Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 11 September 2016

This report is for media and the general public. 

The SMM recorded a sharp increase of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region on both 10 and 11 September, including 515 and 116 explosions respectively, compared with 36 explosions recorded in the previous period. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations on both 10 and 11 September and recorded one explosion on 11 September compared with four in the previous reporting period. The SMM conducted crater analysis. It observed mines and unexploded ordnance near populated areas. The Mission noted long queues at crossing routes and civilians between checkpoints after closure. The SMM monitored seven border areas not under government control. It encountered impediments to its freedom of movement on both sides of the contact line.

The SMM recorded the highest number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region on both 10 and 11 September since the re-commitment to the ceasefire for the start of the school year on 1 September. The SMM recorded 515 explosions on 10 September compared with 36 during the previous reporting period, and 116 explosions on 11 September. The highest number of ceasefire violations was again recorded in the areas of Avdiivka-Yasynuvata.

During the night of 10-11 September, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its location.

Positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) during the day on 10 September, the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 2-7km north-north-east, north-east and north-north-west of its position, as well as two bursts and two single shots of small-arms fire 3-4km north-north-east of its position.

During the evening hours of 9 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk) recorded nine bursts of direct tracer fire (three-five tracers each) from west to east and from east to west 5-7km east-south-east as well as three plumes of smoke and one illumination flare at locations 6-7km east-south-east of its location. Positioned in Avdiivka during the day on 10 September, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions, nine explosions and seven impacts assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, 13 explosions as well as one impact assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds, 19 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and eighteen single shots of small-arms fire 1-3km south-east of its location. While in Yasynuvata on the same day, the SMM heard at least 356 explosions assessed as caused by artillery and mortar rounds, 362 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire and at least 415 single shots of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 500m-6km west-south-west to west-north-west of its position. During the evening hours, the SMM camera in Avdiivka, recorded two explosions assessed as impacts, one outgoing projectile from west to east and 16 bursts of direct tracer fire from west to east 6-8km east-south-east, south-east and south of its location. Positioned in Avdiivka on 11 September, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions, 20 explosions assessed as caused by impacts, two explosions assessed as caused by impacts of 120mm mortar rounds, 19 bursts and 15 single shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at locations 2-8km north-east, east, south-east, south-south-east of its position. The same day, the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded 15 impact explosions 3-4km east-south-east of its location. Positioned in Yasynuvata the SMM heard at least 38 undetermined explosions, 45 bursts and at least 163 single shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-6km west and west-north-west of its position. On one occasion, for a five minute period, the SMM heard uncountable and overlapping bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km west of its position.

During the evening hours of 9 September, whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one burst of small-arms fire 3-4km south-east of its location. In the early morning hours of 10 September the SMM heard five bursts and 30 single shots of small-arms as well as three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-6km south-east of its location. On 11 September, the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an outgoing mortar round, three bursts of small-arms and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, 20 explosions assessed as caused by recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire, 20 explosions assessed as fire from automatic grenade launcher, and ten explosions assessed as outgoing infantry fighting vehicle cannon (IFV; BMP-1, 73mm) fire.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded approximately 30 undetermined explosions at an unknown distance to the east of the camera’s location on the evening of 8 September. Just under 15 minutes later, the camera recorded 11 rocket-assisted projectiles fired from the east to the east-south-east approximately 10km east of the camera’s location. The SMM assessed that the explosions and the projectiles were part of a live-fire exercise in violation of the ceasefire and of the March 2016 Trilateral Contact Group’s decision on the prohibition of live-fire exercises within the security zone. The SMM requested that a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) join the SMM on a visit to the site, but the officer declined, citing lack of permission from his chain of command. The JCCC officer said an amphibious exercise had taken place in the area. A civilian told the SMM that there had been a fire in a field and that “DPR” members had left the area after having fired weapons.

On the night of 10 September the SMM camera in Shyrokyne recorded 24 rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west to east, two of which were recorded exploding on impact and five undetermined explosions, all recorded at unknown distances north of the camera’s location. The camera also recorded three rocket-assisted projectiles fired from the south-west to the north-east 2-3km north-east of the camera’s location.

On 10 September, in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing and five explosions assessed as caused by impacts approximately 3km north and east-north-east of its position.

In the Luhansk region the SMM recorded no explosions on 10 September and one explosion on 11 September. On 10 September while near government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one burst of heavy-machine-gun fire approximately 1km east of its position. During the night of 10-11 September, whilst in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard a single undetermined explosion and ten bursts of machine-gun fire approximately 3-4km south-west of its location. Positioned approximately 1.8km north-west of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) on 11 September, the SMM heard a single shot of small-arms fire from a location 1-2km north-east of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis and observed damage to houses in the area of “DPR”-controlled Kruta Balka. The SMM observed seven fresh impacts, including two direct impacts on the east side of two different single-storey houses, shrapnel damages to the roof tiles and broken windows. The SMM observed two of the impacts in gardens located 7-10m from civilian residences. In two of the seven cases the SMM assessed the damage and impact as caused by 30mm rounds (BMP-2 cannon) fired from southerly and south-easterly directions. The SMM observed one piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in a garden. The SMM was accompanied by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer from the JCCC and noted the presence of three media representatives at the site during the SMM patrol. On highway MO3, approximately 1km south and south-east of the impact sites, the SMM observed fresh tracks of tracked vehicle.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines the SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system (9K22 Tunguska) near government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces area and observed two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa), including one observed for the first time. The SMM observed that two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles, aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. On 10 September, near “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (APC; MT-LB), and one IFV (BMP-1). Near “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol), the SMM saw one IFV (BMP) and two military-type trucks next to armed positions along the coast. In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two APCs (MT-LB), one on the back of a truck, and one IFV (BTR-80). On 10 September, in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-2) parked in the yard of one of the houses  near which the SMM has observed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel previously.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) near populated areas. On 9 September in “LPR”-controlled Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a piece of UXO on the road and also observed newly placed, improvised wooden mine warning signs with “MINES” written in red paint near the residential area. On 11 September, the SMM observed a piece of UXO assessed as rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-27) approximately 15-20 metres west side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge with the back and tail-fin visible above ground. In “LPR”-controlled Shovkova Protoka (30km south of Luhansk) the SMM continued to observe a piece of UXO in a field approximately 200m from the nearest houses. Two female residents complained to the SMM about the continued presence of the UXO. In “LPR”-controlled Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk), the SMM observed mine warning signs on both sides of the road and five anti-tank mines next to the road; one anti-tank mine did not have a fuse while the fuses of the other mines were not visible. At the same location, the SMM also saw an anti-personnel mine (OZM-72) with a tripwire leading to an alleged minefield. An “LPR” armed member told the SMM that the anti-tank mines did not have fuses, adding that there were anti-personnel mines placed beneath the anti-tank mines. In government-controlled Novobakhmutivka (29km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed at least three professionally manufactured signs featuring a red background, a white skull and crossbones symbol, and white lettering with “DANGER MINES” written in Ukrainian and English attached to barbed wire fencing surrounding a military compound. The compound is adjacent to garden plots being cultivated by residents of the village.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to essential infrastructure. On 9 September, the SMM monitored in government-controlled Orikhove (56km north-west of Luhansk) repairs to the railroad track. On 10 September, the SMM observed ongoing repairs to high-voltage power lines in “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5 (60km west of Luhansk) and repairs in the area of the power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at all entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the government checkpoint in Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk) on 10 September, the SMM observed 30 vehicles queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 180 vehicles and nearly 200 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. In the span of one hour, the SMM observed that 18 vehicles, four buses and one motorbike crossed the checkpoint into the government-controlled area, while 33 vehicles, four buses, and ten motorbikes crossed the checkpoint in the opposite direction. Near the “DPR” checkpoint north of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM spoke with civilians who said they had been trying to cross towards the government-controlled area since the early morning. The SMM observed 40 civilian cars between government and “DPR” checkpoints after 18:00 and notified the JCCC. On 11 September across the six entry-exit checkpoints between “DPR”-controlled Horlivka and government-controlled Zaitseve, the SMM observed 340 cars, 20 buses, 35 mini buses and 800 pedestrians traveling toward government-controlled areas and 200 cars, two buses, 24 mini-buses and 350 pedestrians traveling in the other direction. The SMM observed civilian cars passing through the “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka in the direction of the government checkpoint in Maiorsk after the closure of the checkpoint and notified the JCCC.

On 10 September, at the southernmost government checkpoint in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed 340 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 137 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. At the northernmost “LPR” checkpoint on the bridge, the SMM observed around 70 people waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and around 250 waiting to travel in the other direction. The SMM also observed an ambulance, 100 passenger cars and three minibuses in the parking lot next to the “LPR” checkpoint. The SMM observed a man (approximately 25 years old) carrying out improvised repairs to the broken wooden ramp used by pedestrians. He told the SMM that he had taken the wood and nails from the “LPR” checkpoint. The following day, at the government checkpoint, the SMM observed around 300 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas and 100 people waiting to travel in the other direction. At the “LPR” checkpoint, the SMM observed 200 people queued to enter government-controlled areas and 20 people waiting to travel in the other direction.

The SMM monitored seven border areas currently not under government control. On 9 September, the SMM visited the border crossing point in Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 80km south of Luhansk) and observed that access was blocked by one concrete electric pole laid across the road and did not observe signs of any traffic. On 10 September, at the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed ten civilian cars (three with Russian and seven with Ukrainian licence plates) waiting to enter the Russian Federation. While at the border crossing point in Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 69 civilian vehicles and seven cargo trucks queuing to cross into the Russian Federation. The breakdown of licence plates was 33 Ukrainian, 26 Russian and two Georgian as well as three vehicles with Transdniestrian plates and five vehicles with “DPR“plates. The SMM spoke to a man and woman in their twenties and two men in their forties, who said that they had been waiting in line for approximately five hours and were approximately 80 meters from the “customs area”. At the pedestrian border crossing point in Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed no civilians at the crossing point. On 11 September, at two border crossing points in Krasnodarskyi (58km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven and two pedestrians entering Ukraine and four and eight pedestrians crossing into the Russian Federation, respectively. On 11 September, the SMM observed low traffic at the border crossing point in Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) with only one civilian car traveling to the Russian Federation from Ukraine.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that they had to wait for their commander to arrive before giving the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area. The SMM notified the JCCC and after 27 minutes, the patrol left the site.

Conditional access:

• On 11 September near “LPR”-controlled Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk), two “LPR” members told the SMM not to proceed citing risks of mines. They also said that the SMM could not fly the UAV. The SMM notified the JCCC as well as representatives of the “LPR” and after one hour and five minutes, the SMM was granted access to a foot patrol on the condition of escort by an armed “LPR” member. The SMM proceeded under escort and performed a UAV flight.  

Delay:

• On 10 September, Ukrainian Armed Forces guards delayed the SMM from accessing a heavy weapons holding area for 23 minutes while waiting for the commander to arrive.
• On 11 September at a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Prymorske (39km north-east of Mariupol), armed “DPR” members delayed the SMM for 19 minutes. No reason was given for the delay; the SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint near government-controlled Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk), four Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel delayed the SMM for 25 minutes, citing lack of approval from their commander. The JCCC was informed.
• On 11 September at checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Pervomaiske (59km south of Donetsk), an armed “DPR” member told the SMM that he would not allow the SMM to pass, citing dangers of mines and live-fire training. After 16 minutes the armed “DPR” member told the SMM that he received instructions from his superior to allow the patrol to pass. The JCCC was informed.

Other impediments:

• On 10 September while flying a mini UAV in the area of “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM lost the control of it on two separate occasions. The loss of control was consistent with jamming.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.