Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 6 June 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to each of the previous two days, and noted a high number of ceasefire violations, including 266 explosions, in Luhansk region compared to none on 4 and 5 June. The SMM conducted crater analysis in government-controlled Krymske and at the “LPR” checkpoint on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. It continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential infrastructure in the Zolote-Pervomaisk area and in Veselohorivka. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The SMM monitored gatherings in Odessa. Its freedom of movement was restricted on four occasions on both sides of the contact line.

The week in Donetsk region started with a slightly higher number of recorded ceasefire violations[1] as compared to 4 and 5 June, concentrated around the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area, south of Svitlodarsk and in Oleksandrivka. 

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard, between 6:30 and 6:42, 25 undetermined explosions, 4-6km north-west of its position. Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard 42 explosions (39 undetermined explosions 3-8km north-north-east and three impacts 3-5km north-north-east of its position).

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard more than 200 undetermined explosions, and numerous bursts and single shots of heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire at locations from 1-6km ranging from south-west to north-north-west of its position. Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM, within one hour, recorded 37 undetermined explosions 4-8km east, south-east and south of its position.

During the night of 5 June, whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 85 explosions assessed as caused by artillery and mortar impacts, heard 53 explosions (13 assessed as caused by outgoing mortar rounds), and saw 11 tracers of cannon (BMP1 30mm) fire 1-8km south, south-west and west of its position. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM, between 22:10 and 22:30, heard 32 explosions assessed as caused by artillery impacts 15-17km north-north-west of its position. The following day, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM, between 16:00 and 17:18, heard 117 undetermined explosions, more than 400 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and 300 single shots of small-arms fire 2-4km west and west-north-west of its position.

In Luhansk region, the SMM observed a high number of ceasefire violations, with 266 explosions recorded during the night of 5 June in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) as compared to none on both 4 and 5 June, but fewer than on 3 June. Positioned there, the SMM heard, between 21:31 and 22:38, 266 explosions (105 assessed as caused by automatic grenade launcher fire or 30mm automatic-cannon fire, and 156 undetermined explosions), saw first 16 red tracers flying east to west, then four red tracers flying from west to east, and then another two white tracers flying south, 1.5-5km south-south-west and west of its position.

The SMM followed up on shelling at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge The SMM observed fresh impacts on the wall of the “LPR” checkpoint structure south of the bridge assessed as caused by automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) fire. The SMM also noted a fresh crater on the asphalt road 150m north of the bridge, in the area between the “LPR” and government checkpoints, which it assessed as caused by grenade launcher fire from a northerly direction. Some 4km south-east of government-controlled Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) that had been struck by a wire guided missile (9K113 Konkurs). The SMM traced the direction of the guiding wire in a south-south-easterly direction.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and noted at one site that all previously recorded weapons were present. Two other sites were abandoned as first observed on 4 April, with 16 tanks (T-64), and three mortars (two 2B9, 82mm; and one BM-37, 82mm) missing.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM continued to observe a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 27 May) on 4 June, and 15 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in "LPR"-controlled Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyk Luch) (54km south-west of Luhansk). Also in violation of the withdrawal lines, aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 5 June of what is assessed to be a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10 120mm) in “DPR”-controlled Korsun (31km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed eight towed artillery pieces (D-20, 152mm). The SMM noted as missing: eight towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm, with four missing since 2 April and four since 23 April); 25 self-propelled howitzers (seven 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm, observed missing since 14 March; and 18 2S1, 122mm); 18 anti-tank guns (six D-48, 85mm, observed missing since 19 February, and 12 MT-12, 100mm); and 12 mortars (2S3, 152mm).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk), one armoured combat vehicle (MTLB), one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23), and a light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a 50mm heavy machine-gun in Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), two armoured personnel carriers (APC; one BTR-60 and one BTR-4) in Komyshuvakha (68km west of Luhansk), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and an APC (BTR-60) in Nyzhnie.

The SMM continued to observe no progress in mine action and noted the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). At a potential crossing route in the Zolote-Pervomaisk area (60km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed no progress with the marking, fencing and mapping of the areas close to the potential crossing routes. The SMM observed that a 2km zone in the “LPR”-controlled areas surrounding the Pervomaisk-Zolote road was still mined. Two “LPR” members prevented the SMM from proceeding further in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk), citing ongoing demining work in the area.*

In government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM facilitated a dialogue between a group of about 35 residents and the commander of a Ukrainian Armed Forces battalion aimed at providing mine awareness to the residents. The atmosphere was tense as the residents expressed frustration about booby traps in residential houses (see SMM Daily Report 26 May), the general security situation, and occupation of private houses by armed forces. Residents have expressed to the SMM concerns about the latter on several occasions; however, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel have previously denied SMM access to those areas claiming that they were mined. The residents welcomed the mine awareness session, but requested concrete actions to be taken to clear the mines.

The SMM continued to monitor queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line and noted a generally calm situation. At a government checkpoint in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM noted 260 civilian vehicles and 150 pedestrians queuing to travel to government-controlled areas and none waiting to travel in the opposite direction. At a government checkpoint in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM that the checkpoint had been closed from 6:05 to 12:05 because of a sniper reportedly operating in the early morning from a nearby five-storey building. At various instances at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM noted a maximum of 300 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 15 people queuing to walk in the opposite direction. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM saw some 100 people waiting to cross the bridge towards government-controlled areas.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works on essential infrastructure. The SMM saw that the gas pipeline repair in government-controlled Marinka was finished without interruption. Potentially, over 30,000 civilians and businesses in the area will benefit from this repair once the testing and inspection of the gas distribution station near the contact line is concluded. In government-controlled Obozne (18km north of Luhansk), the SMM facilitated and monitored the third day of ongoing electrical repairs.

The SMM monitored the 21st consecutive day of an around-the-clock protest by internally displaced persons (IDPs) in front of and inside the Odessa regional administration building, demanding housing close to the city, where they can have better work opportunities and access to medical care. The SMM observed ten IDPs (the majority women, aged 25-65) present. The SMM noted senior officials from the region meeting with the protesting IDPs. The acting head of the regional department of health and social protection told the SMM that the purpose of the meeting was to urge IDPs to enter into rental contracts with the two facilities used by IDPs as collective centres, and to inform them of alternative housing.

On 5 June, the SMM monitored the weekly commemoration of the 2 May 2014 events by anti-Maidan activities at Kulykove Pole in Odessa. The police had closed the main section of the square to all activists and the general public before the event, which they said was done to prevent clashes between the pro- and anti- Maidan activists. Beyond the police perimeter, the SMM observed 45 anti-Maidan activists (the majority women, aged 35-65) and also two pro-Maidan activists (a man and a woman, aged 35-40). The SMM noted 30 uniformed police officers in the area. The gathering passed off without incidents.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At a government-controlled checkpoint near Novotoshkivske (54km west of Luhansk) a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied passage to the SMM claiming that this checkpoint was not on the list of officially approved ones. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).
• Two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM from proceeding further in Veselohorivka, citing ongoing demining work.
• Armed “DPR” members continue to keep the power supply to SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected as they have been since 20 May. As a result, SMM remote monitoring equipment at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine and in government-controlled Avdiivka remained disabled (see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2016).

Delay:

• At a government checkpoint 1.5km from Kamianka (17km north of Donetsk), a soldier denied passage to the SMM, claiming that he had received orders to do so. The SMM informed the JCCC which, one hour after, facilitated access for the SMM.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.