Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 13 December 2015
This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM recorded ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk*. The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces sites in relation to the implementation of the Addendum of the Package of Measures. The SMM followed up on reports that an explosion had killed a prominent Cossack “Lugansk People’s Republic” member. The SMM observed civilians without public utilities on both sides of the contact line.
The SMM observed a number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk on 12 and 13 December[1]. Positioned at an observation point at the “Donetsk People’s Republic”(“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) between 9:00 and 15:00hrs on 12 December, the SMM heard a total of 12 undetermined explosions and sporadic bursts of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 3-6km west-north-west and north-north-west of its position. From the same location on 13 December, between 9:00 and 15:30hrs[2], the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions in areas 3-10km to the west, west-north-west, north-west and north of its position. During the same time period, the SMM also heard bursts of small-arms fire on seven occasions, at distances of 4-6km west, west-north-west, north-north-east and south of its position. On 12 December in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (38km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard some explosions, which according to both Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces representatives at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was an exchange of fire (involving small arms and light weapons, and possibly 120mm mortars) between “DPR”-controlled Shyroka Balka (33km north-east of Donetsk), and government-controlled Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk). On 12 December, the SMM heard 99 explosions in a 90-minute period when positioned in Novotroitske (67km north of Mariupol), in an area to the south-east. Also on 12 December, in government-controlled Starohnativka (53km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 32 explosions in an area 10km to the north.
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a total of four explosions and one burst of small-arms fire on 12 and 13 December.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. All previously recorded weapons were present. At one site, the SMM observed two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), which are covered not under the Addendum but the Package of Measures.
The SMM observed an Addendum-proscribed weapon in violation of its relevant withdrawal line: one mortar (120mm, M-38) being towed by a truck in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre.
In areas beyond the withdrawal lines – but outside storage sites – the SMM observed the following Addendum-related weapons: 17 tanks (T-64 and T-72) at a training area in the area of “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) and two tanks at a training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of measures. On 13 December the SMM received from the “DPR” a list of heavy weapons declared for withdrawal, as well as the coordinates of what was referred to as “temporary withdrawal locations”. Members of the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) had provided the SMM with an inventory of heavy weapons, their serial numbers and the locations at which they are said to be stored, as requested by the SMM. The Ukrainian military authorities had earlier provided an inventory list of weapons systems as well as their serial numbers, but not the locations to which the weapons are to be permanently withdrawn.
The SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.
In such Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas, the SMM observed: 23 howitzers (12 SG2C1 Gvozdika, 122mm, and 11 SG2C3 Akatsyia, 152mm); 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM21 Grad, 122mm); and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). In one of these areas, the SMM observed also Addendum-related weapons: nine tanks (T-72).
In such “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed: eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm).
The SMM observed 14 self-propelled howitzers (Gvozdika, 122mm) at a training area near “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).
In “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on reports that an explosion had killed a prominent Cossack “LPR” member in the town on 12 December. On 13 December, at the reported site of the explosion on the T0504 road, the SMM observed signs of an explosion, scattered vehicle parts and blood stains on the road. A civilian at the scene told the SMM that he had seen a vehicle burning at the location the previous afternoon. On 13 December a man in Pervomaisk told the SMM that as a result of the explosion, the curfew in the town now lasts from 17:00 to 6:00hrs (it had previously covered 21:00 to 5:00hrs). According to him, since the night before, there were more armed men on the streets checking identity documents.
On the government-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) on 13 December, the SMM spoke to a resident of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk). He told the SMM that “LPR” members had refused to allow him to cross from an “LPR”-controlled checkpoint near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) to government-controlled areas that morning, necessitating a longer journey to cross the contact line. According to the interlocutor, “LPR” members had told him that the crossing had been closed (the interlocutor did not know upon whose order) following the death of the prominent Cossack “LPR” member that reportedly occurred on 12 December.
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the water pipeline between “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (38km north-east of Donetsk) and government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk). After demining works had begun, the Russian Federation Armed Forces JCCC officer informed the SMM that two persons carrying out demining had been injured when a booby trap had detonated. The SMM observed two persons with minor shrapnel injuries to their legs being transported to hospital No. 2 in Horlivka. The work was postponed as a result. According to the Russian Federation Armed Forces JCCC officer and the Chief Engineer of the company overseeing the repair works, the booby trap had recently been placed at the location.
In government-controlled Avdiivka (11km north of Donetsk), Ukrainian JCCC officers told the SMM that two soldiers were killed and seven injured when their armoured personnel carrier hit an improvised explosive device (fougasse) near government-controlled Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk) on 9 December. According to them, two additional unexploded improvised devices were later found in the area. The SMM could not verify this information.
At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (15km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed six anti-tank mines placed within the last week. Their presence was not marked and a recent covering of snow had made them difficult to see.
In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), the head of the civil-military administration told the SMM that there had been a specific operation in the area against what he referred to as “terrorists” on 11 December and that 85 people had been detained. One woman in the town told the SMM that police had entered her house, checked her phone contacts, asked some questions and left. Other civilians said that they had seen people being arrested.
On both sides of the contact line, the SMM observed civilians suffering without public utilities. At the headquarters of the civil-military administration in Krasnohorivka, the SMM observed approximately 50 civilians (mainly pensioners) angrily demonstrating about having no electricity. According to them, they had been without electricity since the main power line supplying the city was damaged by shelling on 5 December. In “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), some local residents complained that they did not have any city heating despite paying the “municipality” for it. Residents in Debaltseve also said that they had endured water cuts (between 05:00-10:00hrs and 17:00-23:00hrs), which one resident attributed to shelling damage sustained by the water pipeline between Yenakiieve and Debaltseve.
A representative of the “mayor” in “LPR”-controlled Heorhiivka (16km south of Luhansk) told the SMM out of the 350 village houses damaged during fighting between July and September 2014, only approximately 10% had been rebuilt by “LPR” “authorities”. The SMM observed some of the rebuilt houses.
The SMM monitored trucks transporting coal at border crossing points in areas not controlled by the Government. On 12 December, the SMM observed 124 civilian trucks (most of them loaded with coal, all with Ukrainian plates) and eight civilian vehicles (two with Russian Federation plates) at the Marynivka crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), waiting to cross. At the same location on 13 December, the SMM observed 106 civilian trucks loaded with coal (all with Ukrainian plates) and 26 civilian cars (all with Ukrainian plates). One truck driver, who told the SMM that he had been waiting 24 hours to cross, said the price of coal in the Russian Federation is approximately 6,000 Rubles a tonne - double the price in “DPR”-controlled areas.
On 12 and 13 December, the SMM observed a decrease in the number of activists in the vicinity of the Kalanchak and Chaplynka crossing points at the administrative boundary line with Crimea, compared with previous days and weeks. The SMM did not see any Right Sector (Pravyi Sektor) members at these locations; some of the activists who remained told the SMM that Right Sector had left on 11 December. The roadblock located 10km north of the Chaplynka crossing point - previously staffed by dozens of activists - was deserted, as was the site of damaged electric pylons near the town. Near the village of Chonhar, the SMM saw two Crimean Tatars at the site of the downed electricity pylons, and Crimean Tatars and “Azov Civil Corps” members at the Chonhar roadblock.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.
Denial of access:
- On 12 December, “DPR” members stopped the SMM at the checkpoint at the southern entrance to “DPR”-controlled Prymorske (39km north-east of Mariupol) and denied further travel due to what they said was a volatile security situation. “DPR” members occasionally pointed their assault rifles at SMM vehicles.
- On 13 December, “DPR” members denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint at the southern entrance to “DPR”-controlled Prymorske (39km north-east of Mariupol) stating that they had clear instructions from their “commander” not to allow SMM to pass due to what they said was a volatile security situation. They said they could not guarantee the safety of the SMM in the area. The SMM did observe that civilian vehicles were allowed to proceed.
- A barrier across the road at the northern entrance to Shyrokyne (20km west of Donetsk) prevented the SMM from travelling further.
Conditional:
- Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel recorded the personal details of SMM members at checkpoints in government-controlled Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol) and Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol), after which the SMM was allowed to proceed.
Delay:
- “DPR” members delayed the SMM for 33 minutes, without explanation, at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol).
- “DPR” members delayed the SMM at a checkpoint north of “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) for 29 minutes.
- A “DPR” member at a heavy weapons holding area told the SMM that only one monitor could enter the site. After the SMM explained that this was a freedom of movement restriction, the “DPR” member called his “commander”. After speaking to him, the “DPR” member allowed all SMM monitors to enter.
- “LPR” members stopped the SMM at a checkpoint between “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (54km south-east of Luhansk) and Krasnodon (44km south-east of Luhansk), and asked for the Russian-language version of its patrol plan. The SMM patrol was allowed to proceed after ten minutes.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] All times in this report refer to the Eastern Europe time zone.