to remove them. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel allowed the SMM to visit a heavy weapons holding area only on foot.

Delay:

• Between 16:50 and 18:40, at the last “DPR” checkpoint before the line of contact near “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM was surrounded by a crowd of around 40 people (majority of them women, with a man assessed as orchestrating the protest) and blocked their cars forming a barricade. “DPR” members at the checkpoint did not intervene.  The protestors initially demanded that the SMM escort them to the area between government and “DPR” checkpoints. Later, the protestors told the SMM they would block the SMM patrol and force it to spend the night at the checkpoint. The JCCC was informed and at 18:30 other “DPR” members arrived and dispersed the crowd.

Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.